호세 알바레스 훈코 “스페인 군·경, 과거사 청산 거리낌 없어”

[인터뷰] 스페인판 ‘과거사법’ 제정 참여 호세 알바레스 훈코 교수


스페인 의회는 지난해 말 ‘역사적 기억법’이란 추상적 명칭의 법을 통과시켰다. 이 법은 스페인 내란과 프랑코 장기독재 체제에서 있었던 불행한 과거사를 정리하기 위한 법이다. 법의 뼈대는 △내전과 독재 치하에서 있었던 사법판결의 정당성 부정 △프랑코 독재 상징물의 철거 △희생자 유족에 대한 금전 보상 △방치된 희생자 주검 발굴 △내란 관련 문서보관소 설치 등이다.

스페인 내전은 20세기 전반 유럽을 강타한 대표적 비극의 하나다. 1936년 프랑코 장군이 이끄는 군부의 반란으로 시작된 내전은 거의 3년에 걸친 유혈참극을 거쳐 반란군의 승리로 종결됐지만, 피카소의 그림 ‘게르니카’가 상징하듯 양쪽에서 수십만명이 숨지고 수백만이 국외 망명을 택하는 등 엄청난 비극을 남겼다.

마드리드에 있는 콤플루텐세 대학의 호세 알바레스 훈코 교수가 진실화해위원회 초청으로 잠시 서울을 방문했다. 스페인 근현대사의 권위자이며, 소르본·하버드·파도바 대학 등 구미의 여러 대학에서 강의를 했던 그는 대통령부 정치헌법학센터 소장 자격으로 역사적 기억법 제정에 깊이 관여했던 인물이다. 자신의 학문을 정치학 절반, 역사학 절반이라고 설명하는 그를 9월30일 만나 스페인 과거청산 작업 전반에 대한 견해를 들었다.

먼저 내란이 시작된 지 70여년이 지나서 뒤늦게 법이 제정된 이유부터 물었다. 훈코 교수는 프랑코가 숨진 1975년까지는 문제를 거론하는 것 자체가 불가능했다고 전제하고, 프랑코 사후에도 취약한 민주주의를 뿌리내리기 위해 보복을 해서는 안 된다는 불문의 사회적 합의가 있었기 때문이라고 설명했다. 군부 등 보수세력을 자극하지 않으려고 프랑코 체제의 상징물도 일체 제거하지 않고, 내전 당시의 잔인한 범죄행위에 대해서도 형사적 책임을 묻지 않는 사면법이 정치권의 합의로 77년 제정됐다.

내전의 깊은 상처를 직시하기를 기피한 스페인의 이런 풍토는 2004년 총선에서 당시 44살의 사파테로가 이끄는 사회당이 승리하면서 깨졌다. 사파테로는 취임 직후 자신의 선거공약의 하나인 과거사 정리를 실현하기 위해 정부 합동위원회를 구성하고 2006년 법안을 의회에 제출했다. 보수 야당인 국민당, 가톨릭교회, 보수 언론은 사파테로가 오랜 상처를 다시 건드려 국민을 불안하게 하는 과거 회귀적 정책을 취하고 있다고 거세게 반발했다.

하지만 보수진영의 반대에도 불구하고 법안은 작년 10월 하원, 12월에는 상원을 통과해 발효됐다. 훈코 교수는 상황이 달라진 배경을 세 가지 요소로 풀이했다. 첫째 과도 이행기에는 민주주의가 취약했고 심지어 1981년에는 심각한 쿠데타 기도까지 있었지만 지금은 민주주의가 제도적으로 공고화됐다. 둘째 경제발전이 계속돼 삶의 수준이 훨씬 나아졌다. 셋째 내전 체험자들의 ‘손자 세대’ 등장이다. 훈코 교수 같은 ‘아들 세대’는 내전의 참혹함에 대한 얘기를 많이 듣고 자라 무엇보다도 그런 역사가 되풀이되는 것을 막는 데 우선순위를 두었지만, 현재 30~40대의 손자세대는 아무 두려움 없이 옳다고 생각하는 것을 한다는 것이다.

그렇다고 스페인의 일반 대중이 과거사 정리 작업에 높은 관심을 보이는 것은 아니다. 훈코 교수는 법안이 스페인 사회에서 강력한 반대도 없었고 열렬한 지지도 없이 통과됐다는 점을 인정했다. 국민당과 가톨릭교회는 법의 내용이 애초 예상했던 것보다 온건한 것으로 채워지자 통과 후에는 무시하는 전략을 취하고 있다. 올해 3월 치러진 총선에서 야당은 이 법을 쟁점으로 삼지 않았다. 그런 점에서 법의 취지에 대해 어느 정도 국민적 공감대가 형성됐다고 말할 수도 있다.

우리의 과거사 정리 작업과 대조되는 것은 군부와 경찰이 적극적으로 법의 취지에 협조를 한다는 점이다. 스페인 군대는 프랑코 시절의 군부와 아무 상관이 없다. 징병제는 폐지됐고 모두 직업군인으로 구성돼 있다. 군인들이 하는 유일한 일은 유엔 평화유지 사업에 참여해 유럽의 다른 군대와 협력하며 민주적 풍토를 배우는 것이다. 내전 시절 엄청난 잔혹행위를 저질렀던 경찰도 군부와 마찬가지로 완전히 민주화됐다. 이들은 내전 당시의 관련 자료를 아무 거리낌 없이 살라망카에 설치키로 한 문서보존소에 제출하고 있다고 한다.

스페인의 과거사 작업이 중남미와 남아공과 다른 점은 학살이나 잔혹행위 책임자를 정부 차원에서 조사하거나 형사소추하지 않는다는 점이다. 세월이 오래 경과돼 잔혹행위의 주역들이 실질적으로 모두 사망한데다 사면법을 일찍 제정했기 때문이다. 그렇다면 스페인에서 정의가 이뤄졌다고 할 수 있나? 이 물음에 훈코 교수는 물론 ‘아니다’라고 잘라 말했다. 정의가 범죄적 행위가 이뤄지기 전의 상태로 복원하는 것이라면 정의를 세울 수가 없다는 것이다. 대신 진실을 말할 수 있다고 내세웠다. ‘제한 없이’ 모든 진실을 아는 것이 신뢰를 갖는 최선의 비용이고 민주주의는 신뢰의 비용 위에 확립돼야 한다는 것이다.

그에게 한국의 과거사 규명 작업에 대한 조언을 부탁하자 짧은 일정에 실제로 본 것이 별로 없어 말하기가 매우 어렵다고 밝혔다. 3년 동안의 내전, 장기 독재체제 지속 등 스페인과 형식적 유사성이 있지만, 분단대치 상황이라는 특수성 때문에 자신이 예상했던 것보다 더 어려운 것 같다고 말했다. 그러면서 무엇보다도 숨기지 않고 모든 것을 밝히는 것이 중요하다고 강조했다.




훈코 교수는

●1942년생 ●콤플루텐세 대학에서 스페인 무정부주의 연구로 박사

●멕시코 하버드 소르본 옥스퍼드 대학교수 등 역임 ●현재 콤플루텐세 교수, 정치사상과 사회운동








글 김효순 대기자 hyoskim@hani.co.kr

사진 강재훈 기자 khan@hani.co.kr




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일문 일답


2007년 말 스페인 의회를 통과한 <역사적 기억법>의 제정 작업에 주요 역할을 한 호세 알바레스 훈코 교수가 9월30일 한겨레신문사를 방문해 김효순 대기자와 인터뷰를 했다. 다음은 일문일답이다.


김=첫 방한인가? 첫 인상은 어떤가?

훈코=서울 밖으로 나가지 못해 실제로 본 것이 별로 없다. 내가 예상했던 것보다 더 어려운 것 같다. 상황이 현재의 스페인보다 분명하지 않다. 프랑코 사후 프랑코의 군부가 그대로 남아있던 과도이행기 무렵과 비교할 수 있을 것 같다.


▷ 내전 끝났지만 프랑코 미국 지지받아 25년간 생존


김=대부분의 한국인에게 스페인은 낯설다

훈코=스페인은 16세기 유럽의 큰 대국이었지만 점차 세력이 약화됐다. 특히 1898년 미국과의 재앙적 전쟁에서 져 쿠바, 푸에르트로리코, 필리핀 등을 잃고 모두 위기를 느꼈다. 모두 근대화를 얘기했지만 생각이 달랐다. 한쪽에서는 세속국가, 가톨릭 교회의 비중 축소, 권력분산, 교육확대를 말했다. 다른 쪽에서는 16 ,17세기의 ‘대 스페인’으로 돌아가는 것 , 즉 가톨릭 교회의 권위를 강화하고 왕권을 중심으로 한 단결을 강조했다. 모든 사람들이 스페인의 재생이 필요하다고 동의했지만 방식을 달리 해석했다. 1930년대 들어 도시지역과 전통적 농촌지역의 긴장이 고조돼 내전으로 이어졌다. 내전은 잔혹했다. 왜냐하면 죽은 사람의 규모뿐만 아니라 죽임의 방식에서 그랬다. 다수의 희생자들은 암살되거나 한 밤중에 집에서 끌려나와 공동묘지 등에서 바로 처형됐다. 내전은 프랑코 장군의 반란군이 가톨릭 교회와 파시스트 당의 지지를 받아 이겼다. 프랑코 정권은 히틀러와 무솔리니 체제와 비슷했지만, 프랑코는 교활하고 신중해 2차 세계대전에서 살아남았다. 히틀러 무솔리니가 사라진 후 프랑코는 1945년부터 49년까지 고립됐으나 냉전의 시작과 함께 미국의 지지를 받았다. 그래서 프랑코 체제는 그가 사망하는 1975년까지 계속됐다. 그 25년 동안 스페인은 놀라운 경제발전을 이뤘다. 1인당 국민소득은 이탈리아와 비슷한 수준이 됐고 영국에도 크게 떨어지지 않았다. 이 경제적 성공이 프랑코 사후 민주주의로의 이행을 비교적 순조롭게 했다. 그의 사후 3년간 이행기가 있었고 1982년 처음으로 사회당이 집권에 성공했다. 민주주의가 공고화되고, 경제발전이 지속됐다. 이 시점에서 내란의 희생자들을 기억해야 할 때가 왔다고 생각한 사람들이 나타난 것이다.

김=내전 발생 이후 법 제정까지 70여년이 걸린 이유는 무엇인가?

훈코=프랑코 집권 40년간은 물론 가능하지 않았다. 그의 사후 민주주로의 이행기에는 어떤 불문의 합의가 이뤄졌다. 하나는 보복이 있어서는 안 된다는 것이다. 내전기간 중 프랑코 협력자중에 잔인한 행위가 많았지만 학살은 양쪽에 다 있었다. 또 하나는 프랑코 체제의 상징물을 제거해서는 안 된다는 것이다. 19세기 스페인 혁명이나 1930년대의 2공화국 때 주요 거리나 광장 이름을 바꾸는 상징적 조처가 있었다. 좌절감을 느낀 대중들이 국왕의 이름 대신 ‘자유광장’이나 ‘헌법 광장’이란 식으로 명명했다. 이행기에는 그런 상징적 변화를 추구하지 않고 실무적으로 했다. 내전기간 중 잔인한 범죄행위를 저지른 자에 대해서도 77년 10월 사면법이 제정됐다.

김=역사적 기억법의 건축자로 알려져 있는데 어떻게 관여하게 됐나?

훈코=내가 주도한 것이 아니고 위원회의 한 사람일 뿐이다. 나의 역할은 제한적이다. 단지 위원회 구성원 가운데 내가 유일한 역사가로서 내란과 2공화국 관련 부분에 조언을 했다.


▷ ‘스페인 아이들 보호 위해’ 소련·멕시코로 대피

김=위원회는 의회에서 구성한 것인가?

훈코=관련부처 고위관리들로 구성된 정부위원회이다. 당시 법적 조처의 정당성을 따지고 희생자 지원 조처 등을 다루기 위해 국방 재경 법무부서 등이 들어왔다. 외무부도 포함됐다. 이른바 ‘스페인 아이들’을 지원하기 위해서다. 당시 공화파의 어린이들을 보호하기 위해 외국 특히 소련 멕시코로 대피시켰다. 이들은 거기서 60~70년을 보냈다. 이제 아주 늙은 노인으로 돌아오는 것이다.

김=법 이름이 왜 역사적 기억인가? 스페인의 역사 맥락에서 특별한 의미를 갖는건가?

훈코=법 자체는 역사와 별로 상관이 없다. 역사적 기억법은 정식명칭이 아니다 저널리즘이 그렇게 붙인 것이다. 정식명칭은 아주 길어 <내전 및 독재기간 중 있었던 탄압과 폭력 피해자를 위한 권리 인정과 확대조처를 위한 법>이다. 기본적으로 내전 희생자들에 대한 법이다.

김=언론이 역사적 기억이라고 이름 붙인 이유가 따로 있나?

훈코=모르겠다. 하나의 유행이다. 정부조차 유행의 덫에 빠졌다. 새로 설치되는 ‘역사적 기억 문서보관소’에서 이름을 따왔을 수도 있으나 왜 그 이름을 고집해야 하는지 이유를 모르겠다. 역사적 기억이라면 과거에 일어난 모든 것이 해당된다.

김=이 법은 사파테로 총리에 의해 주도됐다. 그가 2004년 총선에서 승리했을 때 44살의 비교적 젊은 정치인이었다. 지난 30년과 비교해 어떤 변화가 있었길래 이 법이 통과됐나?


▷ ‘손자세대’ 진실 밝히는데 두려움 없어


훈코=많은 변화가 있었다. 무엇보다도 스페인의 민주주의가 공고화됐다. 70년대는 민주주의가 취약했고 심지어 81년에는 아주 심각한 쿠데타 기도까지 있었다. 당시 우리는 민주주의의 성공에 대해 자신을 가질 수 없었으나 이제는 달라졌다. 경제발전이 계속돼 이전보다 삶의 수준이 훨씬 나아졌다. 세대의 변화도 있었다. 지금의 30~40대는 내란 체험자들의 아들이 아니라 ‘손자 세대’이다. 그들은 파시스트에 대해 아무 두려움이 없다. 나 같은 ‘아들 세대’는 내란의 잔혹 처참한 양상에 대해 수많은 얘기를 듣고 자라, 그런 역사가 되풀이 되지 않도록 하는 것이 무엇보다 중요하다고 생각했다. 지금 손자 세대는 아무 두려움이 없이 옳다고 생각하는 것을 한다.

김=법 제정과정에서 많은 저항이 있었을 텐데 가톨릭 교회와 군부의 반응은 어떠했나?

훈코=가톨릭교회는 전반적으로 반대하는 자세였다. 사파테로는 2004년 총선에서 많은 것을 공약했는데 기본적으로 이 법은 공약 중에서 가장 늦게 실현된 것이다. 내용도 완화됐다. 법 제정과정에서 보수계 신문, 가톨릭교회, 보수정당인 국민당은 강력히 반대했다. 하지만 작년 말 법안이 통과된 이후 이들은 무시하는 태도를 취하고 있다. 2008년 3월 총선에서도 거의 쟁점으로 삼지 않았다.

김=그렇다면 이 법에 대해 국민적 공감대가 이뤄졌다고 말할 수 있나?

훈코=현 시점에서 어떤 공감대가 있다고 말할 수는 있겠다. 국민당은 이 법에 대해 얘기하려 하지 않는다. 기자들이 물어보면 법이 필요없다고 생각하지만, 관심이 없다는 식이다.

김=이해가 잘 안 된다. 법안 심의 때 국민당은 사파테로가 오랜 상처를 다시 벌린다고 비난했다. 미래를 바라보는 것이 아니라 과거 지향을 하고 있다고 비난했는데 정치 풍토에 무슨 변화가 생긴 거냐?

훈코=국민당은 당초 생각보다 법안이 과격하지 않다는 것을 이해했다. 국민당 전체라기보다는 당안의 일부 세력과 가톨릭의 일부 진영이 이 법의 제정 반대에 대단히 전투적이었다. 스페인 국민들에게 내란을 먼저 상기시킨 것은 가톨릭 교회이다. 교황 요한 바오로 2세가 당시 희생된 가톨릭 사제들을 성인으로 인정하는 시성 작업을 1990년대에 추진했다. 이 법 제정보다 훨씬 일찍 시작했다. 흥미롭게도 군부의 반대는 없었다. 군부는 극적으로 바뀌었으며 프랑코 시절의 군대와 아무 상관이 없다. 군부는 아무런 주저 없이 당시 내란과 관련된 모든 자료를 살라만카에 세우려고 하는 문서보존소에 보내고 있다. 스페인의 징병제 는 폐지됐고 군인들은 모두 직업군인이다. 그들이 하는 유일한 일은 유엔이 하는 평화유지 작전에 참가하는 것이다. 그들은 모두 영어를 하며 유럽의 다른 군대와 협력하기 때문에 많이 변했다. 당신이 군인들에게 프랑코에 관해 묻는다면 아무 상관이 없다는 답을 듣게 될 것이다. 군부는 전혀 문제가 아니다. 경찰도 마찬가지이다. 내전 기간중 그들은 엄청난 잔혹행위를 저질렀지만 그들도 모든 관련자료를 아무 문제 없이 제출하고 있다.


▷ 책임자 모두 사망…진상규명이 더 쉬워


김=군부독재를 경험한 중남미의 군부는 반동적 경향으로 알려져 있는데 스페인 군부가 그렇게 바뀐 이유는 뭔가?

훈코=중남미에서는 독재가 끝난 후 경과시간이 많이 지나지 않았다. 중남미의 군부독재는 70~80년대이고 스페인 내전은 30년대의 일이다. 70년 전의 일이라서 당시 군사적 정치적 책임을 질 사람은 현실적으로 모두 죽었다. 중남미에서 중요한 문제는 누구를 기소하느냐였지만 스페인에서는 그런 일이 없다. 모두 죽었으니까. 스페인의 과제는 무엇이 있었던지를 분명히 해서 진상을 알고 싶다는 것이다. 그래서 보다 용이한 일이다.

김=대표적 진보 신문 <엘파이스>조차 법 제정을 적극적으로 지지하지 않았다고 하는데 그 배경이 무엇인가?

훈코=스페인 일반 대중이 별로 흥미를 갖지 않았다는 증거이기도 하다. 위원회에서 무슨 일을 하는게 좋은지 여론 조사를 하면 유해발굴 등 그런 일에 관심이 없다는 쪽이 많다. 하지만 소수의 피해자단체들은 물론 대단히 관심이 많다.

김=법안이 대중의 열렬한 지지나 지원 없이 통과됐다는 것이 좀 이상하다

훈코=그렇다. 강력한 반대도 없었고 열렬한 지지도 없었다. 어떤 사람들은 사파테로의 개인적 공약이라고 주장한다. 왜냐 하면 그의 할아버지가 프랑코 세력에 의해 총살당했기 때문이라는 것이다. 진실을 말하면 사회당 정부 안에서도 이 법에 대해 열렬히 지지하지 않는 요소들이 있다.

김=당사자들이 모두 죽었다고 처벌을 요구하는 움직임도 전혀 없었던 건가?

훈코=죽었기 때문이기도 하지만 사법적 처벌을 하지 않는다는 합의가 있었다. 70년대에 모두가 동의했다.

김=그렇다면 스페인에서 정의가 이뤄졌다고 할 수 있나?

훈코=물론 아니다. 과거에는 아무도 정의라는 것을 들으려 하지 않았다. 정의라는 묭어는 과연 무엇을 의미하느냐? 정의가 범죄적 행위가 이뤄지기 전의 상태로 복원하는 것이라면 정의를 세울 수가 없다. 만일 당신의 아버지가 그 당시 죽었다면, 당신이 20년 동안 감옥에 수감돼 있었다면 그런 경우 정의가 실현될 수 있나? 유일하게 할 수 있는 것은 범죄자를 처벌하는 것인데 죽었으니 할 수가 없다. 정의를 말하기는 대단히 어려운 것이다. 우리는 그 대신 진실을 말할 수 있다. 우리는 무제한으로 모든 진실을 알고 싶다. 왜냐하면 아는 것이 우리 사이의 신뢰를 갖는 최선의 비용이다. 민주주의는 신뢰의 비용 위에 확립돼야 한다. 침묵이나 공포의 비용이 아니라.

김=희생자 유족들이 가장 원하는 것은 무엇이냐?

훈코=유해가 아직도 발굴되지 않았을 경우 찾아내 정중하게 매장하는 것, 그리고 공식으로 명예회복을 하는 것이다. 예를 들어 작은 마을에는 학살자의 손자들이 근처에 살고 있다. 그러면 모든 마을 사람들의 참가 하에 학살된 사람들이 양민이었다고, 그런 처참한 운명을 겪어서는 안 될 사람이었다는 사실을 선포하는 것이다. 그것이 기본이다.

김=유골이 발견되면 일반적으로 그 지역에 매장되나?

훈코=어떤 방식이든 유족이 원하는 식으로 한다. 어떤 가족들은 들판이건 어디건 발견된 장소에 그대로 안치하기를 희망한다. 기념비나 추모비와 함께. 어떤 가족들은 유골을 인수해 공동묘지에 매장한다. 유족들의 의지에 달려 있다.

김=혹시 국가 차원의 추도묘지를 건립할 계획은 없나?

훈코=없다. 프랑코는 자신의 주검이 안치되는 전몰자의 계곡에서 그런 계획을 실현하려고 했다. 일부 유족들의 반대에도 불구하고 내란에서 양쪽의 희생자 수천명을 매장했다. 우리는 전몰자의 계곡은 그대로 두되 정치적 행위는 못하게 하고 있다.

김=관련자료를 살라만카에 모은다고 하는데 그 도시가 내전과 어떤 연관이 있나?

훈코=불행히도 그렇다. 살라만카는 반란군의 수도였다. 프랑코 자신이 그곳에서 2~3년 살았다. 프랑코는 정당 노동조합 등에서 탈취한 모든 자료를 살라만카로 옮기도록 지시했다. 그는 좌파들의 모든 자료를 압수할 것을 바랬다. 의도는 좋지 않았지만 역사가들에게는 다행스럽게도 많은 자료가 보존된 셈이다. 반대로 좌파진영은 우파로부터 탈취한 모든 자료를 소각하고 건물도 불 태워버렸다. 그래서 내란문서보관소가 있었다. 자료를 다 모아서 역사적 기억 문서보관소를 설립해 통합하는 것이다.


▷ 피노체트 담당 판사, 실종·사망자 정보 공개 요구


김=법 통과 이후 실제로 이뤄진 구체적 변화는 무엇이 있나?

훈코=중요한 것은 없다.

김=상징적 변화란 의미인가?

훈코=프랑코의 동상이 2~3개 있는데 이미 철거됐거나 진행 중에 있다. 프랑코나 반군 세력의 이름이 부쳐진 거리 이름도 바뀌고 있다. 가장 중요한 것은 희생자 유골 발굴 작업에 진력하고 있는 ‘역사적 기억 회복협회’ 같은 단체들이 정보의 보조금을 받게 된 것이다. 또 중요한 변화는 지난 9월 발타사르 가르손 판사가 갑자기 내란과 프랑코 독재 치하에서 실종됐거나 살해된 모든 사람의 정보를 요구하는 결정을 내렸다. 가르손 판사는 가톨릭교회와 지방의회에 협조를 요청했다. 그는 인도주의에 대한 죄, 대량학살죄 협의를 걸 수 있을지를 검토하는 것 같다. 앞으로 어떻게 진전이 될지 현 시점에서는 모르겠다. 그는 칠레의 독재자 피노체트를 법정에 세우려 했던 판사이다.

김=역사적 기억법과 상관없는 독립적 행위인가?

훈코=직접 관련은 없다. 하지만 법 통과와 연관돼 전개되고 있는 발전이다. 대량학살죄는 양쪽이 다 해당될 수 있다. 단지 가톨릭교회에 속해 있다는 이유로, 또는 속하지 않았다는 이유만으로 죽은 사람들이 있다.

김=내전을 후세들에게 어떻게 가르칠 것인지 정치권에서 논의가 있나?

훈코=정부차원에서는 내전에 관한 공식적 책이 있기를 희망한다. 다른 한편으로 스페인의 교육제도는 중앙의 통제를 받지 않는다. 안달루시아, 카탈로니아 지방정부들은 각기 지방의 역사를 학교에서 가르치고 있다. 가톨릭계 학교들도 가톨릭 시점에서 역사를 가르친다. 정부의 영향은 제한적이다.


▷ 가르손 판사 ‘새로운 시도’ 따라 희생자 수 달라질 것


김=스페인에서 과거사 정리의 다음 단계는 무엇인가?

훈코=엄격히 말하면 오직 발타사르 가르손 판사의 새로운 시도에 달려 있다. 그가 성공하면 큰 변화가 있을 것이다. 내전 때 희생자들의 추정치 수도 달라질 가능성이 있다. 가르손 판사의 시도를 지원하는 방안을 검토할 것이다.

김=한국의 과거사 규명작업에 한 마디 조언을 한다면?

훈코=말하기가 매우 어렵다. 형식상 유사성은 있다. 3년간의 내전이 있었고 거의 40년에 이르는 독재체제가 있었다. 여전히 분단상황이고 북한의 독재체제가 있다. 강력한 정부, 보수적 정책을 지지하는 층들이 있다는 점을 들었다. 스페인과 다른 점이다. 내가 말하고 싶은 것은 진실은 감춰지지 않고 밝혀져야 한다는 것이다.


김효순 대기자 hyoskim@hani.co.kr

Government slashes welfare spending

Fears that the government’s sweeping tax cuts would significantly slash state expenditures on social welfare seem to have become a reality. The administration of President Lee Myung-bak, which is aiming to cut more than 20 trillion won (US$16.8 billion) in taxes by 2010, plans to limit social welfare spending in favor of spending on programs that will increase economic growth during Lee’s five-year term. Coupled with the recent tax cuts, which mainly benefit the upper class and wealthy property owners, the proposed cuts in the welfare budget are likely to widen the gap between rich and poor.


The administration’s budget proposal will shrink welfare spending in the coming year. The administration claims that spending on social welfare and public health will increase nine percent, or 6.05 trillion won, to 73.7 trillion won in 2009, outpacing the six percent increase in spending in the budget as a whole. However, some 5.28 trillion of the 6.05 trillion won increase is largely seen as being part of a natural increase in spending on existing systems. This includes spending on the national pension fund (2.41 trillion won), national health insurance benefits (656.6 billion won) and pension payments (874.9 billion won). Excluding these, only 777.9 billion won will be allocated to health and welfare by the Lee administration next year.


If the four state-run pension funds, such as the pension fund for ordinary people and public servants, are subtracted from the administration’s 2009 budget proposal, welfare spending increases by only 6.86 percent, which is below the 7.2 percent increase for the budget as a whole. Lee Tae-su, a professor at Hyundo University of Social Welfare, noted that the Lee administration had publicly announced a policy of “active welfare.” He said, however, that when he looked at the details of the budget proposal, it was difficult to find evidence that the government had been active in allocating funds to the welfare budget. He called it a retreat from welfare because the administration is maintaining current spending levels, which are still insufficient amid surging inflation.



The government’s plans to curb welfare spending will continue beyond 2010. According to a report released on September 30 by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, spending on social welfare will expand at an annual average rate of 8.4 percent between 2009 and 2012. However, if pension fund expenditures are subtracted, the growth rate would stand at 6.57 percent, a level similar to the overall annual increase in spending of 6.2 percent. Between 2005 and 2008, spending on social welfare, excluding pension funds, rose at an average annual growth rate of 9.28 percent.


Beginning next year, spending on childcare programs and programs for women, the family, the elderly, the young and the underprivileged will decline significantly. Spending on childcare, women and family affairs rose at an annual rate of 42 percent between 2005 and 2008, or from 700 billion won to 1.6 trillion won during that period. However, the government is now planning to increase welfare spending at an average annual rate of 9.5 percent between 2009 and 2012. While spending on the elderly, the young and the underprivileged had increased at an annual average rate of 31 percent between 2005 and 2008, that number will decrease to a rate of 14.1 percent over the next four years.


Kim Dong-geon, a professor at Dongseo University, said that the ratio of spending on the welfare budget to spending on the budget as a whole rose from some 18 percent in 1998 to some 28 percent in 2006, a total of 10 percentage points. Kim said that during the administration of former President Roh Moo-hyun, spending on childcare increased sharply and fiscal investment was reinforced to create social-service jobs, such as the approximately 110,000 jobs in the heath and welfare field that had been created as of August and the number of economically active women had risen accordingly, from 48.8 percent in 2000 to 50.2 percent last year. Kim said that the budget proposal expresses the administration’s desire to not add new welfare services and use only existing systems.

S. Korea and Russia agree to pursue natural gas pipeline

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev met at the Kremlin September 29 and agreed to jointly pursue a project that would bring Russian natural gas to Korea beginning in 2015. The two sides agreed to elevate bilateral relations to the level of a strategic cooperative partnership and issued a ten-point statement.


The countries’ two state gas companies, Korea Gas Corporation and Gazprom, signed a memorandum of understanding on Russia supplying Korea with natural gas in the presence of the two leaders. The document states that South Korea will import 7.5 tons of natural gas yearly for thirty years, and that prior to that, Korea Gas and Gazprom will undertake joint research of the construction of a gas pipeline that goes through North Korea. South Korea and Russia will seek the cooperation of North Korea in the future. The two countries will sign a final contract by 2010, and, starting around 2015, South Korea will be able to use natural gas supplied via the Korea-Russia gas pipeline.


The deal comes as the interests of the two nations converge at the point where South Korea needs stable natural gas and Russia wants to stimulate its Far Eastern economy by developing Eastern Siberian gas fields.



If the deal goes as planned, it would mean Korea imports 7.5 tons of natural gas a year from Russia, which by 2015 will be 20 percent of Korea’s total natural gas consumption.


Another expected effect of having gas arrive in Korea by pipeline would be that the price of gas would drop, as pumping it by pipeline over a distance under 3,000 kilometers is cheaper than transporting liquefied natural gas, or LNG, from overseas. The distance from Vladivostok to Busan is a mere 700 kilometers.


Critical to the whole project is the construction of a pipeline in North Korea and having gas actually pass through it. South Korean officials say Russia is going to actively work with North Korea on formulating an agreement and, since the North would enjoy more than US$100 million in transit charges a year, expect Pyongyang to agree to a deal. South Korea and Russia do have an alternative plan in place, one that would involve shipping it as LNG from Vladivostok, if they are unable to build the pipeline through North Korea as desired.


The two leaders also discussed connecting the Trans-Korean Railway and the Trans-Siberian Railway and the joint development of a port in the Russian Far East close to the area where China, North Korea and Russia share borders.

Shampoo Commercial?

Wreck Diving near Kyungpodae, East Coast, Korea
Sept. 21, 2008

Some said I looked like a hair-do model from a shampoo commercial. ^^

Roh criticizes Lee for not implementing October 4 declaration

» Former President Roh Moo-hyun greets participants of an international academic conference commemorating the first anniversary of the October 4, 2007, summit declaration at the Seoul Millennium Hilton on October 1.





Former President Roh Moo-hyun said October 1 that the summit declaration of October 4, 2007, is a statement that has almost no ideological political character and consists of practical, businesslike content, but that inter-Korean relations have become blocked once again as a result of the Lee Myung-bak administration not respecting this declaration. He also said that the Lee administration appears somewhat nervous of late in its scrambling to offer various proposals for the restoration of relations.


In a speech held at the Seoul Millennium Hilton on the afternoon of October 1 for the opening of an international academic conference sponsored by the preparation committee for the one-year anniversary of the October 4 declaration, Roh declared that as far as policy toward the North is concerned, “reciprocity” which has been emphasized by the Lee administration since its inauguration, is a term that has been used to pick fights regarding a policy of dialogue and cooperation and is nothing more than another word for confrontationalism.


He also directly criticized President Lee’s doctrine of rehabilitating the ROK-U.S. alliance, saying that if there is any intention of achieving real dialogue in the current situation between two Koreas, it is not necessary to heighten and emphasize the current level of rhetoric in relation to the ROK-U.S. alliance for Northern deterrence in the present situation. In particular, he stated that there are people who are putting a strong emphasis on the ROK-U.S. alliance and ideological cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan, who openly state that North Korea is the nation’s chief enemy, and who even openly raise the possibility of a preemptive strike on the North, and asked if this could be called a strategy for peaceful unification.



Roh went on to state that OPLAN 5029 included contents regarding the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces carrying out joint operations in the North Korean region at the time of a North Korean emergency, and was suggested to South Korea by the United States at the time of Roh’s administration, but was rejected by South Korea. Roh said that the plan was being broached once again by the Lee administration and he made his opposition clear, asking if it is worth risking damaging the trust of North Korea and China by enforcing this plan, which does not even have any basis in the ROK-U.S. defense pact.


The former president urged a shift in awareness from the government and the citizenry, asking whether it is pragmatism to emphasize the National Security Law, the alliance and liberal democratic values, and stating that if the government sincerely wishes to achieve unification it can concede part of its sovereignty, and must accept that concession is neither surrender nor an act benefiting the enemy.


Roh arrived at the Hilton Hotel, the site of the event, around 11:30 am that morning together with his wife, Kwon Yang-sook. Following his departure from office on February 25, he returned to his hometown of Bongha Village in Gimhae, South Gyeongsang Province, and this event marks his first visit to Seoul in more than seven months. Prior to the formal event at 6:00 pm, the former president had an audience at the hotel with formal and special attendants who had participated in the 2007 inter-Korean summit, and citizens supporting Roh gathered at the entrance of the hotel and welcomed him, waving banners and yellow balloons.


Over 350 high-ranking individuals from the Roh administration participated in the event, including ministers who visited the North as members of the retinue at the summit; representatives of the financial world; civic and social groups; prominent figures in the worlds of culture, art, and religion; and former prime ministers Lee Hae-chan and Han Myeong-sook. Congratulatory addresses were given by the Democratic Party’s Chung Sye-kyun, the Democratic Labor Party’s Kang Ki-kab, and the Renewal of Korea Party’s Moon Kook-hyun, while UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sent a congratulatory video. Former President Roh is staying overnight in Seoul and will return to Bongha Village after speaking at the academic conference to be held today.


Please direct questions or comments to [englishhani@hani.co.kr]

Greetings from DownUnder!

In U.N. Speech, Bush Highlights Fight Against Violence, Terrorism

September 23, 2008, 1:40 pm

In his eighth and final speech to the U.N. General Assembly, President George W. Bush said the international community must stand firm against the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. He said that despite past disagreements over the U.S.-led war in Iraq, members of the U.N. must unite to help the struggling democracy succeed. And he scolded Russia for invading neighboring Georgia, calling it a violation of the U.N. charter. Here, the full text of his address.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Secretary General, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen: I’m pleased to be here to address the General Assembly.

Sixty-three years ago, representatives from around the world gathered in San Francisco to complete the founding of the Charter of the United Nations. They met in the shadow of a devastating war, with grave new dangers on the horizon. They agreed on a historic pledge: “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, and unite their strength to maintain international peace and security.”

This noble pledge has endured trying hours in the United Nations’ history, and it still guides our work today. Yet the ideals of the Charter are now facing a challenge as serious as any since the U.N.’s founding — a global movement of violent extremists. By deliberately murdering the innocent to advance their aims, these extremists defy the fundamental principles of international order. They show contempt for all who respect life and value human dignity. They reject the words of the Bible, the Koran, the Torah, or any standard of conscience or morality. They imperil the values of justice and human rights that gave birth to the United Nations — values that have fueled an unprecedented expansion of freedom across the world.

To uphold the words of the Charter in the face of this challenge, every nation in this chamber has responsibilities. As sovereign states, we have an obligation to govern responsibly, and solve problems before they spill across borders. We have an obligation to prevent our territory from being used as a sanctuary for terrorism and proliferation and human trafficking and organized crime. We have an obligation to respect the rights and respond to the needs of our people.

Multilateral organizations have responsibilities. For eight years, the nations in this assembly have worked together to confront the extremist threat. We witnessed successes and setbacks, and through it all a clear lesson has emerged: The United Nations and other multilateral organizations are needed more urgently than ever. To be successful, we must be focused and resolute and effective. Instead of only passing resolutions decrying terrorist attacks after they occur, we must cooperate more closely to keep terrorist attacks from happening in the first place. Instead of treating all forms of government as equally tolerable, we must actively challenge the conditions of tyranny and despair that allow terror and extremism to thrive. By acting together to meet the fundamental challenge of our time, we can lead toward a world that is more secure, and more prosperous, and more hopeful.

In the decades ahead, the United Nations and other multilateral organizations must continually confront terror. This mission requires clarity of vision. We must see the terrorists for what they are: ruthless extremists who exploit the desperate, subvert the tenets of a great religion, and seek to impose their will on as many people as possible. Some suggest that these men would pose less of a threat if we’d only leave them alone. Yet their leaders make clear that no concession could ever satisfy their ambitions. Bringing the terrorists to justice does not create terrorism — it’s the best way to protect our people.


Multilateral organizations must respond by taking an unequivocal moral stand against terrorism. No cause can justify the deliberate taking of innocent human life — and the international community is nearing universal agreement on this truth. The vast majority of nations in this assembly now agree that tactics like suicide bombing, hostage-taking and hijacking are never legitimate. The Security Council has passed resolutions declaring terror unlawful and requiring all nations to crack down on terrorist financing. And earlier this month, the Secretary General held a conference to highlight victims of terror, where he stated that terrorism can never be justified.

Other multilateral organizations have spoken clearly, as well. The G8 has declared that all terrorist acts are criminal and must be universally condemned. And the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference recently spoke out against a suicide bombing, which he said runs counter to the teachings of Islam. The message behind these statements is resolutely clear: Like slavery and piracy, terrorism has no place in the modern world.

Around the globe, nations are turning these words into action. Members of the United Nations are sharing intelligence with one another, conducting joint operations, and freezing terrorist finances. While terrorists continue to carry out attacks like the terrible bombing in Islamabad last week, our joint actions have spared our citizens from many devastating blows.

With the brutal nature of the extremists increasingly clear, the coalition of nations confronting terror is growing stronger. Over the past seven years, Afghanistan and Iraq have been transformed from regimes that actively sponsor terror to democracies that fight terror. Libya has renounced its support for terror and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are actively pursuing the terrorists. A few nations — regimes like Syria and Iran — continue to sponsor terror. Yet their numbers are growing fewer, and they’re growing more isolated from the world.

As the 21st century unfolds, some may be tempted to assume that the threat has receded. This would be comforting; it would be wrong. The terrorists believe time is on their side, so they made waiting out civilized nations part of their strategy. We must not allow them to succeed. The nations of this body must stand united in the fight against terror. We must continue working to deny the terrorists refuge anywhere in the world, including ungoverned spaces. We must remain vigilant against proliferation — by fully implementing the terms of Security Council Resolution 1540, and enforcing sanctions against North Korea and Iran. We must not relent until our people are safe from this threat to civilization.

To uphold the Charter’s promise of peace and security in the 21st century, we must also confront the ideology of the terrorists. At its core, the struggle against extremists is a battle of ideas. The terrorists envision a world in which religious freedom is denied, women are oppressed, and all dissent is crushed. The nations of this chamber must present a more hopeful alternative — a vision where people can speak freely, and worship as they choose, and pursue their dreams in liberty.

Advancing the vision of freedom serves our highest ideals, as expressed in the U.N.’s Charter’s commitment to “the dignity and worth of the human person.” Advancing this vision also serves our security interests. History shows that when citizens have a voice in choosing their own leaders, they are less likely to search for meaning in radical ideologies. And when governments respect the rights of their people, they’re more likely to respect the rights of their neighbors.

For all these reasons, the nations of this body must challenge tyranny as vigorously as we challenge terror. Some question whether people in certain parts of the world actually desire freedom. This self-serving condescension has been disproved before our eyes. From the voting booths of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia, to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia, to the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, we have seen people consistently make the courageous decision to demand their liberty. For all the suggestions to the contrary, the truth is that whenever or wherever people are given the choice, they choose freedom.

Nations in these chambers have supported the efforts of dissidents and reformers and civil society advocates in newly free societies throughout the new United Nations Democracy Fund. And we appreciate those efforts. And as young democracies around the world continue to make brave stands for liberty, multilateral organizations like the United Nations must continue to stand with them.

In Afghanistan, a determined people are working to overcome decades of tyranny, and protect their newly-free society. They have strong support from all 26 nations of the NATO Alliance. I appreciate the United Nations’ decision this week to renew the mandate for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The United Nations is also an active civilian presence in Afghanistan, where experts are doing important work helping to improve education, facilitate humanitarian aid, and protect human rights. We must continue to help the Afghan people defend their young democracy — so the Taliban does not return to power, and Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for terror.

In Iraq, the fight has been difficult, yet daily life has improved dramatically over the past 20 months — thanks to the courage of the Iraqi people, a determined coalition of nations, and a surge of American troops. The United Nations has provided the mandate for multinational forces in Iraq through this December. And the United Nations is carrying out an ambitious strategy to strengthen Iraq’s democracy, including helping Iraqis prepare for their next round of free elections. Whatever disagreements our nations have had on Iraq, we should all welcome this progress toward stability and peace — and we should stand united in helping Iraq’s democracy succeed.

We must stand united in our support of other young democracies, from the people of Lebanon struggling to maintain their hard-won independence, to the people of the Palestinian Territories, who deserve a free and peaceful state of their own. We must stand united in our support of the people of Georgia. The United Nations Charter sets forth the “equal rights of nations large and small.” Russia’s invasion of Georgia was a violation of those words. Young democracies around the world are watching to see how we respond to this test. The United States has worked with allies in multilateral institutions like the European Union and NATO to uphold Georgia’s territorial integrity and provide humanitarian relief. And our nations will continue to support Georgia’s democracy.

In this chamber are representatives of Georgia and Ukraine and Lebanon and Afghanistan and Liberia and Iraq, and other brave young democracies. We admire your courage. We honor your sacrifices. We thank you for your inspiring example. We will continue to stand with all who stand for freedom. This noble goal is worthy of the United Nations, and it should have the support of every member in this assembly.

Extending the reach of political freedom is essential to prevailing in the great struggle of our time — but it is not enough. Many in this chamber have answered the call to help their brothers and sisters in need by working to alleviate hopelessness. These efforts to improve the human condition honor the highest ideals of this institution. They also advance our security interests. The extremists find their most fertile recruiting grounds in societies trapped in chaos and despair — places where people see no prospect of a better life. In the shadows of hopelessness, radicalism thrives. And eventually, that radicalism can boil over into violence and cross borders and take innocent lives across the world.

Overcoming hopelessness requires addressing its causes — poverty, disease, and ignorance. Challenging these conditions is in the interest of every nation in this chamber. And democracies are particularly well-positioned to carry out this work. Because we have experience responding to the needs of our own people, we’re natural partners in helping other nations respond to the needs of theirs. Together, we must commit our resources and efforts to advancing education and health and prosperity.

Over the years, many nations have made well-intentioned efforts to promote these goals. Yet the success of these efforts must be measured by more than intentions — they must be measured by results. My nation has placed an insistence on results at the heart of our foreign assistance programs. We launched a new initiative called the Millennium Challenge Account, which directs our help to countries that demonstrate their ability to produce results by governing justly, and fighting corruption, and pursuing market-based economic policies, as well as investing in their people. Every country and institution that provides foreign assistance, including the United Nations, will be more effective by showing faith in the people of the developing world — and insisting on performance in return for aid.

Experience also shows that to be effective, we must adopt a model of partnership, not paternalism. This approach is based on our conviction that people in the developing world have the capacity to improve their own lives — and will rise to meet high expectations if we set them. America has sought to apply this model in our Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Every nation that receives American support through this initiative develops its own plan for fighting HIV/AIDS — and measures the results. And so far, these results are inspiring: Five years ago, 50,000 people in sub-Sahara Africa were receiving treatment for HIV/AIDS. Today that number is nearly 1.7 million. We’re taking a similar approach to fighting malaria, and so far, we’ve supported local efforts to protect more than 25 million Africans.

Multilateral organizations have made bold commitments of their own to fight disease. The G8 has pledged to match America’s efforts on malaria and HIV/AIDS. Through the Global Fund, many countries are working to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB. Lives in the developing world depend on these programs, and all who have made pledges to fight disease have an obligation to follow through on their commitments.

One of the most powerful engines of development and prosperity is trade and investment, which create new opportunities for entrepreneurs, and help people rise out of poverty, and reinforce fundamental values like transparency and rule of law. For all these reasons, many in these chambers have conducted free trade agreements at bilateral and regional levels. The most effective step of all would be an agreement that tears down trade barriers at the global level. The recent impasse in the Doha Round is disappointing, but that does not have to be the final word. I urge every nation to seize this opportunity to lift up economies around the world — and reach a successful Doha agreement as soon as possible.

Beyond Doha, our nations must renew our commitment to open economies, and stand firm against economic isolationism. These objectives are being tested by turbulence in the global financial markets. Our economies are more closely connected than ever before, and I know that many of you here are watching how the United States government will address the problems in our financial system.

In recent weeks, we have taken bold steps to prevent a severe disruption of the American economy, which would have a devastating effect on other economies around the world. We’ve promoted stability in the markets by preventing the disorderly failure of major companies. The Federal Reserve has injected urgently-needed liquidity into the system. And last week, I announced a decisive action by the federal government to address the root cause of much of the instability in our financial markets — by purchasing illiquid assets that are weighing down balance sheets and restricting the flow of credit. I can assure you that my administration and our Congress are working together to quickly pass legislation approving this strategy. And I’m confident we will act in the urgent time frame required.

The objectives I’ve laid out for multilateral institutions — confronting terror, opposing tyranny, and promoting effective development — are difficult, but they are necessary tasks. To have maximum impact, multilateral institutions must take on challenging missions. And like all of us in this chamber, they must work toward measurable goals, be accountable for their actions, and hold true to their word.

In the 21st century, the world needs a confident and effective United Nations. This unique institution should build on its successes and improve its performance. Where there is inefficiency and corruption, it must be corrected. Where there are bloated bureaucracies, they must be streamlined. Where members fail to uphold their obligations, there must be strong action. For example, there should be an immediate review of the Human Rights Council, which has routinely protected violators of human rights. There should be a stronger effort to help the people of Burma live free of the repression they have suffered for too long. And all nations, especially members of the Security Council, must act decisively to ensure that the government of Sudan upholds its commitment to address the violence in Darfur.

The United Nations is an organization of extraordinary potential. As the United Nations rebuilds its headquarters, it must also open the door to a new age of transparency, accountability, and seriousness of purpose.

With determination and clear purpose, the United Nations can be a powerful force for good as we head into the 21st century. It can affirm the great promise of its founding.

In the final days of the San Francisco Conference, the delegates negotiating the U.N. Charter received a visit from President Harry Truman. He acknowledged the enormous challenges they faced, and said success was only possible because of what he called an “unshakable unity of determination.” Today the world is engaged in another period of great challenge. And by continuing to work together, that unshakable unity of determination will be ours. Together, we confront and defeat the evil of terrorism. Together, we can secure the Almighty’s gift of liberty and justice to millions who have not known it. And together, we can build a world that is freer, safer, and better for the generations who follow.

Thank you. (Applause.)

South Korean government looks to rein in the Net

The South Korean police used water canons during protests against the import of U.S. beef. As a result of the protests, the South Korean government wants restrictions on the Internet, which was used to organized the demonstrations. (Jo Yong hak/Reuters)
South Korean government looks to rein in the Net
By Michael Fitzpatrick Published: September 7, 2008

TOKYO: The South Korean government is pursuing a series of restrictions on Internet use to prevent what the embattled administration of President Lee Myung Bak calls the spread of false information that prompts social unrest.

Under the proposal, all forum and chat room users will be required to make verifiable registrations using their real names. In addition, the Korea Communications Commission would make it mandatory that Web sites took down for 30 days articles that received complaints for being fraudulent or slanderous.

During that time, the Korean Communications Standards Commission, the country's media arbitration body, would rule on whether to allow the article to be published again.

Regulators have not worked out what penalties violators would face.

This is not the first time South Korea has attempted to rein in the Internet, said Robert Koehler, an English-language blogger on Korea based in Seoul.

Multimedia

"Even under progressive presidents like Roh Moo Hyun, police blocked pro-North Korean Web sites, demanded pro-North Korean postings be erased and even arrested two activists for - among other things - downloading 'The Communist Manifesto,"' he said.

"It should also be pointed out that the government's charge - that there's a lot of misinformation being spread on the Net, and that this can cause major social problems - is not completely without merit, even if the government needs to be careful in the manner in which it approaches the issue."

The conservative government, led by Lee, was buffeted by recent mass protests over U.S. beef imports that were organized and incited over the Internet. The government blamed the disruptions on rumors and lies propagated by Internet users, and accused service providers of failing to police its content and of providing a platform for hate, libelous claims and cyberbullying.

The president said the measures were designed to ensure accountability for actions taken online and defended the proposal as checks against "a society rampant with excessive emotional behavior, disorderliness and rudeness."

The country has to guard against "a phenomenon in which inaccurate, false information is disseminated; prompting social unrest that spreads like an epidemic," Lee said during a recent speech.

The bill which, is being prepared by the governing party, will be submitted to the regular session of the National Assembly in November.

The proposals in South Korea follow discussion of similar measures in Japan, where a government panel has recommended requiring Internet service providers, or ISPs, to enforce certain controls. The governing party is seeking to have the regulations enacted by 2010.

Critics say Tokyo is not only interested in curbing bad Internet behavior but also wants to censor what it considers controversial or critical sites.

"The Internet threatens the government, but the new law will put the government back in control by making the ISPs directly answerable to the government," said Kazuo Hizumi, a human-rights lawyer in Tokyo. "This is the untenable position we are facing in Japan."

"By all means bring in some control, but let the providers do it and let the government act through an independent body; not the LDP," he said, referring to the governing party.

China, meanwhile, continues to deny access to some foreign-based Web sites, and employs surveillance systems and data mining.

An army of Internet police watch the content circulating within China, which has most Internet users in the world. But Internet-based companies do much of the work, checking rigorously for political content, according to Rebecca MacKinnon professor of new media at the University of Hong Kong.

"There are a lot of people in China who don't realize how much political censorship there is until they try to find, say, information on human rights," she said. "It just isn't there."

Nor does the government require its own omnipresence to curb dissent on the Web. Self-censorship fulfills this role, too, she said.

"It's the companies that control China's Web, policed by company employees," MacKinnon said. "The police keep an eye out for those companies who don't follow the rules. Those found trying to organize political opposition on the Net aren't just censored in China - they go to jail."

In response to the threat of the measures in South Korea, the largest Korean portal, Naver, said it would drop all news from its front page. Its rival, Daum, has offered an olive branch to old media. Daum says it will share revenue from its banner advertisements on news stories with newspapers, television and other media outlets providing the articles.

Lee Han Ki, the editor in chief of OhmyNews, the biggest citizen-journalist portal in South Korea, suggested that the new president would fail to put South Korea's willful Internet genie back into the bottle."The proposed legislation will not only hinder free speech by Korean netizens but seems to be aimed at controlling the public opinion of Internet news media," Lee said. "Such measures would not help to promote the democratic development of the Korean press and could end up turning back the Internet clock in Korea."

SKorea's leader regrets alleged religious bias

The Associated PressPublished: September 9, 2008
SEOUL, South Korea: South Korean President Lee Myung-bak on Tuesday expressed regret to Buddhists who have accused his predominantly Christian Cabinet of discriminating against them.

Lee, a Christian, made the comments at a Cabinet meeting in an attempt to soothe the anger of Buddhists who have accused Lee's administration of pro-Christian bias in personnel appointments and other policies. They have noted that he filled most of his Cabinet and top presidential posts with other Christians.

"It is deeply regrettable that the heart of the Buddhist society has been hurt by words and deeds by some officials that could cause misunderstanding," Lee said in the televised comments.

In a further appeasement gesture, the government also revised the code of conduct for public officials to include a clause that they should maintain religious neutrality when carrying out duties.

Buddhist anger spiked when police inspected the car of a top Buddhist monk in July when he left his Seoul temple where civic activists were holed up to avoid arrests for allegedly organizing illegal rallies. Buddhists took the inspection as a slight to their religion.

One party, still poor: Angola as democracy
They held a protest rally in Seoul last month that drew 60,000 people, including 7,000 monks clad in gray Buddhist garb, and demanded Lee sack the country's police chief and apologize.

The government has denied any religious discrimination.

Lee's expression of regret came amid media speculation that his government may face bigger protests similar to those over U.S. beef imports that had rocked the new president in his first months in office.

South Korea is a country where religious diversity is widely respected and there is no history of sectarian disputes between Christians and Buddhists.

Buddhism is the oldest major religion in Korea, though Christianity has grown dramatically, especially during the 20th century. According to government census figures, Buddhists made up 22.8 percent of the population in 2005, while Christians accounted for 29.2 percent. Some 48 percent declined to list any religion.

Lee is not the first Christian to serve as South Korea's president. Others include Syngman Rhee, Kim Young-sam and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Kim Dae-jung.

Of the 15 members of Lee's Cabinet, 12 are Christian and one is Buddhist.

N.Korea used taekwondo group to plot murder

ReutersPublished: September 9, 2008

SEOUL: North Korea infiltrated an international taekwondo group, using it as a front to send out spies and plot the killing of a South Korean president who ruled for much of the 1980s, newspapers said on Tuesday.

The Korea Times quoted Choi Jung-hwa, son of the late Choi Hong-hi who founded the International Taekwondo Federation (ITF) in 1966, as saying North Korea ordered overseas ITF masters, including himself, to assassinate President Chun Doo Hwan.

"After taking control of the ITF, the North trained spies and sent them overseas, disguising them as taekwondo masters," the Korea Times quoted Choi as telling reporters on his return to South Korea on Monday after living overseas for 34 years.

The Korea Times quoted Choi as saying he plotted to kill Chun on a visit to Canada in 1982, but Canadian police got wind of the plan and Choi fled to North Korea.

An official at South Korea's culture ministry had no comment. Choi Jung-hwa could not be reached for immediate comment on the media coverage.

Long-viewed with suspicion in South Korea, the ITF's structure is fragmented, with different groups in Austria and Canada claiming Choi Hong-hi's heritage after his death in 2002.

Choi senior fell out of favour with then South Korean President Park Chung-hee in the 1970s, exiling himself to Canada and taking with him his International Taekwondo Federation, which had built up a widespread international membership.

In 1973, the separate and unrelated World Taekwondo Federation sprang up in South Korea, rivalling the ITF and gaining huge popularity.

WTF club memberships in South Korea dwarf ITF memberships, although ITF-style taekwondo enjoys greater popularity abroad.

WTF taekwondo was adopted as an Olympic sport at the Sydney 2000 games and differs from ITF in sparring techniques and strategies.

The JoongAng Ilbo newspaper said Choi had returned to South Korea to clear up misunderstandings about his past.

"I have committed some wrongs whether it was my intention or not," it quoted Choi as telling reporters. "I should pay for what I have done."

(Reporting by Keiron Henderson and Kim Junghyun; Editing by Jon Herskovitz and Alex Richardson)

Leader of North Korea is said to be ailing

By Mark Mazzetti and Choe Sang-Hun Published: September 9, 2008

WASHINGTON: The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is seriously ill and might have suffered a stroke weeks ago, an American intelligence official in Washington said Tuesday, after Kim failed to attend an unexpectedly small-scale celebration of his country's 60th anniversary.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the exact status of the North Korean's health was unclear, but that it did not seem Kim was on the verge of death.

Kim's health is the focus of intense attention among governments and security experts. He leads one of the world's most isolated and unpredictable regimes, one with a nuclear weapons program that is the focus of international concern.

Kim, 66, has not missed any of the 10 previous military or militia parades staged for major party, military and state anniversaries, in which columns of armored vehicles and rocket launchers rumbled through the capital Pyongyang's main plaza as legions of goose-stepping soldiers saluted him.

But for the 60th anniversary — a deeply significant milestone in North Korea — there was only a parade by militia groups in charge of civil defense, which Kim did not attend, said a spokesman at Seoul's main spy agency, the National Intelligence Service.

There has been speculation about Kim's condition for some time, the American official in Washington said, but his absence at the celebration is evidence that he remains in serious condition.

However, the official said, there are few indications that North Korean officials are stepping up preparations for a transfer of authority.

South Korea's largest daily, Chosun Ilbo, reported Tuesday that Kim collapsed on Aug. 22, citing an unidentified South Korean diplomat in Beijing. The Seoul government could not confirm the report. The South Korean intelligence agency said it was trying to confirm reports of Kim's ill health.

The North's state-run media have not reported any public appearance by Kim since mid-August, and speculation was already swirling that he might be in ill health. According to South Korea's intelligence service, Kim has chronic heart disease and diabetes.

Since North Korea was founded in 1948 under Soviet guardianship, it has had only two leaders: Kim Il-sung, and after his death in 1994, his son, Kim Jong-il, the first and only hereditary leader in the Communist world. Kim has three sons. None has emerged as heir-apparent and experts on North Korea are widely divided who will succeed the president.

A second American official briefed on intelligence about Kim's health expressed concern that there did not appear to be a clear plan to transfer power in the event of his death.

"There is no succession track, which could lead to infighting and chaos," he said.

North Korea experts in Seoul cautioned that Kim has often disappeared from public view for extended periods, using the ensuing rumors and uncertainty to keep the outside world at bay.

"Kim Jong-il has a history of keeping away from public view when he had something important to decide and the North's external relations worsened," said Koh Yu-hwan, a longtime North Korea observer at Seoul's Dongkuk University.

Kim Keun Sik, a North Korea expert in Kyungnam University in South Korea, said: "The nuclear talks are in a stalemate. Tensions with the United States are deepening. Kim knew that the world was watching whether he would show up today. For him, this may be a perfect chance to bring world attention to him."

In a joint statement of loyalty to Kim on Tuesday, the North's key ruling organs — including the Workers' Party, the cabinet and the military — praised him for building a "powerful war deterrent that can safeguard the nation's survival."

"If the American imperialists dare ignite the flames of war, we will mobilize all our powerful potentials to mercilessly punish the invaders and win decisively in our great showdown against the United States," said the statement, carried by the North's official news agency, KCNA.

Such strident pronouncements have become more common in the North's official rhetoric in recent weeks.

When tensions with the United States increase, the government redoubles its efforts to inspire fears of an American invasion. Such propaganda carries particular urgency because the North feeds 20 percent of its 23 million people with food aid provided by the United States, which its official media regularly calls "our sworn enemy."

Efforts to halt the North's nuclear weapons efforts have recently stalled. The North had agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons programs in return for economic and political rewards from the United States and its allies. North Korea began disabling its Soviet-era nuclear plant in Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang, last November, in a major diplomatic victory for the Bush administration.

But it stopped the work in August, angry that Washington had not removed it from a terrorism blacklist. The United States said North Korea must first agree to a comprehensive inspection program to reveal whether it is hiding any nuclear assets.

The Korean War Mass Graves

Heonik Kwon

On a gentle hillside on Jeju, a communal graveyard has a unique name and history. Surrounded by the reed fields that abound on this beautiful island near the southern maritime border of Korea, the gravesite consists of a large stone-walled compound, where one hundred and thirty-two modest, well-tended grave mounds lie in neat lines, and a tall stone-made memorial stands in the middle of the compound. Visitors can easily recognize that it is no ordinary graveyard. The site is distinct from the stone-walled individual or family tombs familiar to the island population, or from the traditional family ancestral graves commonly found on the hills of mainland Korea. There are simply too many graves concentrated in one place in this graveyard, and moreover, none is marked by the usual gravestone or a stone tablet, where visiting relatives can place offerings of food and alcohol for the dead according to the traditional custom of commemoration. The graves here are nameless, and they stand in a strangely ordered fashion, in tidily organized rows—an organization that people would expect to see in a military cemetery, not in a village graveyard.



Miryang communal graveyard


The graveyard is called, according to the inscription written on the memorial stone in Chinese script, “One Hundred Ancestors and A Single Descendent.” On the memorial stone’s pitch-black surface, on the back, the purpose of the stone is explained. It is a community ancestral shrine built in the hope of consoling the spirits of the dead buried on the premises. The name of the site is surprising: it goes against the conventional image of genealogical continuity in Korea’s traditional mortuary and commemorative culture. In ordinary circumstances, this continuity should be expressed in in the language of reproductive prosperity and family expansion from one ancestor to many descendents. Here the order is reversed. The site’s name does not fit with the form of genealogical order familiar to anthropologists, which usually takes a pyramid shape, with a single apical ancestral figure on the top (or on the right) followed by increasingly numerous members in descending lines. How is it possible that a lone descendent survives the historical community of one hundred ancestors? What happened in their genealogical history that their lineage has fallen to the current anomalous situation of minimal existence?



Miryang graveyard closeup


The gravesite is in possession of another object, which, on closer examination, offers small clues to the history of the place. Near the black memorial stone is a large glass sachet that contains several broken fragments of what appears to have been a sizeable tombstone or a memorial stone. According to the annals compiled by the One Hundred Ancestors and One Single Descendent Association of Bereaved Families, the fragments of the broken stone originate from an ancestral memorial erected in 1959. The old memorial stone “died” in 1961 and was brought back to life in 1993, the year the current memorial stone was erected. The annals also describe the circumstance of the stone’s death. In June 1961, the district’s gendarmerie ordered the families related to those buried in the graveyard to remove the memorial stone and, when they protested against the order, sent a police convoy to destroy it. The gendarmerie also intended to clear the graves from the premises, but failed to do so in the face of vigorous protests from the families and local villagers. The police justified these measures on the grounds that the construction of the graveyard and the memorial was an “act of treason—colluding with communism.” After the stone was broken and buried, the police took on a distinctive identity among the locals—as the desecrator of family ancestral graves.

The confrontation between the political authority and the families over the question of burial was not unique to this place on Jeju but is known elsewhere in postwar South Korea. On 28 July 1960, thousands of women in traditional white dresses assembled at the public square in front of Daegu’s central railway station. This is where, ten years previously, daily large assemblies of students and other youth groups had protested the aggression by North Korea and called for patriotic unity against the communist aggressors’ “treacherous ambition to turn the Korean peninsula into a red territory.” In the summer of 1950, the environs of the Daegu station had turned into a gigantic slum and shelter for war refugees, and on the outskirts of the city, the United States and South Korean armies had built trenches along the river, determined to defend this city in southeastern Korea in order to halt the rapid southward advance of the North Korean army. The women in white dresses who gathered in the square in July 1960 came from all over the town and many from the near and distant countryside, having seen in the newspaper or heard the rumor that bereaved families of the casualties of war like them were invited to join a public gathering that day. This crowd of thousands of bereaved women shook the town center with their cries, according to the newspaper report of the day’s event, when they heard the memorial address that ended with the remark: “You the grievous spirits of the dead who are deprived of resting places—we shall cry for you for next thousand years!” Someone in the crowd began a loud lamentation, which soon developed to deafening simultaneous lamentations by thousands of participants. The gathering at the station was one of the first public assemblies in postwar Korea, outside Jeju, of the families of the victims of the Korean War civilian massacres.



Daegu railway station, 1950


This event was part of a momentous development in postwar Korea, in which villagers and townspeople across South Korea began assembling in public spaces to demand justice for their relatives killed unlawfully before and during the Korean War. In 1960, South Koreans experienced a brief period of political democracy after student-led protests brought down the US-backed postwar regime of Syngman Rhee. Immediately after the democratic revolution, a number of local associations of bereaved families were established, which soon expanded to a national assembly of the families of the victims of the Korean War civilian killings. Some of these local associations took the initiative to open the mass graves of the victims. The associations reburied the remains of their relatives and held collective death-commemorative rites at the new collective tombs. The National Assembly of Bereaved Families hoped that the parliamentary inquiry would change the status of their relatives from collaborators with communism to victims of state violence.

The families’ aspirations were thwarted in the following year, however, when a group of army officers staged a coup and subsequently reestablished anticommunist authoritarian political rule. Some members of the family associations were subsequently brought before military courts, and many more were later subjected to strict surveillance by the state’s security apparatus. The collective tombs and the memorials prepared earlier by the local associations were desecrated and destroyed. These included the original stone of the “One Hundred Ancestors and A Single Descendent” in Jeju and the temporary collective tomb prepared by the association of bereaved families in Daegu. During this turbulent time, human remains became the object of radical conflicts between the postwar state authority and the bereaved families of the Korean War. The families collaborated to unearth the bones from a site where a mass killing took place in the early days of the Korean War; the political authority seized the exhumed objects and re-interred them en masse. For those who had participated in the opening of the mass graves in the Daegu area, it remains unanswered how an act of exhumation could become a threat to national security and how their private wish to provide a decent burial to their husbands, brothers and sons was judged a public crime.



One hundred ancestors and a single descendant


The politically plagued commemorative efforts described above concerned casualties of the Korean War who belonged to a specific category of war dead. The memorial stone on Jeju island was dedicated to the victims of a tragic incident that took place immediately after the Korean War broke out in June 1950, when the island’s police and military forces, under orders from a higher authority, arrested several hundred islanders and executed them en masse, without trial, in several remote locations. Similar orders were carried out throughout the central and southern regions of mainland South Korea, as the country’s military forces failed to stop the advance of the North Korean invasion and the South Korean government was forced to flee southward, having abandoned the capital Seoul. These atrocious actions targeted mainly those whom the government had earmarked before the war as communist sympathizers or potential collaborators with North Korea. An estimated one hundred thousand civilians are believed to have been killed by this extraordinary state-of-emergency measure taken in the first few weeks of the Korean War. The dead included inmates of national and provincial prisons, who were held there on charges of political crimes relating to the social unrest and political conflicts of postcolonial Korea since the nation’s liberation from Japan’s colonial rule in August 1945 at the end of the Pacific War and the subsequent division of the nation between the Soviet-occupied north and the US-occupied south.


Rite of spirit consolation, Jeju


The killings were conducted in remote hill areas, in abandoned mines, or on unpopulated islands. Also reported are cases in which the victims were thrown into the coastal water, with their hands tied behind their backs and heavy objects attached to their bodies. After the killings, the massacre sites became forbidden places. For a period after the war ended in 1953, families of victims were forbidden from coming to the sites to identify and recover the bodies of their relatives from the shallow mass graves. The state authority branded the bodies in these mass graves the bodies of the traitors so, by extension, the act of touching these bodies (especially for the purpose of giving burial to the victims) constituted treason. Despite these harsh measures, a number of families secretly recovered the bodies of their relatives; this was often done through a wider communal effort involving several bereaved families. The gravesite on Jeju was prepared in this way in 1956 based on a shared initiative of bereaved families. By that time, the corpses had decomposed, and the families found it nearly impossible to identify the remains that they had excavated from a valley where an old munitions depot of the Japanese colonial army had existed before 1945. The villagers joined hands to separate the entangled remains and to put them back together, according to a village elder who participated in the exhumation, in the hope of helping the dead have a “minimal human shape with a head, two arms, and two legs.” This communal forensic activity resulted in one hundred thirty-two more or less complete skeletal sets. The bereaved families then prepared one hundred and thirty-two graves, buried the remains separately in these nameless graves, and gave the collective of graves the name “One Hundred Ancestors and A Single Descendent.”

Considering this background of mass burial and exhumation, the graveyard’s name appears to be less extraordinary, and less about an anomalous, upside-down genealogical condition. “One Hundred Ancestors and A Single Descendent” addresses the norms of kinship to commemorate the dead and, since the commemoration concerns a mass grave, the imperative for the bereaved families to unite beyond the narrow sphere of kinship. Although the one hundred thirty-two human remains were buried in the cemetery individually, their bodies were in actuality all intertwined with one another. Likewise, the name of the graveyard denotes that the bereaved families are interconnected with one another, constituting a single community of mourners, despite their differences in genealogical identity and separate ties to the dead.

Also notable is the fact that the memorial stone is not a solitary object. The stone does not merely represent the desire of the bereaved families to commemorate their tragically dead ancestors but also testifies to the radical challenges to their commemorative effort. Standing next to the broken remains of the old memorial, the stone shows that it has a history of death and regeneration of life. The stone speaks of the fact that the rights of kinship to remember the dead can be negated by a powerful political force, and that the assertion of these rights is interlocked with the advancement of political democracy. The history of Korea’s political democracy is, in a crucial way, about the right to properly bury and commemorate the tragic dead from the Korean War. This was the case in 1960, and it continues to be so today.

The Korean War was not a single war. It was a civil war within a nation divided into two separate postcolonial states, and the first major international crisis since the end of the Second World War. Underneath the reality of a civil and international war fought between contending political forces and their armed groups, however, there was another reality of war that remains largely unknown to the outside world. Viewed in this way, the Korean War was not necessarily or primarily a violent struggle between contending armed forces, but rather involved the struggle of unarmed civilians for survival against the generalized, indiscriminate violence perpetrated by the armed political forces of all sides. The preemptive violence committed in the beginning of the war against hypothetical collaborators with the enemy set off a vicious cycle of violence against civilians in the ensuing chaos of war: it radicalized the punitive actions perpetrated under the North Korean occupation against the individuals and families who were classified as supporters of the southern regime, which again escalated the intensity of retaliatory violence directed against the so-called collaborators with the communist occupiers when the tide of war changed.

This hidden reality of the Korean War has been slowly uncovered in recent years. The following exchange between the Vietnamese writer Do Khiem and the Korean scholar Kim Sung-soo reflects on the ongoing efforts in today’s South Korea, including those of the government’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to investigate the incidents of mass civilian killing committed during the Korean War and to account for the victims of these tragic events. These initiatives for historical accountability are remarkable, considering that Korea is still a partitioned nation where the understanding of the nation’s civil war is not yet free from the politics of the Cold War. The initiatives are remarkable also in the broader context of northeast Asia, where the horizons of historical knowledge and accountability are still imbued with denials of historical responsibility and false truth claims about the past. The Korean War was a formative event in the making of the order of northeast Asia as we know it today. The history of this war can help us imagine a better future for the region, if there is enough will to tell it truthfully.


Heonik Kwon is a Reader of Social Anthropology at the University of Edinburgh and the author of the prize-winning After the Massacre: Commemoration and Consolation in Ha My and My Lai (2006) and Ghosts of War in Vietnam (2008). He is now completing a book on the commemoration of the Korean War.

Heonik Kwon wrote this article for Japan Focus. Posted on August 1, 2008.


See Do Khiem and Kim Sung-soo, Crimes, Concealment and South Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.


Bruce Cumings, The South Korean Massacre at Taejon: New Evidence on US Responsibility and Coverup.

Charles J. Hanley & Jae-Soon Chang, Summer of Terror: At least 100,000 said executed by Korean ally of US in 1950


Heonik Kwon

On a gentle hillside on Jeju, a communal graveyard has a unique name and history. Surrounded by the reed fields that abound on this beautiful island near the southern maritime border of Korea, the gravesite consists of a large stone-walled compound, where one hundred and thirty-two modest, well-tended grave mounds lie in neat lines, and a tall stone-made memorial stands in the middle of the compound. Visitors can easily recognize that it is no ordinary graveyard. The site is distinct from the stone-walled individual or family tombs familiar to the island population, or from the traditional family ancestral graves commonly found on the hills of mainland Korea. There are simply too many graves concentrated in one place in this graveyard, and moreover, none is marked by the usual gravestone or a stone tablet, where visiting relatives can place offerings of food and alcohol for the dead according to the traditional custom of commemoration. The graves here are nameless, and they stand in a strangely ordered fashion, in tidily organized rows—an organization that people would expect to see in a military cemetery, not in a village graveyard.



Miryang communal graveyard


The graveyard is called, according to the inscription written on the memorial stone in Chinese script, “One Hundred Ancestors and A Single Descendent.” On the memorial stone’s pitch-black surface, on the back, the purpose of the stone is explained. It is a community ancestral shrine built in the hope of consoling the spirits of the dead buried on the premises. The name of the site is surprising: it goes against the conventional image of genealogical continuity in Korea’s traditional mortuary and commemorative culture. In ordinary circumstances, this continuity should be expressed in in the language of reproductive prosperity and family expansion from one ancestor to many descendents. Here the order is reversed. The site’s name does not fit with the form of genealogical order familiar to anthropologists, which usually takes a pyramid shape, with a single apical ancestral figure on the top (or on the right) followed by increasingly numerous members in descending lines. How is it possible that a lone descendent survives the historical community of one hundred ancestors? What happened in their genealogical history that their lineage has fallen to the current anomalous situation of minimal existence?



Miryang graveyard closeup


The gravesite is in possession of another object, which, on closer examination, offers small clues to the history of the place. Near the black memorial stone is a large glass sachet that contains several broken fragments of what appears to have been a sizeable tombstone or a memorial stone. According to the annals compiled by the One Hundred Ancestors and One Single Descendent Association of Bereaved Families, the fragments of the broken stone originate from an ancestral memorial erected in 1959. The old memorial stone “died” in 1961 and was brought back to life in 1993, the year the current memorial stone was erected. The annals also describe the circumstance of the stone’s death. In June 1961, the district’s gendarmerie ordered the families related to those buried in the graveyard to remove the memorial stone and, when they protested against the order, sent a police convoy to destroy it. The gendarmerie also intended to clear the graves from the premises, but failed to do so in the face of vigorous protests from the families and local villagers. The police justified these measures on the grounds that the construction of the graveyard and the memorial was an “act of treason—colluding with communism.” After the stone was broken and buried, the police took on a distinctive identity among the locals—as the desecrator of family ancestral graves.

The confrontation between the political authority and the families over the question of burial was not unique to this place on Jeju but is known elsewhere in postwar South Korea. On 28 July 1960, thousands of women in traditional white dresses assembled at the public square in front of Daegu’s central railway station. This is where, ten years previously, daily large assemblies of students and other youth groups had protested the aggression by North Korea and called for patriotic unity against the communist aggressors’ “treacherous ambition to turn the Korean peninsula into a red territory.” In the summer of 1950, the environs of the Daegu station had turned into a gigantic slum and shelter for war refugees, and on the outskirts of the city, the United States and South Korean armies had built trenches along the river, determined to defend this city in southeastern Korea in order to halt the rapid southward advance of the North Korean army. The women in white dresses who gathered in the square in July 1960 came from all over the town and many from the near and distant countryside, having seen in the newspaper or heard the rumor that bereaved families of the casualties of war like them were invited to join a public gathering that day. This crowd of thousands of bereaved women shook the town center with their cries, according to the newspaper report of the day’s event, when they heard the memorial address that ended with the remark: “You the grievous spirits of the dead who are deprived of resting places—we shall cry for you for next thousand years!” Someone in the crowd began a loud lamentation, which soon developed to deafening simultaneous lamentations by thousands of participants. The gathering at the station was one of the first public assemblies in postwar Korea, outside Jeju, of the families of the victims of the Korean War civilian massacres.



Daegu railway station, 1950


This event was part of a momentous development in postwar Korea, in which villagers and townspeople across South Korea began assembling in public spaces to demand justice for their relatives killed unlawfully before and during the Korean War. In 1960, South Koreans experienced a brief period of political democracy after student-led protests brought down the US-backed postwar regime of Syngman Rhee. Immediately after the democratic revolution, a number of local associations of bereaved families were established, which soon expanded to a national assembly of the families of the victims of the Korean War civilian killings. Some of these local associations took the initiative to open the mass graves of the victims. The associations reburied the remains of their relatives and held collective death-commemorative rites at the new collective tombs. The National Assembly of Bereaved Families hoped that the parliamentary inquiry would change the status of their relatives from collaborators with communism to victims of state violence.

The families’ aspirations were thwarted in the following year, however, when a group of army officers staged a coup and subsequently reestablished anticommunist authoritarian political rule. Some members of the family associations were subsequently brought before military courts, and many more were later subjected to strict surveillance by the state’s security apparatus. The collective tombs and the memorials prepared earlier by the local associations were desecrated and destroyed. These included the original stone of the “One Hundred Ancestors and A Single Descendent” in Jeju and the temporary collective tomb prepared by the association of bereaved families in Daegu. During this turbulent time, human remains became the object of radical conflicts between the postwar state authority and the bereaved families of the Korean War. The families collaborated to unearth the bones from a site where a mass killing took place in the early days of the Korean War; the political authority seized the exhumed objects and re-interred them en masse. For those who had participated in the opening of the mass graves in the Daegu area, it remains unanswered how an act of exhumation could become a threat to national security and how their private wish to provide a decent burial to their husbands, brothers and sons was judged a public crime.



One hundred ancestors and a single descendant


The politically plagued commemorative efforts described above concerned casualties of the Korean War who belonged to a specific category of war dead. The memorial stone on Jeju island was dedicated to the victims of a tragic incident that took place immediately after the Korean War broke out in June 1950, when the island’s police and military forces, under orders from a higher authority, arrested several hundred islanders and executed them en masse, without trial, in several remote locations. Similar orders were carried out throughout the central and southern regions of mainland South Korea, as the country’s military forces failed to stop the advance of the North Korean invasion and the South Korean government was forced to flee southward, having abandoned the capital Seoul. These atrocious actions targeted mainly those whom the government had earmarked before the war as communist sympathizers or potential collaborators with North Korea. An estimated one hundred thousand civilians are believed to have been killed by this extraordinary state-of-emergency measure taken in the first few weeks of the Korean War. The dead included inmates of national and provincial prisons, who were held there on charges of political crimes relating to the social unrest and political conflicts of postcolonial Korea since the nation’s liberation from Japan’s colonial rule in August 1945 at the end of the Pacific War and the subsequent division of the nation between the Soviet-occupied north and the US-occupied south.


Rite of spirit consolation, Jeju


The killings were conducted in remote hill areas, in abandoned mines, or on unpopulated islands. Also reported are cases in which the victims were thrown into the coastal water, with their hands tied behind their backs and heavy objects attached to their bodies. After the killings, the massacre sites became forbidden places. For a period after the war ended in 1953, families of victims were forbidden from coming to the sites to identify and recover the bodies of their relatives from the shallow mass graves. The state authority branded the bodies in these mass graves the bodies of the traitors so, by extension, the act of touching these bodies (especially for the purpose of giving burial to the victims) constituted treason. Despite these harsh measures, a number of families secretly recovered the bodies of their relatives; this was often done through a wider communal effort involving several bereaved families. The gravesite on Jeju was prepared in this way in 1956 based on a shared initiative of bereaved families. By that time, the corpses had decomposed, and the families found it nearly impossible to identify the remains that they had excavated from a valley where an old munitions depot of the Japanese colonial army had existed before 1945. The villagers joined hands to separate the entangled remains and to put them back together, according to a village elder who participated in the exhumation, in the hope of helping the dead have a “minimal human shape with a head, two arms, and two legs.” This communal forensic activity resulted in one hundred thirty-two more or less complete skeletal sets. The bereaved families then prepared one hundred and thirty-two graves, buried the remains separately in these nameless graves, and gave the collective of graves the name “One Hundred Ancestors and A Single Descendent.”

Considering this background of mass burial and exhumation, the graveyard’s name appears to be less extraordinary, and less about an anomalous, upside-down genealogical condition. “One Hundred Ancestors and A Single Descendent” addresses the norms of kinship to commemorate the dead and, since the commemoration concerns a mass grave, the imperative for the bereaved families to unite beyond the narrow sphere of kinship. Although the one hundred thirty-two human remains were buried in the cemetery individually, their bodies were in actuality all intertwined with one another. Likewise, the name of the graveyard denotes that the bereaved families are interconnected with one another, constituting a single community of mourners, despite their differences in genealogical identity and separate ties to the dead.

Also notable is the fact that the memorial stone is not a solitary object. The stone does not merely represent the desire of the bereaved families to commemorate their tragically dead ancestors but also testifies to the radical challenges to their commemorative effort. Standing next to the broken remains of the old memorial, the stone shows that it has a history of death and regeneration of life. The stone speaks of the fact that the rights of kinship to remember the dead can be negated by a powerful political force, and that the assertion of these rights is interlocked with the advancement of political democracy. The history of Korea’s political democracy is, in a crucial way, about the right to properly bury and commemorate the tragic dead from the Korean War. This was the case in 1960, and it continues to be so today.

The Korean War was not a single war. It was a civil war within a nation divided into two separate postcolonial states, and the first major international crisis since the end of the Second World War. Underneath the reality of a civil and international war fought between contending political forces and their armed groups, however, there was another reality of war that remains largely unknown to the outside world. Viewed in this way, the Korean War was not necessarily or primarily a violent struggle between contending armed forces, but rather involved the struggle of unarmed civilians for survival against the generalized, indiscriminate violence perpetrated by the armed political forces of all sides. The preemptive violence committed in the beginning of the war against hypothetical collaborators with the enemy set off a vicious cycle of violence against civilians in the ensuing chaos of war: it radicalized the punitive actions perpetrated under the North Korean occupation against the individuals and families who were classified as supporters of the southern regime, which again escalated the intensity of retaliatory violence directed against the so-called collaborators with the communist occupiers when the tide of war changed.

This hidden reality of the Korean War has been slowly uncovered in recent years. The following exchange between the Vietnamese writer Do Khiem and the Korean scholar Kim Sung-soo reflects on the ongoing efforts in today’s South Korea, including those of the government’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to investigate the incidents of mass civilian killing committed during the Korean War and to account for the victims of these tragic events. These initiatives for historical accountability are remarkable, considering that Korea is still a partitioned nation where the understanding of the nation’s civil war is not yet free from the politics of the Cold War. The initiatives are remarkable also in the broader context of northeast Asia, where the horizons of historical knowledge and accountability are still imbued with denials of historical responsibility and false truth claims about the past. The Korean War was a formative event in the making of the order of northeast Asia as we know it today. The history of this war can help us imagine a better future for the region, if there is enough will to tell it truthfully.


Heonik Kwon is a Reader of Social Anthropology at the University of Edinburgh and the author of the prize-winning After the Massacre: Commemoration and Consolation in Ha My and My Lai (2006) and Ghosts of War in Vietnam (2008). He is now completing a book on the commemoration of the Korean War.

Heonik Kwon wrote this article for Japan Focus. Posted on August 1, 2008.


See Do Khiem and Kim Sung-soo, Crimes, Concealment and South Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.


Bruce Cumings, The South Korean Massacre at Taejon: New Evidence on US Responsibility and Coverup.

Charles J. Hanley & Jae-Soon Chang, Summer of Terror: At least 100,000 said executed by Korean ally of US in 1950.

Spain probes Franco-era missing

Spain has begun its largest inquiry into the fate of thousands of people who went missing during the 1936-39 civil war and rule of Francisco Franco.

Judge Baltasar Garzon has petitioned the Roman Catholic Church and local councils to send him the records they hold about people who disappeared.

About 30,000 bodies lie unidentified in mass graves around the country.

The aim of the census is to determine if the high court has jurisdiction to prosecute killers who are still alive.

Peace of mind

Many Spaniards were executed during the civil war seven decades ago or murdered afterwards by the nationalist forces of Gen Franco, who governed Spain until 1975.

During the transition to democracy in the 1970s, Spain's political parties agreed not to hold anyone to account for crimes committed during and after the civil war.

The conservative Popular Party is still so concerned about this recent past it opposed legislation that helps families locate the missing bodies of relatives, many of them dead for more than 70 years.

The first exhumation and identification of a mass grave containing victims of Gen Franco's forces took place 10 years ago.

This new investigation by Judge Garzon could be another important step towards peace of mind for thousands of Spanish families.




스페인 잃어버린 프랑코 시절을 규명하다

대니 우드, BBC, 마드리드

스페인은 프란시스코 프랑코의 통치와 1936년과 39년 사이의 내전기간 동안 실종된 수 천 명의 사람들에 대한 대대적인 규명작업을 시작했다.

Baltasar Garzon 판사는 로마 카톨릭 교회와 지방 의회들에게 당시 실종된 이들에 관해 그들이 가지고 있는 기록을 그에게 보내주기를 청원하였다.

약 3만구의 시신이 전국적으로 분포한 대규모 무덤에 신원도 밝혀지지 못한 채 묻혀있다.

진행되고 있는 조사의 목적은 고등법원 (High Court)이 아직까지 생존해 있는 학살자들을 기소할 수 있는 사법권한이 있는지를 결정하기 위한 것이다.

마음의 평화

수 십 년 전, 수많은 스페인 사람들이 내전 기간이나 그 후 있었던 1975년 까지 스페인을 통치했던 프랑코의 민족주의 세력에 의해 처형되거나 살해되었다.

1970년대 민주화 과도기에서, 스페인의 정치 정당들은 내전 중이나 그 후 자행된 범죄들과 관련하여 누구에게도 책임을 묻지 말자는데 동의하였다.

보수적인 민중당(Popular Party)은 실종자 가족들이 자신들의 실종된 가족의 시신들이 (이들 중 많은 수는 이미 70년도 전에 이미 사망하였다) 어느 곳에 매장되어 있는지를 밝히도록 도울 수 있는 법안이 통과되는 것을 반대하였던 최근의 자신들의 과거에 대해 아직도 많은 우려를 갖고 있다.

프랑코 권력의 희생자들이 매장된 대규모 무덤의 발굴과 그에 대한 신분확인 작업은 10년 전에 처음으로 시행되었다.

Garzon 판사에 의한 새로운 조사가 수 천명의 희생자 가족들에게 마음의 평화를 가져다 주기 위해 내딛는 또 다른 한 걸음이 될 수 있으리라 기대해본다.

`Korea Lacks Confession Culture'

Korea lacks a confession culture, which could possibly lead to a better reconciliation between enemies of the past, Song Ki-in, the head of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, said.

Among verified truths involving thousands of deaths and the trauma of the common people in the past, there are very few people that come clean about their wrongdoings and repent, he said.

``In many Western societies, when a man comes out into the light to confess his offense and repent, people cheer him and forgive him. That encourages other people to openly talk about their own guilt,'' he said.

``I hope Korea will become a place where more people voluntarily talk about their embarrassing past and the victims or their families generously accept others' apologies so that wrong-doers do not hide themselves, fearing a backlash,'' he said.

In an interview with The Korea Times, Song who is to retire today after finishing his two-year tenure, said he assumed more than a million people in the nation have lived through trauma ― where their beloved ones or themselves suffered atrocities in society and were not able to speak out about their scars.

Since its establishment in 2005, more than 10,901 cases have been reported to the commission. Among the verified cases were the death of Jo Bong-am, who was killed for political reasons, and the forgery of the will of pro-democracy activist Kim Ki-sul. Both revelations were regarded as sensational as the two people were labeled as ``impure elements'' in the nation's history.

Through the help of the commission, Jo again was labeled as true pro-democratic politician who stood against the Syngman Rhee administration and Kang Ki-hoon was able to regain his honor as a pro-democracy fighter from a man who played a part in his friend's death and forged his will as alleged by the Roh Tae-woo administration.

`` We go out to seek the truth and recommend that offenders who try to manipulate cases come clean about them. If the government is the offender, we advise it to make an official apology,'' he said. In fact, the government has made an official apology statement to the residents of Jeju Island twice for wrongfully accusing them of being communists in 1947.

``It's not always that you have to give something or do something about it. Sometimes, just by telling them that you know their pain and how awful it must have been, you will see a great difference,'' he said.

There are some obstacles, too. The commission has been praised for bold decisions and no-holds-barred investigations, but has also been criticized by many newly revealed ``offenders''.

One of the then investigators who manipulated the investigation of Kang Ki-hoon strongly denied the commission's conclusion. He said he was innocent and believed what he did was right.

Also there is some cynicism that at this time focusing on the economy is the most crucial issue and looking back at history in anger helps no one. However, Song strongly refuted this argument. ``These days, not many people die of hunger, but many actually die from the trauma experienced in the past,'' he said.

Some say it's so hard to say goodbye to yesterday, but Song said a proper goodbye will take Korea to a better tomorrow. ``You can never talk about tomorrow when you don't know about the past,'' he said.

The now-retired Catholic priest hoped that the commission could look into the historical trauma involving other countries, too. He says many of the unidentified tragedies involve the United States and Japan, and cooperating with them could reveal hidden stories. ``That will be the way for the world to see a better tomorrow.''

bjs@koreatimes.co.kr

Korea Urged to Write New Chapter for Adoption

Dozens of Korean adoptees joined forces last Thursday to ask the South Korean government to address the problems of overseas adoption.

They formed an organization as a first step to call for a transparent inquiry and a full understanding of the adoption issue, both past and present in Korea, which has been dubbed as a ``country exporting babies.'' Since the 1950s, the country has sent more than 150,000 children to live with Western families.

``It is an attempt to help adoptees and Korean society understand each other,'' said Han Boon-young, chief executive general of Truth and Reconciliation for the Adoption Community of Korea (TRACK). ``It is also for healing relations between adoptees and Korean society.''

TRACK aims to comprehensively address the issue of international adoption at a national level and reveal the problems in the adoption program so that the rights of Korean children and families will be better preserved in the future, she said.

``Such efforts will also rectify and reconcile the past to create a bright collective future for adoptees overseas,'' she said.

Exporting babies

As of 2006, 227,983 Korean babies have been adopted. Among them, 159,044, or 69.8 percent, had new families in foreign countries, while Korean families here have adopted 68,939 children.

TRACK claims adoptees overseas might be as high as 200,000, considering those who have been adopted privately and have not been recorded in government statistics.

Consequently, the massive number has often drawn criticism that the country has ``exported'' babies to Western countries. Adoption agencies can earn up to 20 million won arrangement fees when they find a child a new home overseas while domestic adoption earns them less than 2 million won.

Many civic groups also claim that a large number of babies were sent overseas for adoption without their mothers' consent and some child placement agencies in the past used fraudulent documents in order to get children adopted there.

Adoptee Solidarity Korea (ASK) is an organization campaigning for an end to adoption overseas.

``We're not trying to stop inter-country adoption right now,'' Jenny Na, a member of ASK said. ``At the moment, there are no programs for single mothers or underprivileged families. But we want to offer them an option for them to keep their kids.''

Given the economic status of Korea, it should make an effort to create a proper social welfare system to take care of its children, not to simply send them to overseas families, she said. ``People should also know adoption is an issue of human rights.''

Reacting to the mounting criticism, the government has already promised to end international adoptions from Korea in the next three to four years.

The government has also offered various incentives to encourage domestic adoption.

From last year, single people were able to adopt children as the number of single person households has steadily increased, accounting for 16 percent of the total as of 2007.

The age of adoptive parents has been also raised to 60 from 50 in the past.

Dilemmas in international adoption

The Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs last year proudly announced that more adopted children were placed in Korea than overseas.

The ministry reported families living in Korea adopted 724 children in the first half of last year, 59 percent of the total 1,223. During the previous five years, the domestic adoption rate was less than 40 percent.

But adoption agencies say the policies have ignored reality in focusing on increasing the rate of domestic adoptions.

``Our priority is to find babies new homes at very early ages,'' said an official from one of the four major inter-country adoption agencies. ``We try hard, but it is almost impossible to find them new homes domestically.''

The official said that most Korean families are reluctant to embrace male babies and babies with disabilities, and so overseas adoptions are the last option for them before they are sent to an orphanage.

She criticized that the increase in domestic adoption was only possible because of a new law that gave Korean parents priority for the first five months after children were put up for adoption. No international adoption was allowed in that period.

``We agree with the necessity of domestic adoption and various incentive programs. But who should be first considered in the adoption? Isn't it the baby? All the policies only aim at deregulating procedures in adoption but what if disqualified parents adopt a baby?'' she said.

Journey to find their roots

The issue of adoption has recently drawn people's attention but little of that has been given to Korea adoptees sent to other countries. Some have made a lonely journey by themselves to discover the ``missing part'' of their life.

``It's like a mystery,'' said Sara Schultzer, 28, who was adopted by a family from the United States. ``You don't really know anything about Korea and its culture and your parents also don't know much.''

She joined a Korean culture camp for adoptees in America but it was only a taste of Korean culture and didn't satisfy her. But it was not easy for her to come to Korea alone and experience what the country is like.

But she was finally able to visit Korea and experience Korean culture, thanks to a ``Welcome Home'' program by the Korean adoption agency Social Welfare Society (SWS).

``I had a wonderful time here. It was more tangible experience, allowing me to understand Korea better,'' she recalled. ``I know the selection and funding is difficult but I wish more adoptees could have more chances like this.''

Not only to find a home for babies but to offer adoptees chances to learn about Korea are important, she said.

e3dward@koreatimes.co.kr