This will be dedicated to Khiem and Christophe who have kindly been interested in the work we do at the commission and took their precious time and shed much perspiration to visit one of our excavation sites in Korea.
As one of the dear friends described, "He really managed to turn even those people against him."
An estimated 60,000 South Koreans, including 7,000 monks, gathered at City Hall in Seoul to protest against what they say is a pro-Christian bias in President Lee Myung-bak's government.
Buddhists are angry at what they see as a predominance of Christian appointees in the government and a series of recent incidents they say express an anti-Buddhist approach by the authorities.
Monks marched to Jogye Temple, home to the Jogye Order. Eight civic activists have been staying there since rallies earlier this year against Mr Lee's decision to open South Korea to US beef imports.
The protesters want Mr Lee to apologise for alleged transgressions against Buddhism, and to fire his police chief. They are particularly upset by a recent check of top monk Jigwan's car.
Mr Lee, a Presbyterian, has faced a long run of protests since his government came to power in February. Intense anger fuelled by his approval of US beef imports caused his popularity to plummet.
Religious tolerance is prized in South Korea. Buddhism is the oldest religion but officials say Christians make up about 29% of the population compared to the Buddhists' 23%.
Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Thursday, August 21, 2008
Ousted KBS Chief Indicted
By Kim Rahn
Staff Reporter
Former KBS President Jung Yun-joo was indicted Wednesday for breach of trust, charged with causing 189 billion won in losses to the network by dropping a lawsuit in which the company sought a corporate tax refund.
Hours after the indictment, the Seoul Administrative Court rejected Jung's request to suspend President Lee Myung-bak's dismissal decision.
``(The court) does not see a need to take an emergency step to prevent any irrecoverable damage from the dismissal of Jung,'' judge Jeong Hyeong-sik said in the ruling. It said it is ``in a situation where it cannot clearly say that President Lee's endorsement of dismissal constitutes a breach of the law.''
Jung's lawyers said they would appeal.
In January 2006, KBS settled with the National Tax Service on a refund of 50 billion won, though it had a chance of winning a larger amount. Prosecutors say Jung dropped the suit to use the refund to make up for a company deficit he caused due to mismanagement.
Since the probe began in May, Jung has refused five summonses for questioning. He was taken into custody last week and let go after 40 hours of questioning.
Jung's attorneys said that if he committed breach of trust, prosecutors must investigate the tax authority, the high court, KBS financial advisers and certain law firms, calling them all accomplices.
The court battle is expected to focus on if Jung dropped the suit to make up for the deficit as prosecutors claim or for other managerial reasons. His attorneys say the decision to drop the suit was made with the agreement of the KBS board of directors, financial advisers and auditors, and not at Jung's discretion.
If the charge is proven, a court will also set the amount of losses Jung caused KBS. Under law, those who cause losses of more than five billion won ($5 million) face a minimum of five years in prison.
The KBS board recommended Jung's dismissal to the President, who accepted this.
Jung has said that President Lee had no right to fire him under a law revision in 1999, which stipulated the chief executive had the right to appoint the network's chief only. He said the revision got rid of the dismissal right to secure KBS independence, while the government said the appointment right includes that of dismissal.
The law stipulated the appointment right only between 1972 and 1985, included both rights after a revision until 1999, and now carries only the appointment right since a second revision in 1999.
rahnita@koreatimes.co.kr
Staff Reporter
Former KBS President Jung Yun-joo was indicted Wednesday for breach of trust, charged with causing 189 billion won in losses to the network by dropping a lawsuit in which the company sought a corporate tax refund.
Hours after the indictment, the Seoul Administrative Court rejected Jung's request to suspend President Lee Myung-bak's dismissal decision.
``(The court) does not see a need to take an emergency step to prevent any irrecoverable damage from the dismissal of Jung,'' judge Jeong Hyeong-sik said in the ruling. It said it is ``in a situation where it cannot clearly say that President Lee's endorsement of dismissal constitutes a breach of the law.''
Jung's lawyers said they would appeal.
In January 2006, KBS settled with the National Tax Service on a refund of 50 billion won, though it had a chance of winning a larger amount. Prosecutors say Jung dropped the suit to use the refund to make up for a company deficit he caused due to mismanagement.
Since the probe began in May, Jung has refused five summonses for questioning. He was taken into custody last week and let go after 40 hours of questioning.
Jung's attorneys said that if he committed breach of trust, prosecutors must investigate the tax authority, the high court, KBS financial advisers and certain law firms, calling them all accomplices.
The court battle is expected to focus on if Jung dropped the suit to make up for the deficit as prosecutors claim or for other managerial reasons. His attorneys say the decision to drop the suit was made with the agreement of the KBS board of directors, financial advisers and auditors, and not at Jung's discretion.
If the charge is proven, a court will also set the amount of losses Jung caused KBS. Under law, those who cause losses of more than five billion won ($5 million) face a minimum of five years in prison.
The KBS board recommended Jung's dismissal to the President, who accepted this.
Jung has said that President Lee had no right to fire him under a law revision in 1999, which stipulated the chief executive had the right to appoint the network's chief only. He said the revision got rid of the dismissal right to secure KBS independence, while the government said the appointment right includes that of dismissal.
The law stipulated the appointment right only between 1972 and 1985, included both rights after a revision until 1999, and now carries only the appointment right since a second revision in 1999.
rahnita@koreatimes.co.kr
Thursday, August 14, 2008
No More Freedom of Speech in South Korea
MBC Buckles; Union Protests
Banners hung at MBC headquarters in Seoul to denounce the probe of its report on mad cow disease. MBC aired an apology for the report Tuesday, accepting the order from the Korea Communications Commission which concluded its report false and biased. / Korea Times
Prosecutors Warn of Tougher Investigation of ‘PD Notebook’
By Kim Rahn
Staff Reporter
MBC, the nation's second largest broadcaster, apologized late Tuesday night for its ``biased'' report on mad cow disease, which triggered the months-long candlelit protests against the resumption of American beef.
Its apology came hours after the ousted KBS chief Jung Yun-joo was arrested by prosecutors for alleged breach of trust. Prosecutors also threatened to confiscate the original recordings of the ``PD Notebook'' episode on mad cow disease and arrest its program directors. Prosecutors claim that the investigative piece intentionally distorted facts to exaggerate dangers linked to mad cow disease and defame the agriculture ministry.
Progressive groups and the broadcaster's union denounced the apology, claiming MBC bowed down to government pressure and its attempt to control the media.
MBC aired the two-minute apology at around 10:40 p.m. Tuesday, following an order from the Korea Communications Commission. As PD Notebook was not aired due to special reports about the Beijing Olympics, the apology was aired at the end of its main news program.
``Reporting Humane Society's video clip about animal abuse and news about an American woman who died from symptoms similar to that of the human form of mad cow disease, we made six translation errors, and mistakenly described `downer' cows as those infected with mad cow disease,'' MBC said in a statement.
``We also said Koreans are more vulnerable than Westerners. We also reported unilateral opinions about the U.S.' butchery system and feed policy, although conflicting opinions exist. These were in violation of the broadcast regulation for fair and objective reporting, so we apology to viewers,'' it said.
Earlier in the afternoon, MBC President Ohm Ki-young said in an executives' meeting that he decided to air the apology after considering ``the intent of the program, facts, and the future of MBC.''
Ohm added the broadcaster would come up with strengthened guidelines to boost investigative programs' accuracy, fairness and accountability. Regarding the report about mad cow disease, however, he said he thought it had contributed to public health and public interests.
MBC has dismissed two PD Notebook directors from the show, and will assign them new positions in the near future.
Unionized MBC workers denounced the management's move. ``The management has hurt the pride of public broadcasting and bowed to the government, making political compromise. Those in charge of the humiliating apology should take responsibility,'' the union said.
In a separate move from the apology, the prosecution is considering seeking arrest warrants for the directors and scriptwriters of the program for questioning, as they have refused summons.
Prosecutors have demanded they hand over the original recordings of the report, but the directors refused. Tentatively concluding that the report distorted facts, the prosecution demanded they offer evidence invalidating the prosecution's findings by Wednesday ― a demand not met.
PD Notebook has built up a strong reputation over the years with groundbreaking reports that have sent ripples across the world, such as the 2006 scoop that revealed stem cell scientist Hwang Woo-suk's claims as fraudulent.
rahnita@koreatimes.co.kr
Banners hung at MBC headquarters in Seoul to denounce the probe of its report on mad cow disease. MBC aired an apology for the report Tuesday, accepting the order from the Korea Communications Commission which concluded its report false and biased. / Korea Times
Prosecutors Warn of Tougher Investigation of ‘PD Notebook’
By Kim Rahn
Staff Reporter
MBC, the nation's second largest broadcaster, apologized late Tuesday night for its ``biased'' report on mad cow disease, which triggered the months-long candlelit protests against the resumption of American beef.
Its apology came hours after the ousted KBS chief Jung Yun-joo was arrested by prosecutors for alleged breach of trust. Prosecutors also threatened to confiscate the original recordings of the ``PD Notebook'' episode on mad cow disease and arrest its program directors. Prosecutors claim that the investigative piece intentionally distorted facts to exaggerate dangers linked to mad cow disease and defame the agriculture ministry.
Progressive groups and the broadcaster's union denounced the apology, claiming MBC bowed down to government pressure and its attempt to control the media.
MBC aired the two-minute apology at around 10:40 p.m. Tuesday, following an order from the Korea Communications Commission. As PD Notebook was not aired due to special reports about the Beijing Olympics, the apology was aired at the end of its main news program.
``Reporting Humane Society's video clip about animal abuse and news about an American woman who died from symptoms similar to that of the human form of mad cow disease, we made six translation errors, and mistakenly described `downer' cows as those infected with mad cow disease,'' MBC said in a statement.
``We also said Koreans are more vulnerable than Westerners. We also reported unilateral opinions about the U.S.' butchery system and feed policy, although conflicting opinions exist. These were in violation of the broadcast regulation for fair and objective reporting, so we apology to viewers,'' it said.
Earlier in the afternoon, MBC President Ohm Ki-young said in an executives' meeting that he decided to air the apology after considering ``the intent of the program, facts, and the future of MBC.''
Ohm added the broadcaster would come up with strengthened guidelines to boost investigative programs' accuracy, fairness and accountability. Regarding the report about mad cow disease, however, he said he thought it had contributed to public health and public interests.
MBC has dismissed two PD Notebook directors from the show, and will assign them new positions in the near future.
Unionized MBC workers denounced the management's move. ``The management has hurt the pride of public broadcasting and bowed to the government, making political compromise. Those in charge of the humiliating apology should take responsibility,'' the union said.
In a separate move from the apology, the prosecution is considering seeking arrest warrants for the directors and scriptwriters of the program for questioning, as they have refused summons.
Prosecutors have demanded they hand over the original recordings of the report, but the directors refused. Tentatively concluding that the report distorted facts, the prosecution demanded they offer evidence invalidating the prosecution's findings by Wednesday ― a demand not met.
PD Notebook has built up a strong reputation over the years with groundbreaking reports that have sent ripples across the world, such as the 2006 scoop that revealed stem cell scientist Hwang Woo-suk's claims as fraudulent.
rahnita@koreatimes.co.kr
Monday, August 11, 2008
Democracy Now; Interview with Charles J. Hanley
South Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is concluding the US military indiscriminately killed large groups of South Korean civilians during the Korean War in the early 1950s. The Commission has more than 200 cases on its docket, based on hundreds of citizens’ petitions recounting US bombing and strafing runs on South Korean refugee gatherings in 1950 and ’51. We speak with Pulitzer Prize-winning Associated Press reporter Charles Hanley, co-author of The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War. [includes rush transcript]
Guest:
Charles Hanley, special correspondent for the Associated Press who has written extensively about the Korean War. He was part of the AP team in 2000 that won the Pulitzer Prize for investigative journalism for their coverage of the massacre at No Gun Ri. He is co-author of the book The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War.
Related Links
Mass Killings in Korea (Interactive feature from Associated Press)
Seoul probes civilian `massacres' by US (Associated Press)
Korean War pilot: `We're not lily-white' (Associated Press)
AMY GOODMAN: As we look back at the Rwandan genocide more than a decade ago to killings in another part of the world, to killings in Korea, and what it means for President Bush’s trip to South Korea. Anjali?
ANJALI KAMAT: President Bush heads to China today for the last leg of his three-nation trip to Asia. The press has been focusing heavily on his decision to visit Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Summer Olympic Games and criticism of China’s human rights record. But there has been hardly any coverage of another story, this one out of South Korea, where the President held summit talks on Wednesday.
It was revealed this week that South Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is concluding the US military indiscriminately killed large groups of South Korean civilians during the Korean War in the early 1950s.
The commission has more than 200 cases on its docket, based on hundreds of citizens’ petitions recounting US bombing and strafing runs on South Korean refugee gatherings in 1950 and ’51. The citizens’ petitions have accumulated since 1999, when the Associated Press confirmed the 1950 refugee killings at No Gun Ri in 1950, where some 400 civilians, mostly women and children, were killed by US troops.
Concluding its first investigations, the commission is urging the South Korean government to seek US compensation for victims. South Korean legislators have also asked a US Senate committee to join them in investigating declassified evidence that American ground commanders had adopted a policy of deliberately targeting refugees.
AMY GOODMAN: Charles Hanley is a special correspondent for the Associated Press who has written extensively about the Korean War. He was part of the AP team that won the Pulitzer Prize for investigative journalism in 2000 for their coverage of the massacre at No Gun Ri. He is co-author of the book The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War. He joins me now in the firehouse studio, Anjali and I, to talk about the relevance of this today. We’re talking more than half a century later.
Can you talk about what is being demanded and how you discovered what you did back in, what, ’99?
CHARLES HANLEY: Well, what happened in 1999 was actually a contemporary news story as much as a piece of history, because at the time, in the 1990s, the survivors of the No Gun Ri killings—and the survivors estimate that about 400 refugees were killed there, mostly women and children, by the US Army and the US Air Force—those survivors finally were able to bring their stories forth and were demanding an investigation, an apology, compensation, some sort of token of acknowledgement of culpability.
AMY GOODMAN: Can you describe it for us? Just give a picture. Most people, I think, in this country, especially younger people, hardly even know what the Korean War was, let alone that US troops were there.
CHARLES HANLEY: Well, what happened was, after the division of Korea in 1945 by the US and the Soviet Union, the effort to unite the two Koreas failed, and in June of 1950, the North Koreans invaded. The Communist North Koreans invaded South Korea. This sent large numbers of South Korean refugees moving farther and farther south, as the North Koreans advanced. And the United States very hastily decided to intervene with troops who were really unprepared for what they were about to face. And one thing led to another—rumors and fears and panic among the US troops—such that they became convinced that every Korean was their enemy, in effect—many of the troops and many of the commanders.
And so, at this place called No Gun Ri, which is a tiny village in central South Korea, the people from two nearby villages had been chased by US troops to head farther south, and they ran into a battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. First, what happened to these people was that they were strafed and bombed by US airplanes, warplanes. And secondly, then they were trapped and fired upon for three days, trapped around and under a railroad bridge. And the survivors, as I say, estimate that 400 of them were killed.
At the time, we discovered in our research that there were documented orders to fire on refugees. In fact, the most important document that has emerged was discovered by the American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz and disclosed only recently. It was a letter from the US ambassador in South Korea at the time, John Muccio, writing back to the State Department in Washington, saying that the US Army has adopted a policy of firing on refugees that approached their lines despite warning shots and such. And so, this was, in essence, clearly a policy that was countenanced.
AMY GOODMAN: We’re talking to Charles Hanley, special correspondent for the Associated Press, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist. We’ll come back to this conversation in a minute.
[break]
AMY GOODMAN: Our guest is Charles Hanley, a Pulitzer Prize-winning special correspondent for the Associated Press, written extensively about the Korean War and was co-author of The Bridge at No Gun Ri. Anjali?
ANJALI KAMAT: Charles Hanley, you mentioned Ambassador John Muccio during the Korean War. Can you talk about his role a little bit more? And also, the US Army concluded an investigation after your report in 2001. Did they mention John Muccio at all?
CHARLES HANLEY: No. The US Army conducted a fourteen-month investigation of the No Gun Ri incident, after our reporting confirmed it. The Army previously had rejected the allegations.
But we discovered, only two years ago—or last year, actually—that the Army, during that investigation, did indeed find the Muccio letter, the letter that reported to Washington that the Army had adopted this policy of firing on South Korean refugees. In that letter, by the way, which was written to Dean Rusk, later Secretary of State—and Rusk was then the Assistant Secretary for East Asia—in that letter, Muccio said this policy is bound to have repercussions if it becomes known. Well, of course, it did not become known in the chaos and the journalistic blindness, actually, in 1950. The Army found the letter, we later confirmed, and did not report its existence. This letter would have confirmed a policy of shooting at refugees.
The Army finally told us and told the South Korean government it did not report the existence of the Muccio letter, because they found, in essence, it wasn’t relevant to this investigation of a mass killing of refugees. That is patently ridiculous. The Army actually told us then that, well, it discussed a proposed policy and not an actual policy. That, too, is just plain untrue. The letter very clearly says this was decided last night.
AMY GOODMAN: And one of the powerful parts of your expose was actually speaking to US soldiers.
CHARLES HANLEY: Yes. This was the key to the whole No Gun Ri story, was to locate—and this was the most difficult part of the research and of the reporting—was to locate the soldiers who were there. Although once we located, were able to zero in on the right unit—that was the real problem—fairly soon we found that the men needed to talk about this and needed to get it off their chests, because at an advanced age, this had been weighing on them for their whole lives.
AMY GOODMAN: Describe what they described.
CHARLES HANLEY: What they described was a scene of pure madness, in the view of some of them. One, who was not involved but was observing it from a distance, said that he looked at it and just said, “What is going on? Stop this! Stop this!” Others refused to fire when they were ordered to fire, but—
AMY GOODMAN: On refugees.
CHARLES HANLEY: On refugees. But, obviously, a good number of them did fire with machine guns and automatic rifles. And as I say, this went on for three days. The Army report in 2001 contended that this was, quote, “not deliberate,” unquote, which, again, is obviously refuted by clear facts, the fact that it went on for three days and was not stopped, and now on the record. We’ve accumulated at least nineteen examples of orders to fire on refugees during this period, during several weeks in mid-1950.
ANJALI KAMAT: The orders to kill people in white?
CHARLES HANLEY: And this was another aspect of this whole story, that the Air Force, in particular, had it in its head that people in white could be enemy threat.
AMY GOODMAN: Wearing white clothes?
CHARLES HANLEY: Wearing white clothes. Now, most Koreans, civilians, wore white clothes during this period. But this all stemmed from the fact that the rumors were that North Korean soldiers were infiltrating the American lines in civilian clothes, meaning in white. And this is what happens in war. You let loose the dogs of war, and they go wild, and you just cannot control it. And so, these jet pilots flying over from bases in Japan, at their intelligence briefings, were told that people in white could be dangerous, and sometimes the air observers would actually target, send them to targets who were refugee columns walking down the roads, because they were wearing white.
AMY GOODMAN: Was this being raised when President Bush went to South Korea? There were mass protests around the issue of mad cow and beef imports being allowed into South Korea. What about No Gun Ri?
CHARLES HANLEY: To my knowledge, of course, officially, the new conservative government certainly would not raise the issue. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission that is working right now, and will be for another couple of years, at least, was established under the previous liberal government of President Roh. President Lee’s current government certainly, I’m sure, even behind closed doors, would not raise the issue. I suspect some of the protesters in the streets may be holding up placards mentioning No Gun Ri and related incidents, but it seems to be overshadowed by the beef dispute and others.
ANJALI KAMAT: Can you talk about the mass execution of political prisoners and leftists in 1950 and the US role in that? How did that come up at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?
CHARLES HANLEY: This is a remarkable chapter of twentieth century history that has been hidden largely for decades. Of course, it was whispered about. South Koreans—older South Koreans know about these things, including even No Gun Ri, but they dared not talk about them publicly during the dictatorships of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee and others until the 1980s, 1990s. And now, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission finally has sort of a government imprimatur that it can apply to these investigations and stories, and people can finally face up to what happened.
And what happened was that, in a matter of a few weeks in mid-1950, as the North Koreans pushed down the peninsula, Syngman Rhee’s right-wing government rounded up tens of thousands of suspected leftists, including tens of thousands of political prisoners being held already, and simply took them out into the countryside and shot them in the head and dumped them into mass graves. The commission believes that a very conservative estimate of the number killed is 100,000. They think it may have been more like 200,000 or even 300,000 people killed, and they are now—for the second summer season, they are excavating mass graves at several sites around South Korea. The reason, the ostensible and immediate reason, for these executions was to prevent the North Koreans from freeing these people, who would then reinforce their army or their programs in various ways as they took over South Korea.
The US role is a bit murky and ambiguous. However, the most interesting and unique document that we have found so far is one that shows that an American colonel, an adviser to a South Korean army division, gave his approval to the proposed execution of 3,500 political prisoners in Pusan, in the southern port of Pusan, and subsequent to that, thousands of political prisoners were indeed killed in Pusan. But otherwise, the US embassy, Ambassador Muccio and his staff, at times expressed disapproval to South Korean officials about these summary—mass summary executions, which, by the way, at times included many women and even children. And, however, General MacArthur, who was the overall commander, was said—according to the declassified record, was said to feel that this was an internal matter of the South Korean government, even though he had formal control over the South Korean forces that were carrying out these executions.
AMY GOODMAN: Could cases like No Gun Ri spark demands for reparations from the United States?
CHARLES HANLEY: Well, this is the key question, of course. The US Army, in its 2001 investigation of No Gun Ri, acknowledged in a footnote that it had learned about other incidents, which, of course, now we’re coming out more openly formally, and indicated that it would not be investigating the other incidents, because this would simply open up Pandora’s box, so to speak, not just in Korea, where we now know of at least 200 incidents, but there are other places, such as Vietnam.
AMY GOODMAN: I want to thank you very much, Charles Hanley, for joining us, special correspondent for the Associated Press, written extensively on the Korean War. He’s co-author of the book The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War. And for our radio listeners, you can go to our website at democracynow.org to see the photos that Charles Hanley was just describing, the killings in South Korea.
Guest:
Charles Hanley, special correspondent for the Associated Press who has written extensively about the Korean War. He was part of the AP team in 2000 that won the Pulitzer Prize for investigative journalism for their coverage of the massacre at No Gun Ri. He is co-author of the book The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War.
Related Links
Mass Killings in Korea (Interactive feature from Associated Press)
Seoul probes civilian `massacres' by US (Associated Press)
Korean War pilot: `We're not lily-white' (Associated Press)
AMY GOODMAN: As we look back at the Rwandan genocide more than a decade ago to killings in another part of the world, to killings in Korea, and what it means for President Bush’s trip to South Korea. Anjali?
ANJALI KAMAT: President Bush heads to China today for the last leg of his three-nation trip to Asia. The press has been focusing heavily on his decision to visit Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Summer Olympic Games and criticism of China’s human rights record. But there has been hardly any coverage of another story, this one out of South Korea, where the President held summit talks on Wednesday.
It was revealed this week that South Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is concluding the US military indiscriminately killed large groups of South Korean civilians during the Korean War in the early 1950s.
The commission has more than 200 cases on its docket, based on hundreds of citizens’ petitions recounting US bombing and strafing runs on South Korean refugee gatherings in 1950 and ’51. The citizens’ petitions have accumulated since 1999, when the Associated Press confirmed the 1950 refugee killings at No Gun Ri in 1950, where some 400 civilians, mostly women and children, were killed by US troops.
Concluding its first investigations, the commission is urging the South Korean government to seek US compensation for victims. South Korean legislators have also asked a US Senate committee to join them in investigating declassified evidence that American ground commanders had adopted a policy of deliberately targeting refugees.
AMY GOODMAN: Charles Hanley is a special correspondent for the Associated Press who has written extensively about the Korean War. He was part of the AP team that won the Pulitzer Prize for investigative journalism in 2000 for their coverage of the massacre at No Gun Ri. He is co-author of the book The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War. He joins me now in the firehouse studio, Anjali and I, to talk about the relevance of this today. We’re talking more than half a century later.
Can you talk about what is being demanded and how you discovered what you did back in, what, ’99?
CHARLES HANLEY: Well, what happened in 1999 was actually a contemporary news story as much as a piece of history, because at the time, in the 1990s, the survivors of the No Gun Ri killings—and the survivors estimate that about 400 refugees were killed there, mostly women and children, by the US Army and the US Air Force—those survivors finally were able to bring their stories forth and were demanding an investigation, an apology, compensation, some sort of token of acknowledgement of culpability.
AMY GOODMAN: Can you describe it for us? Just give a picture. Most people, I think, in this country, especially younger people, hardly even know what the Korean War was, let alone that US troops were there.
CHARLES HANLEY: Well, what happened was, after the division of Korea in 1945 by the US and the Soviet Union, the effort to unite the two Koreas failed, and in June of 1950, the North Koreans invaded. The Communist North Koreans invaded South Korea. This sent large numbers of South Korean refugees moving farther and farther south, as the North Koreans advanced. And the United States very hastily decided to intervene with troops who were really unprepared for what they were about to face. And one thing led to another—rumors and fears and panic among the US troops—such that they became convinced that every Korean was their enemy, in effect—many of the troops and many of the commanders.
And so, at this place called No Gun Ri, which is a tiny village in central South Korea, the people from two nearby villages had been chased by US troops to head farther south, and they ran into a battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. First, what happened to these people was that they were strafed and bombed by US airplanes, warplanes. And secondly, then they were trapped and fired upon for three days, trapped around and under a railroad bridge. And the survivors, as I say, estimate that 400 of them were killed.
At the time, we discovered in our research that there were documented orders to fire on refugees. In fact, the most important document that has emerged was discovered by the American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz and disclosed only recently. It was a letter from the US ambassador in South Korea at the time, John Muccio, writing back to the State Department in Washington, saying that the US Army has adopted a policy of firing on refugees that approached their lines despite warning shots and such. And so, this was, in essence, clearly a policy that was countenanced.
AMY GOODMAN: We’re talking to Charles Hanley, special correspondent for the Associated Press, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist. We’ll come back to this conversation in a minute.
[break]
AMY GOODMAN: Our guest is Charles Hanley, a Pulitzer Prize-winning special correspondent for the Associated Press, written extensively about the Korean War and was co-author of The Bridge at No Gun Ri. Anjali?
ANJALI KAMAT: Charles Hanley, you mentioned Ambassador John Muccio during the Korean War. Can you talk about his role a little bit more? And also, the US Army concluded an investigation after your report in 2001. Did they mention John Muccio at all?
CHARLES HANLEY: No. The US Army conducted a fourteen-month investigation of the No Gun Ri incident, after our reporting confirmed it. The Army previously had rejected the allegations.
But we discovered, only two years ago—or last year, actually—that the Army, during that investigation, did indeed find the Muccio letter, the letter that reported to Washington that the Army had adopted this policy of firing on South Korean refugees. In that letter, by the way, which was written to Dean Rusk, later Secretary of State—and Rusk was then the Assistant Secretary for East Asia—in that letter, Muccio said this policy is bound to have repercussions if it becomes known. Well, of course, it did not become known in the chaos and the journalistic blindness, actually, in 1950. The Army found the letter, we later confirmed, and did not report its existence. This letter would have confirmed a policy of shooting at refugees.
The Army finally told us and told the South Korean government it did not report the existence of the Muccio letter, because they found, in essence, it wasn’t relevant to this investigation of a mass killing of refugees. That is patently ridiculous. The Army actually told us then that, well, it discussed a proposed policy and not an actual policy. That, too, is just plain untrue. The letter very clearly says this was decided last night.
AMY GOODMAN: And one of the powerful parts of your expose was actually speaking to US soldiers.
CHARLES HANLEY: Yes. This was the key to the whole No Gun Ri story, was to locate—and this was the most difficult part of the research and of the reporting—was to locate the soldiers who were there. Although once we located, were able to zero in on the right unit—that was the real problem—fairly soon we found that the men needed to talk about this and needed to get it off their chests, because at an advanced age, this had been weighing on them for their whole lives.
AMY GOODMAN: Describe what they described.
CHARLES HANLEY: What they described was a scene of pure madness, in the view of some of them. One, who was not involved but was observing it from a distance, said that he looked at it and just said, “What is going on? Stop this! Stop this!” Others refused to fire when they were ordered to fire, but—
AMY GOODMAN: On refugees.
CHARLES HANLEY: On refugees. But, obviously, a good number of them did fire with machine guns and automatic rifles. And as I say, this went on for three days. The Army report in 2001 contended that this was, quote, “not deliberate,” unquote, which, again, is obviously refuted by clear facts, the fact that it went on for three days and was not stopped, and now on the record. We’ve accumulated at least nineteen examples of orders to fire on refugees during this period, during several weeks in mid-1950.
ANJALI KAMAT: The orders to kill people in white?
CHARLES HANLEY: And this was another aspect of this whole story, that the Air Force, in particular, had it in its head that people in white could be enemy threat.
AMY GOODMAN: Wearing white clothes?
CHARLES HANLEY: Wearing white clothes. Now, most Koreans, civilians, wore white clothes during this period. But this all stemmed from the fact that the rumors were that North Korean soldiers were infiltrating the American lines in civilian clothes, meaning in white. And this is what happens in war. You let loose the dogs of war, and they go wild, and you just cannot control it. And so, these jet pilots flying over from bases in Japan, at their intelligence briefings, were told that people in white could be dangerous, and sometimes the air observers would actually target, send them to targets who were refugee columns walking down the roads, because they were wearing white.
AMY GOODMAN: Was this being raised when President Bush went to South Korea? There were mass protests around the issue of mad cow and beef imports being allowed into South Korea. What about No Gun Ri?
CHARLES HANLEY: To my knowledge, of course, officially, the new conservative government certainly would not raise the issue. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission that is working right now, and will be for another couple of years, at least, was established under the previous liberal government of President Roh. President Lee’s current government certainly, I’m sure, even behind closed doors, would not raise the issue. I suspect some of the protesters in the streets may be holding up placards mentioning No Gun Ri and related incidents, but it seems to be overshadowed by the beef dispute and others.
ANJALI KAMAT: Can you talk about the mass execution of political prisoners and leftists in 1950 and the US role in that? How did that come up at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?
CHARLES HANLEY: This is a remarkable chapter of twentieth century history that has been hidden largely for decades. Of course, it was whispered about. South Koreans—older South Koreans know about these things, including even No Gun Ri, but they dared not talk about them publicly during the dictatorships of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee and others until the 1980s, 1990s. And now, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission finally has sort of a government imprimatur that it can apply to these investigations and stories, and people can finally face up to what happened.
And what happened was that, in a matter of a few weeks in mid-1950, as the North Koreans pushed down the peninsula, Syngman Rhee’s right-wing government rounded up tens of thousands of suspected leftists, including tens of thousands of political prisoners being held already, and simply took them out into the countryside and shot them in the head and dumped them into mass graves. The commission believes that a very conservative estimate of the number killed is 100,000. They think it may have been more like 200,000 or even 300,000 people killed, and they are now—for the second summer season, they are excavating mass graves at several sites around South Korea. The reason, the ostensible and immediate reason, for these executions was to prevent the North Koreans from freeing these people, who would then reinforce their army or their programs in various ways as they took over South Korea.
The US role is a bit murky and ambiguous. However, the most interesting and unique document that we have found so far is one that shows that an American colonel, an adviser to a South Korean army division, gave his approval to the proposed execution of 3,500 political prisoners in Pusan, in the southern port of Pusan, and subsequent to that, thousands of political prisoners were indeed killed in Pusan. But otherwise, the US embassy, Ambassador Muccio and his staff, at times expressed disapproval to South Korean officials about these summary—mass summary executions, which, by the way, at times included many women and even children. And, however, General MacArthur, who was the overall commander, was said—according to the declassified record, was said to feel that this was an internal matter of the South Korean government, even though he had formal control over the South Korean forces that were carrying out these executions.
AMY GOODMAN: Could cases like No Gun Ri spark demands for reparations from the United States?
CHARLES HANLEY: Well, this is the key question, of course. The US Army, in its 2001 investigation of No Gun Ri, acknowledged in a footnote that it had learned about other incidents, which, of course, now we’re coming out more openly formally, and indicated that it would not be investigating the other incidents, because this would simply open up Pandora’s box, so to speak, not just in Korea, where we now know of at least 200 incidents, but there are other places, such as Vietnam.
AMY GOODMAN: I want to thank you very much, Charles Hanley, for joining us, special correspondent for the Associated Press, written extensively on the Korean War. He’s co-author of the book The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War. And for our radio listeners, you can go to our website at democracynow.org to see the photos that Charles Hanley was just describing, the killings in South Korea.
Monday, August 04, 2008
AP IMPACT: Seoul probes civilian `massacres' by US
By CHARLES J. HANLEY and JAE-SOON CHANG – 8 hours ago
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korean investigators, matching once-secret documents to eyewitness accounts, are concluding that the U.S. military indiscriminately killed large groups of refugees and other civilians early in the Korean War.
A half-century later, the Seoul government's Truth and Reconciliation Commission has more than 200 such alleged wartime cases on its docket, based on hundreds of citizens' petitions recounting bombing and strafing runs on South Korean refugee gatherings and unsuspecting villages in 1950-51.
Concluding its first investigations, the 2 1/2-year-old commission is urging the government to seek U.S. compensation for victims.
"Of course the U.S. government should pay compensation. It's the U.S. military's fault," said survivor Cho Kook-won, 78, who says he lost four family members among hundreds of refugees suffocated, burned and shot to death in a U.S. Air Force napalm attack on their cave shelter south of Seoul in 1951.
Commission researchers have unearthed evidence of indiscriminate killings in the declassified U.S. archive, including a report by U.S. inspectors-general that pilots couldn't distinguish their South Korean civilian allies from North Korean enemy soldiers.
South Korean legislators have asked a U.S. Senate committee to join them in investigating another long-classified document, one saying American ground commanders, fearing enemy infiltrators, had adopted a policy of shooting approaching refugees.
The Associated Press has found that wartime pilots and declassified documents at the U.S. National Archives both confirm that refugees were deliberately targeted by U.S. forces.
The U.S. government has been largely silent on the commission's work. The U.S. Embassy here says it has not yet been approached by the Seoul government about compensation. Spokesman Aaron Tarver also told the AP that the embassy is not monitoring commission findings.
The commission's president, historian Ahn Byung-ook, said the U.S. Army helped defend South Korea in the 1950-53 war, but also "victimized" South Korean civilians. "We feel detailed investigation should be done by the U.S. government itself," he said.
The citizen petitions have accumulated since 1999, when the AP, after tracing Army veterans who were there, confirmed the 1950 refugee killings at No Gun Ri, where survivors estimate 400 died at American hands, mostly women and children.
In newly democratized South Korea, after decades of enforced silence under right-wing dictatorships, that report opened floodgates of memory, as families spoke out about other wartime mass killings.
"The No Gun Ri incident became one of the milestones, to take on this kind of incident in the future," said Park Myung-lim of Seoul's Yonsei University, a Korean War historian and adviser to the truth commission.
The National Assembly established the 15-member panel in December 2005 to investigate not only long-hidden Korean War incidents, including the southern regime's summary executions of thousands of suspected leftists, but also human rights violations by the Seoul government during the authoritarian postwar period.
Findings are meant to "reconcile the past for the sake of national unity," says its legislative charter.
The panel cannot compel testimony, prosecute or award compensation. Since the commission may shut down as early as 2010, the six investigators devoted to alleged cases of "civilian massacre committed by U.S. soldiers" are unlikely to examine all 215 cases fully.
News reports at the time hinted at such killings after North Korea invaded the south in June 1950. But the extent wasn't known. Commission member Kim Dong-choon, in charge of investigating civilian mass killings, says there were large numbers of dead — between 50 and 400 — in many incidents.
As at No Gun Ri, some involved U.S. ground troops, such as the reported killing of 82 civilians huddled in a village shrine outside the southern city of Masan in August 1950. But most were air attacks.
In one of three initial findings, the commission held that a surprise U.S. air attack on east Wolmi island on Sept. 10, 1950, five days before the U.S. amphibious landing at nearby Incheon, was unjustified. Survivors estimate 100 or more South Korean civilians were killed.
In clear weather from low altitude, "U.S. forces napalmed numerous small buildings, (and) strafed children, women and old people in the open area," the commission said.
Investigator Kang Eun-ji said high priority is being given to reviewing attacks earlier in 1950 on refugees gathered in fields west of the Naktong River, in North Korean-occupied areas of the far south, while U.S. forces were dug in east of the river. One U.S. air attack on 2,000 refugees assembled Aug. 20, 1950, at Haman, near Masan, killed almost 200, survivors reported.
"There were many similar incidents — refugees gathered in certain places, and there were air strikes," she said.
The declassified record shows the Americans' fear that enemy troops were disguising themselves as civilians led to indiscriminate attacks on "people in white," the color worn by most Koreans, commission and AP research found.
In the first case the commission confirmed, last November, its investigators found that an airborne Air Force observer had noted in the "Enemy" box of an after-mission report, "Many people in white in area."
The area was the village of Sanseong-dong, in an upland valley 100 miles southeast of Seoul, attacked on Jan. 19, 1951, by three waves of Navy and Air Force planes. Declassified documents show the U.S. X Corps had issued an order to destroy South Korean villages within 5 miles of a mountain position held by North Korean troops.
"Everybody came out of their houses to see these low-flying planes, and everyone was hit," farmer Ahn Shik-mo, 77, told AP reporters visiting the apple-growing village. "It appeared they were aiming at people."
At least 51 were killed, the commission found, including Ahn's mother. Sixty-nine of 115 houses were destroyed in what the panel called "indiscriminate" bombing. "The U.S. Air Force regarded all people in white as possible enemy," it concluded.
"There never were any North Koreans in the village," said villager Ahn Hee-duk, a 12-year-old boy at the time.
The U.S. military itself said there were no enemy casualties, an acknowledgment made Feb. 13, 1951, in a joint Army-Air Force report on the Sanseong-dong bombing, an unusual review undertaken because Korean authorities questioned the attack.
Classified for a half-century, that report included a candid admission: "Civilians in villages cannot normally be identified as either North Koreans, South Koreans, or guerrillas," wrote the inspectors-general, two colonels.
The Eighth Army commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, held, nonetheless, that Sanseong-dong's destruction was "amply justified," the AP found in a declassified document. Today's Korean commission held otherwise, recommending that the government negotiate for U.S. compensation.
A U.S. airborne observer in that attack, traced by the AP, said it's "very possible" the Sanseong-dong mission could be judged indiscriminate. George P. Wolf, 88, of Arlington, Texas, also said he remembered orders to strafe refugees.
"I'm very, very sorry about hitting civilians," said the retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, who flew with the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron.
The day after the Sanseong-dong attack, the cave shelter at Yeongchun, 120 miles southeast of Seoul, came under repeated napalm and strafing attacks from 11 U.S. warplanes.
Hundreds of South Korean civilians, fearing their villages would be bombed, had jammed inside the 85-yard-long cave, with farm animals and household goods outside.
Around 10 a.m., Cho Byung-woo, then 9, was deep in the narrow, low-ceilinged tunnel when he heard screams up front, and saw choking fumes billowing inside. Air Force F-51 Mustangs dropped napalm firebombs at the cave's entrance, a declassified mission report shows.
"I ran forward and all I could hear were people coughing and screaming, and some were probably already dead," Cho recalled, revisiting the cave with AP reporters. His father flung the boy out the entrance, his hair singed. Outside, Cho saw more planes strafe people fleeing into surrounding fields.
He and other survivors said surveillance planes had flown over for days beforehand. "There was no excuse," Cho said. "How could they not tell — the cows, the pieces of furniture?"
Survivors said the villagers had tried days earlier to flee south, but were turned back at gunpoint at a U.S. Army roadblock, an account supported by a declassified 7th Infantry Division journal.
Villagers believe 360 people were killed at the cave. In its May 20 finding, the commission estimated the dead numbered "well over 200." It found the U.S. had carried out an unnecessary, indiscriminate attack and had failed — with the roadblock — to meet its responsibility to safeguard refugees.
The commission also pointed out that Ridgway — in a Jan. 3, 1951, order uncovered by AP archival research — had given units authority to fire at civilians to stop their movement.
Five months earlier, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea confidentially informed Washington that the U.S. Army, fearing infiltrators, had adopted a policy of shooting South Korean refugees who approached its lines despite warnings. Ambassador John J. Muccio's letter was dated July 26, 1950, the day U.S. troops began shooting refugees at No Gun Ri.
American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz reported his discovery of the declassified Muccio letter in his 2006 book "Collateral Damage." But the Army had learned of the letter earlier, during its 1999-2001 No Gun Ri investigation, and had not disclosed its existence.
The Army now asserts it omitted the letter from its 2001 No Gun Ri report because it discussed "a proposed policy," not an approved one. But the document unambiguously described the policy as among "decisions made" — not a proposal — at a high-level U.S.-South Korean meeting, and AP research found declassified documents in which U.S. commanders in subsequent weeks repeatedly ordered troops to fire on refugees.
In a May 15 letter to Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the then-vice speaker of Seoul's National Assembly, Lee Yong-hee, called on Congress to investigate whether the Army intentionally suppressed the Muccio letter in its inquiry.
Since targeting noncombatants is a war crime, "this is a matter of deep concern to the Korean people," wrote Lee, whose district includes No Gun Ri.
Lee, who has since lost his leadership position as a result of elections, suggested a joint U.S.-Korean congressional probe. Frank Jannuzi, the Senate committee's senior East Asia specialist, said its staff would seek Pentagon and State Department briefings on the matter.
In 2001, the U.S. government rejected the No Gun Ri survivors' demand for an apology and compensation, and the Army's report claimed the No Gun Ri killings were "not deliberate."
But at a Seoul news conference on May 15 with survivors of No Gun Ri and other incidents, their U.S.-based lawyers pointed out that powerful contrary evidence has long been available.
"The killings of Korean civilians were extensive, intentional and indiscriminate," lawyers Michael Choi and Robert Swift said in a statement.
In its 2001 report, the Army said it had learned of other civilian killings by U.S. forces, but it indicated they would not be investigated.
Associated Press investigative researcher Randy Herschaft in New York contributed to this report.
On the Net:
South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission: http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/index.asp
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korean investigators, matching once-secret documents to eyewitness accounts, are concluding that the U.S. military indiscriminately killed large groups of refugees and other civilians early in the Korean War.
A half-century later, the Seoul government's Truth and Reconciliation Commission has more than 200 such alleged wartime cases on its docket, based on hundreds of citizens' petitions recounting bombing and strafing runs on South Korean refugee gatherings and unsuspecting villages in 1950-51.
Concluding its first investigations, the 2 1/2-year-old commission is urging the government to seek U.S. compensation for victims.
"Of course the U.S. government should pay compensation. It's the U.S. military's fault," said survivor Cho Kook-won, 78, who says he lost four family members among hundreds of refugees suffocated, burned and shot to death in a U.S. Air Force napalm attack on their cave shelter south of Seoul in 1951.
Commission researchers have unearthed evidence of indiscriminate killings in the declassified U.S. archive, including a report by U.S. inspectors-general that pilots couldn't distinguish their South Korean civilian allies from North Korean enemy soldiers.
South Korean legislators have asked a U.S. Senate committee to join them in investigating another long-classified document, one saying American ground commanders, fearing enemy infiltrators, had adopted a policy of shooting approaching refugees.
The Associated Press has found that wartime pilots and declassified documents at the U.S. National Archives both confirm that refugees were deliberately targeted by U.S. forces.
The U.S. government has been largely silent on the commission's work. The U.S. Embassy here says it has not yet been approached by the Seoul government about compensation. Spokesman Aaron Tarver also told the AP that the embassy is not monitoring commission findings.
The commission's president, historian Ahn Byung-ook, said the U.S. Army helped defend South Korea in the 1950-53 war, but also "victimized" South Korean civilians. "We feel detailed investigation should be done by the U.S. government itself," he said.
The citizen petitions have accumulated since 1999, when the AP, after tracing Army veterans who were there, confirmed the 1950 refugee killings at No Gun Ri, where survivors estimate 400 died at American hands, mostly women and children.
In newly democratized South Korea, after decades of enforced silence under right-wing dictatorships, that report opened floodgates of memory, as families spoke out about other wartime mass killings.
"The No Gun Ri incident became one of the milestones, to take on this kind of incident in the future," said Park Myung-lim of Seoul's Yonsei University, a Korean War historian and adviser to the truth commission.
The National Assembly established the 15-member panel in December 2005 to investigate not only long-hidden Korean War incidents, including the southern regime's summary executions of thousands of suspected leftists, but also human rights violations by the Seoul government during the authoritarian postwar period.
Findings are meant to "reconcile the past for the sake of national unity," says its legislative charter.
The panel cannot compel testimony, prosecute or award compensation. Since the commission may shut down as early as 2010, the six investigators devoted to alleged cases of "civilian massacre committed by U.S. soldiers" are unlikely to examine all 215 cases fully.
News reports at the time hinted at such killings after North Korea invaded the south in June 1950. But the extent wasn't known. Commission member Kim Dong-choon, in charge of investigating civilian mass killings, says there were large numbers of dead — between 50 and 400 — in many incidents.
As at No Gun Ri, some involved U.S. ground troops, such as the reported killing of 82 civilians huddled in a village shrine outside the southern city of Masan in August 1950. But most were air attacks.
In one of three initial findings, the commission held that a surprise U.S. air attack on east Wolmi island on Sept. 10, 1950, five days before the U.S. amphibious landing at nearby Incheon, was unjustified. Survivors estimate 100 or more South Korean civilians were killed.
In clear weather from low altitude, "U.S. forces napalmed numerous small buildings, (and) strafed children, women and old people in the open area," the commission said.
Investigator Kang Eun-ji said high priority is being given to reviewing attacks earlier in 1950 on refugees gathered in fields west of the Naktong River, in North Korean-occupied areas of the far south, while U.S. forces were dug in east of the river. One U.S. air attack on 2,000 refugees assembled Aug. 20, 1950, at Haman, near Masan, killed almost 200, survivors reported.
"There were many similar incidents — refugees gathered in certain places, and there were air strikes," she said.
The declassified record shows the Americans' fear that enemy troops were disguising themselves as civilians led to indiscriminate attacks on "people in white," the color worn by most Koreans, commission and AP research found.
In the first case the commission confirmed, last November, its investigators found that an airborne Air Force observer had noted in the "Enemy" box of an after-mission report, "Many people in white in area."
The area was the village of Sanseong-dong, in an upland valley 100 miles southeast of Seoul, attacked on Jan. 19, 1951, by three waves of Navy and Air Force planes. Declassified documents show the U.S. X Corps had issued an order to destroy South Korean villages within 5 miles of a mountain position held by North Korean troops.
"Everybody came out of their houses to see these low-flying planes, and everyone was hit," farmer Ahn Shik-mo, 77, told AP reporters visiting the apple-growing village. "It appeared they were aiming at people."
At least 51 were killed, the commission found, including Ahn's mother. Sixty-nine of 115 houses were destroyed in what the panel called "indiscriminate" bombing. "The U.S. Air Force regarded all people in white as possible enemy," it concluded.
"There never were any North Koreans in the village," said villager Ahn Hee-duk, a 12-year-old boy at the time.
The U.S. military itself said there were no enemy casualties, an acknowledgment made Feb. 13, 1951, in a joint Army-Air Force report on the Sanseong-dong bombing, an unusual review undertaken because Korean authorities questioned the attack.
Classified for a half-century, that report included a candid admission: "Civilians in villages cannot normally be identified as either North Koreans, South Koreans, or guerrillas," wrote the inspectors-general, two colonels.
The Eighth Army commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, held, nonetheless, that Sanseong-dong's destruction was "amply justified," the AP found in a declassified document. Today's Korean commission held otherwise, recommending that the government negotiate for U.S. compensation.
A U.S. airborne observer in that attack, traced by the AP, said it's "very possible" the Sanseong-dong mission could be judged indiscriminate. George P. Wolf, 88, of Arlington, Texas, also said he remembered orders to strafe refugees.
"I'm very, very sorry about hitting civilians," said the retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, who flew with the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron.
The day after the Sanseong-dong attack, the cave shelter at Yeongchun, 120 miles southeast of Seoul, came under repeated napalm and strafing attacks from 11 U.S. warplanes.
Hundreds of South Korean civilians, fearing their villages would be bombed, had jammed inside the 85-yard-long cave, with farm animals and household goods outside.
Around 10 a.m., Cho Byung-woo, then 9, was deep in the narrow, low-ceilinged tunnel when he heard screams up front, and saw choking fumes billowing inside. Air Force F-51 Mustangs dropped napalm firebombs at the cave's entrance, a declassified mission report shows.
"I ran forward and all I could hear were people coughing and screaming, and some were probably already dead," Cho recalled, revisiting the cave with AP reporters. His father flung the boy out the entrance, his hair singed. Outside, Cho saw more planes strafe people fleeing into surrounding fields.
He and other survivors said surveillance planes had flown over for days beforehand. "There was no excuse," Cho said. "How could they not tell — the cows, the pieces of furniture?"
Survivors said the villagers had tried days earlier to flee south, but were turned back at gunpoint at a U.S. Army roadblock, an account supported by a declassified 7th Infantry Division journal.
Villagers believe 360 people were killed at the cave. In its May 20 finding, the commission estimated the dead numbered "well over 200." It found the U.S. had carried out an unnecessary, indiscriminate attack and had failed — with the roadblock — to meet its responsibility to safeguard refugees.
The commission also pointed out that Ridgway — in a Jan. 3, 1951, order uncovered by AP archival research — had given units authority to fire at civilians to stop their movement.
Five months earlier, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea confidentially informed Washington that the U.S. Army, fearing infiltrators, had adopted a policy of shooting South Korean refugees who approached its lines despite warnings. Ambassador John J. Muccio's letter was dated July 26, 1950, the day U.S. troops began shooting refugees at No Gun Ri.
American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz reported his discovery of the declassified Muccio letter in his 2006 book "Collateral Damage." But the Army had learned of the letter earlier, during its 1999-2001 No Gun Ri investigation, and had not disclosed its existence.
The Army now asserts it omitted the letter from its 2001 No Gun Ri report because it discussed "a proposed policy," not an approved one. But the document unambiguously described the policy as among "decisions made" — not a proposal — at a high-level U.S.-South Korean meeting, and AP research found declassified documents in which U.S. commanders in subsequent weeks repeatedly ordered troops to fire on refugees.
In a May 15 letter to Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the then-vice speaker of Seoul's National Assembly, Lee Yong-hee, called on Congress to investigate whether the Army intentionally suppressed the Muccio letter in its inquiry.
Since targeting noncombatants is a war crime, "this is a matter of deep concern to the Korean people," wrote Lee, whose district includes No Gun Ri.
Lee, who has since lost his leadership position as a result of elections, suggested a joint U.S.-Korean congressional probe. Frank Jannuzi, the Senate committee's senior East Asia specialist, said its staff would seek Pentagon and State Department briefings on the matter.
In 2001, the U.S. government rejected the No Gun Ri survivors' demand for an apology and compensation, and the Army's report claimed the No Gun Ri killings were "not deliberate."
But at a Seoul news conference on May 15 with survivors of No Gun Ri and other incidents, their U.S.-based lawyers pointed out that powerful contrary evidence has long been available.
"The killings of Korean civilians were extensive, intentional and indiscriminate," lawyers Michael Choi and Robert Swift said in a statement.
In its 2001 report, the Army said it had learned of other civilian killings by U.S. forces, but it indicated they would not be investigated.
Associated Press investigative researcher Randy Herschaft in New York contributed to this report.
On the Net:
South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission: http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/index.asp
South Korea Says U.S. Killed Hundreds of Civilians
By CHOE SANG-HUN
WOLMI ISLAND, South Korea — When American troops stormed this island more than half a century ago, it was a hive of Communist trenches and pillboxes. Now it is a park where children play and retirees stroll along a tree-shaded esplanade.
From a hilltop across a narrow channel, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, memorialized in bronze, appears to gaze down at the beaches of Inchon where his troops splashed ashore in September 1950, changing the course of the Korean War and making him a hero here.
In the port below, rows of cars, gleaming in the sun, wait to be shipped around the world — testimony to South Korea’s industrial might and a reminder of which side has triumphed economically since the conflict ended 55 years ago.
But inside a ragged tent at the entrance of the park, some aging South Koreans gather daily to draw attention to their side of the conflict, a story of carnage not mentioned in South Korea’s official histories or textbooks.
“When the napalm hit our village, many people were still sleeping in their homes,” said Lee Beom-ki, 76. “Those who survived the flames ran to the tidal flats. We were trying to show the American pilots that we were civilians. But they strafed us, women and children.”
Village residents say dozens of civilians were killed.
The attack, though not the civilian casualties, has been corroborated by declassified United States military documents recently reviewed by South Korean investigators. On Sept. 10, 1950, five days before the Inchon landing, according to the documents, 43 American warplanes swarmed over Wolmi, dropping 93 napalm canisters to “burn out” its eastern slope in an attempt to clear the way for American troops.
The documents and survivors’ stories persuaded a South Korean commission investigating long-suppressed allegations of wartime atrocities by Koreans and Americans to rule recently that the attack violated international conventions on war and to ask the country’s leaders to seek compensation from the United States.
The ruling was one of several by the government’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in recent months that accused the United States military of using indiscriminate force on three separate occasions in 1950 and 1951 as troops struggled against Communists from the North and from China. The commission says at least 228 civilians, and perhaps hundreds more, were killed in the three attacks.
In one case, the commission said, at least 167 villagers, more than half of them women, were burned to death or asphyxiated in Tanyang, 87 miles southeast of Seoul, when American planes dropped napalm at the entrance of a cave filled with refugees.
“We should not ignore or conceal the deaths of unarmed civilians that resulted not from the mistakes of a few soldiers but from systematic aerial bombing and strafing,” said Kim Dong-choon, a senior commission official. “History teaches us that we need an alliance, but that alliance should be based on humanitarian principles.”
The South Korean government has not disclosed how it plans to follow up on the findings. And Maj. Stewart Upton, a Defense Department spokesman in Washington, said the Pentagon could not comment on the reports pending formal action by the South Korean government.
Under South Korea’s earlier authoritarian and staunchly anti-Communist governments, criticism of American actions in the war was taboo.
But after investigations showed that American soldiers killed South Korean civilians in air and ground attacks on the hamlet of No Gun Ri in 1950 — and after the United States acknowledged the deaths but refused to investigate other claims — a liberal government set up the fact-finding commission in 2005. More than 500 petitions, some describing the same actions, were filed to demand the investigation of allegations of mass killings by American troops, mostly in airstrikes.
The recent findings were the commission’s first against the United States, and it is unlikely that the commission has the time or resources to investigate many more before it is disbanded, as early as 2010.
Separately, the commission has also ruled that the South Korean government summarily executed thousands of political prisoners and killed many unarmed villagers during the war.
The Wolmi victims’ demands for recognition tap into complicated emotions underlying South Korea’s alliance with the United States.
“We thank the American troops for saving our country from Communism, for the peace and prosperity we have today,” said Han In-deuk, chairwoman of a Wolmi advocacy group. “Does that mean we have to shut up about what happened to our families?”
The airstrikes came during desperate times for the American forces and for the South Koreans they came to defend.
The war broke out in June 1950 with a Communist invasion from the north. In September, when the American military planned the landing at Inchon to relieve United Nations forces cornered in the southeastern tip of the peninsula, it decided it first had to neutralize Wolmi, which overlooks the channel that approaches the harbor.
“The mission was to saturate the area so thoroughly with napalm that all installations on that area would be burned,” Marine pilots said in one of their mission reports on Wolmi that were retrieved by the commission from the National Archives and Records Administration of the United States.
They also reported that no troops were seen, “but the flashes observed on the ground indicated the intensity of the fire to be accurate enough to destroy any about.”
The reports describe strafing on the beach but make no mention of civilian casualties.
The Inchon landing helped United Nations troops recapture Seoul and drive the North Koreans back. But the tide turned again when China entered the war.
The other two attacks the commission ruled on, in Tanyang and Sansong, south of Seoul, occurred as Communist forces barreled down the peninsula. As the allies fell back, they were attacked by guerrillas they could not easily distinguish from refugees.
Fearing enemy infiltration, American troops stopped refugees streaming down the roads and told them to return home or stay in the hills, or risk getting shot by allied troops. On Jan. 14, 1951, the Army’s X Corps under Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond ordered the “methodical destruction of dwellings and other buildings forward of front lines which are, or susceptible of being, utilized by the enemy for shelter.” It recommended airstrikes.
“Excellent results” was how American pilots summarized their strikes at Sansong on Jan. 19, 1951.
The same day, however, one of General Almond’s subordinates, Brig. Gen. David G. Barr of the Seventh Infantry Division, wrote to General Almond that “methodical burning out poor farmers when no enemy is present is against the grain of U.S. soldiers.” At least 51 villagers, including 16 children, were killed in Sansong, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
The attack on Tanyang followed the next day, when, survivors say, American planes dropped napalm near the entrance of the cave where refugees had sought shelter.
“When the napalm hit the entrance, the blast and smoke knocked out kerosene and castor-oil lamps we had in the cave,” Eom Han-won, then 15, said in an interview. “It was a pitch-black chaos — people shouting for each other, stampeding, choking. Some said we should crawl in deeper, covering our faces with wet cloth. Some said we should rush out through the blaze. Those who were not burned to death suffocated.”
Like Mr. Eom’s family, most of the people there were refugees who had been turned back at an American roadblock south of Tanyang, survivors said. In the days before the attack, the cave was packed with families. When the American warplanes flew in from the southwest, children were playing outside amid cattle and baggage.
That day, the Seventh Division’s operations logs noted that 13 planes attacked “enemy troops” and “pack animals and cave.” It reported “many casualties and got all animals.”
Mr. Eom, who rushed out of the cave into a hail of machine-gun fire from the planes but survived, said, “The Americans pushed us back toward the enemy area and then bombed us.” He said he lost 10 family members.
Shortly afterward, South Korea’s Second Division reported 34 civilians killed and 72 wounded at Sansong, but “no enemy casualties,” prompting the American military to open an investigation. The American investigators did not dispute the South Korean report but concluded that the airstrike was “amply justified.” They said that Sansong was considered an enemy haven and that its residents had been warned to evacuate.
The case appeared closed until several years ago, when, in the course of a Korean television reporter’s investigation, villagers acquired a copy of the American military’s wartime report and read that they had been told to evacuate. They insist, and the commission agreed, that this was not true. They say the village where North Korean troops were sighted was elsewhere and was never bombed.
Regarding the Wolmi attack, the commission said that while it recognized the need for the landing at Inchon, it could find “no evidence of efforts to limit civilian casualties.”
Wolmi survivors said the North Korean officers’ housing was about 1,000 feet away from their village. They say the American pilots, whose mission reports noted “visibility unlimited” and firing altitudes as low as 100 feet, should not have mistaken villagers, including many women and children, for the enemy.
They said the American troops later bulldozed their charred village to build a base.
“If you say these killings were not deliberate and were mistakes, how can you explain the fact that there were so many of these incidents?” asked Park Myung-lim, a historian at Yonsei University in Seoul.
The victims’ grievances found an outlet in 2005, when left-leaning civic groups tried to topple the MacArthur statue. But Wolmi survivors said they did not join the protest for fear they might be branded anti-American.
“We consider MacArthur a hero to our country, but no one can know the suffering our family endured,” said Chung Ji-eun, an Inchon cabdriver whose father died at Wolmi. “Both governments emphasize the alliance, but they never care about people like us who were sacrificed in the name of alliance.”
WOLMI ISLAND, South Korea — When American troops stormed this island more than half a century ago, it was a hive of Communist trenches and pillboxes. Now it is a park where children play and retirees stroll along a tree-shaded esplanade.
From a hilltop across a narrow channel, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, memorialized in bronze, appears to gaze down at the beaches of Inchon where his troops splashed ashore in September 1950, changing the course of the Korean War and making him a hero here.
In the port below, rows of cars, gleaming in the sun, wait to be shipped around the world — testimony to South Korea’s industrial might and a reminder of which side has triumphed economically since the conflict ended 55 years ago.
But inside a ragged tent at the entrance of the park, some aging South Koreans gather daily to draw attention to their side of the conflict, a story of carnage not mentioned in South Korea’s official histories or textbooks.
“When the napalm hit our village, many people were still sleeping in their homes,” said Lee Beom-ki, 76. “Those who survived the flames ran to the tidal flats. We were trying to show the American pilots that we were civilians. But they strafed us, women and children.”
Village residents say dozens of civilians were killed.
The attack, though not the civilian casualties, has been corroborated by declassified United States military documents recently reviewed by South Korean investigators. On Sept. 10, 1950, five days before the Inchon landing, according to the documents, 43 American warplanes swarmed over Wolmi, dropping 93 napalm canisters to “burn out” its eastern slope in an attempt to clear the way for American troops.
The documents and survivors’ stories persuaded a South Korean commission investigating long-suppressed allegations of wartime atrocities by Koreans and Americans to rule recently that the attack violated international conventions on war and to ask the country’s leaders to seek compensation from the United States.
The ruling was one of several by the government’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in recent months that accused the United States military of using indiscriminate force on three separate occasions in 1950 and 1951 as troops struggled against Communists from the North and from China. The commission says at least 228 civilians, and perhaps hundreds more, were killed in the three attacks.
In one case, the commission said, at least 167 villagers, more than half of them women, were burned to death or asphyxiated in Tanyang, 87 miles southeast of Seoul, when American planes dropped napalm at the entrance of a cave filled with refugees.
“We should not ignore or conceal the deaths of unarmed civilians that resulted not from the mistakes of a few soldiers but from systematic aerial bombing and strafing,” said Kim Dong-choon, a senior commission official. “History teaches us that we need an alliance, but that alliance should be based on humanitarian principles.”
The South Korean government has not disclosed how it plans to follow up on the findings. And Maj. Stewart Upton, a Defense Department spokesman in Washington, said the Pentagon could not comment on the reports pending formal action by the South Korean government.
Under South Korea’s earlier authoritarian and staunchly anti-Communist governments, criticism of American actions in the war was taboo.
But after investigations showed that American soldiers killed South Korean civilians in air and ground attacks on the hamlet of No Gun Ri in 1950 — and after the United States acknowledged the deaths but refused to investigate other claims — a liberal government set up the fact-finding commission in 2005. More than 500 petitions, some describing the same actions, were filed to demand the investigation of allegations of mass killings by American troops, mostly in airstrikes.
The recent findings were the commission’s first against the United States, and it is unlikely that the commission has the time or resources to investigate many more before it is disbanded, as early as 2010.
Separately, the commission has also ruled that the South Korean government summarily executed thousands of political prisoners and killed many unarmed villagers during the war.
The Wolmi victims’ demands for recognition tap into complicated emotions underlying South Korea’s alliance with the United States.
“We thank the American troops for saving our country from Communism, for the peace and prosperity we have today,” said Han In-deuk, chairwoman of a Wolmi advocacy group. “Does that mean we have to shut up about what happened to our families?”
The airstrikes came during desperate times for the American forces and for the South Koreans they came to defend.
The war broke out in June 1950 with a Communist invasion from the north. In September, when the American military planned the landing at Inchon to relieve United Nations forces cornered in the southeastern tip of the peninsula, it decided it first had to neutralize Wolmi, which overlooks the channel that approaches the harbor.
“The mission was to saturate the area so thoroughly with napalm that all installations on that area would be burned,” Marine pilots said in one of their mission reports on Wolmi that were retrieved by the commission from the National Archives and Records Administration of the United States.
They also reported that no troops were seen, “but the flashes observed on the ground indicated the intensity of the fire to be accurate enough to destroy any about.”
The reports describe strafing on the beach but make no mention of civilian casualties.
The Inchon landing helped United Nations troops recapture Seoul and drive the North Koreans back. But the tide turned again when China entered the war.
The other two attacks the commission ruled on, in Tanyang and Sansong, south of Seoul, occurred as Communist forces barreled down the peninsula. As the allies fell back, they were attacked by guerrillas they could not easily distinguish from refugees.
Fearing enemy infiltration, American troops stopped refugees streaming down the roads and told them to return home or stay in the hills, or risk getting shot by allied troops. On Jan. 14, 1951, the Army’s X Corps under Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond ordered the “methodical destruction of dwellings and other buildings forward of front lines which are, or susceptible of being, utilized by the enemy for shelter.” It recommended airstrikes.
“Excellent results” was how American pilots summarized their strikes at Sansong on Jan. 19, 1951.
The same day, however, one of General Almond’s subordinates, Brig. Gen. David G. Barr of the Seventh Infantry Division, wrote to General Almond that “methodical burning out poor farmers when no enemy is present is against the grain of U.S. soldiers.” At least 51 villagers, including 16 children, were killed in Sansong, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
The attack on Tanyang followed the next day, when, survivors say, American planes dropped napalm near the entrance of the cave where refugees had sought shelter.
“When the napalm hit the entrance, the blast and smoke knocked out kerosene and castor-oil lamps we had in the cave,” Eom Han-won, then 15, said in an interview. “It was a pitch-black chaos — people shouting for each other, stampeding, choking. Some said we should crawl in deeper, covering our faces with wet cloth. Some said we should rush out through the blaze. Those who were not burned to death suffocated.”
Like Mr. Eom’s family, most of the people there were refugees who had been turned back at an American roadblock south of Tanyang, survivors said. In the days before the attack, the cave was packed with families. When the American warplanes flew in from the southwest, children were playing outside amid cattle and baggage.
That day, the Seventh Division’s operations logs noted that 13 planes attacked “enemy troops” and “pack animals and cave.” It reported “many casualties and got all animals.”
Mr. Eom, who rushed out of the cave into a hail of machine-gun fire from the planes but survived, said, “The Americans pushed us back toward the enemy area and then bombed us.” He said he lost 10 family members.
Shortly afterward, South Korea’s Second Division reported 34 civilians killed and 72 wounded at Sansong, but “no enemy casualties,” prompting the American military to open an investigation. The American investigators did not dispute the South Korean report but concluded that the airstrike was “amply justified.” They said that Sansong was considered an enemy haven and that its residents had been warned to evacuate.
The case appeared closed until several years ago, when, in the course of a Korean television reporter’s investigation, villagers acquired a copy of the American military’s wartime report and read that they had been told to evacuate. They insist, and the commission agreed, that this was not true. They say the village where North Korean troops were sighted was elsewhere and was never bombed.
Regarding the Wolmi attack, the commission said that while it recognized the need for the landing at Inchon, it could find “no evidence of efforts to limit civilian casualties.”
Wolmi survivors said the North Korean officers’ housing was about 1,000 feet away from their village. They say the American pilots, whose mission reports noted “visibility unlimited” and firing altitudes as low as 100 feet, should not have mistaken villagers, including many women and children, for the enemy.
They said the American troops later bulldozed their charred village to build a base.
“If you say these killings were not deliberate and were mistakes, how can you explain the fact that there were so many of these incidents?” asked Park Myung-lim, a historian at Yonsei University in Seoul.
The victims’ grievances found an outlet in 2005, when left-leaning civic groups tried to topple the MacArthur statue. But Wolmi survivors said they did not join the protest for fear they might be branded anti-American.
“We consider MacArthur a hero to our country, but no one can know the suffering our family endured,” said Chung Ji-eun, an Inchon cabdriver whose father died at Wolmi. “Both governments emphasize the alliance, but they never care about people like us who were sacrificed in the name of alliance.”
Friday, August 01, 2008
보도연맹 학살은 이승만 특명에 의한 것"
보도연맹 학살은 이승만 특명에 의한 것"
민간인 처형 집행했던 헌병대 간부 최초증언
심규상 (djsim) 기자
▲ 1950년 전쟁발발 당시 헌병대 6사단 상사로 보도연맹원 처형과정에 참여했던 김만식(84)씨가 증언하고 있다.
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 심규상
한국전쟁 발발 직후 군경에 의해 자행된 보도연맹원 등 민간인에 대한 학살이 당시 이승만 대통령의 특명에 의한 것이라는 증언이 나왔다. 이는 당시 보도연맹원 처형과정에 직접 참여한 헌병대 초급간부의 첫 증언이라는 점에서 주목된다.
1950년 전쟁발발 당시 헌병대 6사단 상사로 보도연맹원 처형과정에 참여했던 김만식(84, 충북 청주시)씨는 4일 충북도청 기자실에서 열린 회견에서 "6월 27일 경 헌병사령부를 통해 대통령 특명으로 분대장급 이상 지휘관은 명령에 불복하는 부대원을 사형시키고 남로당 계열이나 보도연맹 관계자들을 처형하라는 무전지시를 직접 받았다"고 밝혔다.
그동안 전쟁직후 민간인에 대한 학살이 정부 최상층부로부터 나온 것이라는 추정과 증언이 있었지만 이처럼 "대통령 특명"에 따른 것이라는 증언이 나온 것은 처음이다.
김씨는 이날 '민간인학살 진상규명 충북대책위'가 주최한 기자회견을 통해 "보도연맹원으로 끌려가 죽은 사람들 중에는 아주 순박하고 어진 평범한 시민과 농민들이 많았다"며 "하지만 국가명령에 따라 처형집행을 하지 않을 수 없었다"고 말했다.
그는 또 "당시 헌병대 6사단에 소속돼 (대통령 특명을 받은 다음 날인) 28일 강원도 횡성을 시작으로 원주 등에서 많은 보도연맹원을 처형한 후 충북 충주로 이동했다"고 말했다. 이는 보도연맹원에 대한 최초의 집단 학살이 그간 알려진 7월 1일 경기도 이천이었다는 주장을 뒤집는 것이기도 하다.
전쟁직후 최초 보도연맹원 처형은 6월 28일 강원도 횡성
그는 "이후 충북 충주(7월 5일)-진천(5일, 조리방죽)-음성(8일, 백마령고개)-청원(9일, 옥녀봉)-청원 오창창고(10일) 등에서 보도연맹 관련자를 처형하고 경북 영주(7월 중순)와 문경(7월 15-16일), 상주(7월 중순)등으로 이동하며 처형했다"고 덧붙였다.
진실화해위원회 측은 김씨에 의해 거론된 해당 지역에서 모두 4700여명의 보도연맹원이 학살된 것으로 추정하고 있다.
▲ 충북대책위 관계자가 전쟁당시 6사단 이동경로 및 보도연맹원 처형과정을 설명하고 있다.
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 심규상
미국 육군 소속의 방첩부대(CIC)가 보도연맹원 처형과정에 직접 개입했다는 증언도 관심을 끄는 대목이다.
김씨는 학살집행 과정과 관련해서는 "보도연맹원 소집은 각 경찰서별로 이뤄졌고 CIC(광복 이후 남한 주둔 미군 소속의 정보기관)가 처형여부에 대한 심사를 결정했다"며 "헌병대는 경찰서에서 보도연맹원을 인계받아 연대 헌병대 주관하에 보병과 경찰병력 일부를 지원받아 총살을 집행했다"고 말했다.
그는 "당시 헌병대 장교가 일부 보도연맹원을 임의로 풀어준 책임을 물어 증평 지서장을 권총으로 총살했다는 보고를 받은 적도 있다"고 덧붙였다.
충북대책위원회 박만순 운영위원장은 "그동안 가해자 측 증언이 부족해 사건의 진실을 밝히는 데 많은 한계가 있었다"며 "이같은 증언으로 충북지역은 물론 전쟁전후 전국 민간인학살 사건을 밝히는 데 많은 도움이 될 것으로 보인다"고 말했다.
충북대책위원회는 이날 별도 성명을 통해 "이번 증언은 진실규명운동에 하나의 분기점이 될 것으로 보인다"며 "용기 있는 증언에 박수를 보낸다"고 격려했다. 이어 "이제 국가가 회답할 차례"라며 "이를 계기로 또 다른 증언을 낳게 해 진실규명이 더욱 촉진될 수 있도록 해야 한다"고 덧붙였다.
"CIC(미군 소속의 정보기관)가 처형 여부 심사"
이날 공개증언에 나선 김씨는 1948년 헌병대 6사단에 배속된 후 전쟁직후에는 보도연맹원 처형과 관련 강원도 횡성 등 일부 지역의 현장지휘책임자를 맡기도 했다. 또 1950년 7월 대구 다부동 전투에 '육탄결사대' 소대장으로 참전해 전과를 이룬 공로로 헌병대에서는 처음으로 '을지무공훈장'을 받았다. 그는 1956년 육군대위로 예편해 대한무공수훈자회 초대충북지부장을 역임하기도 했다.
다음은 김씨가 이날 기자회견과 충북대책위를 통해 밝힌 주요 증언 내용.
- 보도연맹원에 대한 처형은 어떤 경로로 이루어졌나?
"6월 27일 경 헌병사령부를 통해 대통령 특명으로 분대장급 이상 지휘관은 명령에 불복하는 부대원을 사형시키고 남로당 계열 및 보도연맹 관계자들을 처형하라는 무전지시를 직접 받았다."
- 당시 왜 보도연맹원에 대한 처형명령이 내려졌다고 생각하나?
"국군에 대한 정보가 보도연맹원을 통해 북의 인민사령부에 보고돼 군이 진퇴양난에 빠졌다고 판단한 것으로 보인다. 실제 남로당원들이 보도연맹에 많이 가입한 것으로 안다. 하지만 농지 무상분배 등 혜택을 받기 위해 아주 순박하고 어진 평범한 시민, 농민들이 많이 가입했다."
▲ 김만식씨가 공개 증언에 앞서 양손을 모으고 생각에 잠겨 있다.
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 심규상
- 소속돼 있던 6사단의 경우 보도연맹원 처형에 어떻게 관여했나.
"28일 강원도 횡성을 시작으로 원주 등에서 많은 보도연맹원을 처형한 후 충북 충주로 이동했다. 이후 충북 충주(7월 5일)-진천(5일, 조리방죽)-음성(8일, 백마령고개)-청원(9일,옥녀봉)-청원 오창창고(10일) 등에서 보도연맹 관련자를 처형하고 문경을 거쳐 경북 영주(7월 중순)와 문경(7월 15-16일), 상주(7월 중순)등으로 이동하며 처형을 계속했다. 일부 지역의 경우 소총으로 안돼 기관총으로 일제 사격을 하기도 했다."
- 전쟁이 일어나자마자 곧바로 작전에 투여됐다는 얘긴가?
"특별한 사정이 있다. 다른 사단의 경우 6ㆍ25때 모두 휴가를 간 상태였다. 하지만 6사단의 경우 한 소속원이 월북해 6사단 2연대, 7연대, 19연대가 휴가도 못가고 비상경비태세에 있었다."
- 처형 과정에서 다른 기관과 CIC역할은 무엇이었나.
"민간계통에서 보도연맹원 신청과 등록을 받았다. 이후 전쟁이 나자 각 경찰서별로 보도연맹원을 소집했다. 심사는 CIC가 했다. AㆍBㆍC급으로 나눠 AㆍB급은 모두 총살하고 C급은 설득시켜 군대로 보냈고 여자들은 훈방 후 요시찰 대상이 됐다. 헌병대의 경우 경찰서에서 보도연맹원을 인계받아 연대 헌병대 주관하에 보병과 경찰병력 일부를 지원받아 총살을 집행했다."
- 경찰서 인계당시 신분장을 넘겨 받았나?
"그런 거 없었다. 그냥 경찰서에서 몇 명이다 하면 대충 숫자만 파악해 인계받았다. 강원도 원주비행장의 경우 상황이 급해서 구덩이도 파지 않고 총살 후 곧바로 이동했다."
- 충북 오창 사건도 6사단이 벌인 일인가.
"그렇다. 6사단 19연대가 맡았다."
- 옥녀봉(충북) 사건은 어떤가?
"6사단 7연대가 나갔다. 당시 증평에서 소집한 보도연맹원 일부를 지서장이 풀어줘 헌병대 장교가 증평 지서장을 권총으로 총살했다는 보고를 받은 적도 있다."
- 경북 영주사건에 대해서는 아는 것이 있나.
"6사단 19연대가 이동한 지역이지만 직접 참여하지 않아 잘 모른다. 다만 영주경찰서에서 트럭에 의해 실려온 보도연맹원들을 영주와 문경 사이 큰 개울옆 야산에서 총살한 것으로 알고 있다."
- 청주형무소나 대전형무소 등 재소자 처형건에 대해 당시 들은 얘기가 있다면?
"들은 바도 없고 잘 모른다."
2007-07-04 14:22 ⓒ 2007 OhmyNews
민간인 처형 집행했던 헌병대 간부 최초증언
심규상 (djsim) 기자
▲ 1950년 전쟁발발 당시 헌병대 6사단 상사로 보도연맹원 처형과정에 참여했던 김만식(84)씨가 증언하고 있다.
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 심규상
한국전쟁 발발 직후 군경에 의해 자행된 보도연맹원 등 민간인에 대한 학살이 당시 이승만 대통령의 특명에 의한 것이라는 증언이 나왔다. 이는 당시 보도연맹원 처형과정에 직접 참여한 헌병대 초급간부의 첫 증언이라는 점에서 주목된다.
1950년 전쟁발발 당시 헌병대 6사단 상사로 보도연맹원 처형과정에 참여했던 김만식(84, 충북 청주시)씨는 4일 충북도청 기자실에서 열린 회견에서 "6월 27일 경 헌병사령부를 통해 대통령 특명으로 분대장급 이상 지휘관은 명령에 불복하는 부대원을 사형시키고 남로당 계열이나 보도연맹 관계자들을 처형하라는 무전지시를 직접 받았다"고 밝혔다.
그동안 전쟁직후 민간인에 대한 학살이 정부 최상층부로부터 나온 것이라는 추정과 증언이 있었지만 이처럼 "대통령 특명"에 따른 것이라는 증언이 나온 것은 처음이다.
김씨는 이날 '민간인학살 진상규명 충북대책위'가 주최한 기자회견을 통해 "보도연맹원으로 끌려가 죽은 사람들 중에는 아주 순박하고 어진 평범한 시민과 농민들이 많았다"며 "하지만 국가명령에 따라 처형집행을 하지 않을 수 없었다"고 말했다.
그는 또 "당시 헌병대 6사단에 소속돼 (대통령 특명을 받은 다음 날인) 28일 강원도 횡성을 시작으로 원주 등에서 많은 보도연맹원을 처형한 후 충북 충주로 이동했다"고 말했다. 이는 보도연맹원에 대한 최초의 집단 학살이 그간 알려진 7월 1일 경기도 이천이었다는 주장을 뒤집는 것이기도 하다.
전쟁직후 최초 보도연맹원 처형은 6월 28일 강원도 횡성
그는 "이후 충북 충주(7월 5일)-진천(5일, 조리방죽)-음성(8일, 백마령고개)-청원(9일, 옥녀봉)-청원 오창창고(10일) 등에서 보도연맹 관련자를 처형하고 경북 영주(7월 중순)와 문경(7월 15-16일), 상주(7월 중순)등으로 이동하며 처형했다"고 덧붙였다.
진실화해위원회 측은 김씨에 의해 거론된 해당 지역에서 모두 4700여명의 보도연맹원이 학살된 것으로 추정하고 있다.
▲ 충북대책위 관계자가 전쟁당시 6사단 이동경로 및 보도연맹원 처형과정을 설명하고 있다.
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 심규상
미국 육군 소속의 방첩부대(CIC)가 보도연맹원 처형과정에 직접 개입했다는 증언도 관심을 끄는 대목이다.
김씨는 학살집행 과정과 관련해서는 "보도연맹원 소집은 각 경찰서별로 이뤄졌고 CIC(광복 이후 남한 주둔 미군 소속의 정보기관)가 처형여부에 대한 심사를 결정했다"며 "헌병대는 경찰서에서 보도연맹원을 인계받아 연대 헌병대 주관하에 보병과 경찰병력 일부를 지원받아 총살을 집행했다"고 말했다.
그는 "당시 헌병대 장교가 일부 보도연맹원을 임의로 풀어준 책임을 물어 증평 지서장을 권총으로 총살했다는 보고를 받은 적도 있다"고 덧붙였다.
충북대책위원회 박만순 운영위원장은 "그동안 가해자 측 증언이 부족해 사건의 진실을 밝히는 데 많은 한계가 있었다"며 "이같은 증언으로 충북지역은 물론 전쟁전후 전국 민간인학살 사건을 밝히는 데 많은 도움이 될 것으로 보인다"고 말했다.
충북대책위원회는 이날 별도 성명을 통해 "이번 증언은 진실규명운동에 하나의 분기점이 될 것으로 보인다"며 "용기 있는 증언에 박수를 보낸다"고 격려했다. 이어 "이제 국가가 회답할 차례"라며 "이를 계기로 또 다른 증언을 낳게 해 진실규명이 더욱 촉진될 수 있도록 해야 한다"고 덧붙였다.
"CIC(미군 소속의 정보기관)가 처형 여부 심사"
이날 공개증언에 나선 김씨는 1948년 헌병대 6사단에 배속된 후 전쟁직후에는 보도연맹원 처형과 관련 강원도 횡성 등 일부 지역의 현장지휘책임자를 맡기도 했다. 또 1950년 7월 대구 다부동 전투에 '육탄결사대' 소대장으로 참전해 전과를 이룬 공로로 헌병대에서는 처음으로 '을지무공훈장'을 받았다. 그는 1956년 육군대위로 예편해 대한무공수훈자회 초대충북지부장을 역임하기도 했다.
다음은 김씨가 이날 기자회견과 충북대책위를 통해 밝힌 주요 증언 내용.
- 보도연맹원에 대한 처형은 어떤 경로로 이루어졌나?
"6월 27일 경 헌병사령부를 통해 대통령 특명으로 분대장급 이상 지휘관은 명령에 불복하는 부대원을 사형시키고 남로당 계열 및 보도연맹 관계자들을 처형하라는 무전지시를 직접 받았다."
- 당시 왜 보도연맹원에 대한 처형명령이 내려졌다고 생각하나?
"국군에 대한 정보가 보도연맹원을 통해 북의 인민사령부에 보고돼 군이 진퇴양난에 빠졌다고 판단한 것으로 보인다. 실제 남로당원들이 보도연맹에 많이 가입한 것으로 안다. 하지만 농지 무상분배 등 혜택을 받기 위해 아주 순박하고 어진 평범한 시민, 농민들이 많이 가입했다."
▲ 김만식씨가 공개 증언에 앞서 양손을 모으고 생각에 잠겨 있다.
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 심규상
- 소속돼 있던 6사단의 경우 보도연맹원 처형에 어떻게 관여했나.
"28일 강원도 횡성을 시작으로 원주 등에서 많은 보도연맹원을 처형한 후 충북 충주로 이동했다. 이후 충북 충주(7월 5일)-진천(5일, 조리방죽)-음성(8일, 백마령고개)-청원(9일,옥녀봉)-청원 오창창고(10일) 등에서 보도연맹 관련자를 처형하고 문경을 거쳐 경북 영주(7월 중순)와 문경(7월 15-16일), 상주(7월 중순)등으로 이동하며 처형을 계속했다. 일부 지역의 경우 소총으로 안돼 기관총으로 일제 사격을 하기도 했다."
- 전쟁이 일어나자마자 곧바로 작전에 투여됐다는 얘긴가?
"특별한 사정이 있다. 다른 사단의 경우 6ㆍ25때 모두 휴가를 간 상태였다. 하지만 6사단의 경우 한 소속원이 월북해 6사단 2연대, 7연대, 19연대가 휴가도 못가고 비상경비태세에 있었다."
- 처형 과정에서 다른 기관과 CIC역할은 무엇이었나.
"민간계통에서 보도연맹원 신청과 등록을 받았다. 이후 전쟁이 나자 각 경찰서별로 보도연맹원을 소집했다. 심사는 CIC가 했다. AㆍBㆍC급으로 나눠 AㆍB급은 모두 총살하고 C급은 설득시켜 군대로 보냈고 여자들은 훈방 후 요시찰 대상이 됐다. 헌병대의 경우 경찰서에서 보도연맹원을 인계받아 연대 헌병대 주관하에 보병과 경찰병력 일부를 지원받아 총살을 집행했다."
- 경찰서 인계당시 신분장을 넘겨 받았나?
"그런 거 없었다. 그냥 경찰서에서 몇 명이다 하면 대충 숫자만 파악해 인계받았다. 강원도 원주비행장의 경우 상황이 급해서 구덩이도 파지 않고 총살 후 곧바로 이동했다."
- 충북 오창 사건도 6사단이 벌인 일인가.
"그렇다. 6사단 19연대가 맡았다."
- 옥녀봉(충북) 사건은 어떤가?
"6사단 7연대가 나갔다. 당시 증평에서 소집한 보도연맹원 일부를 지서장이 풀어줘 헌병대 장교가 증평 지서장을 권총으로 총살했다는 보고를 받은 적도 있다."
- 경북 영주사건에 대해서는 아는 것이 있나.
"6사단 19연대가 이동한 지역이지만 직접 참여하지 않아 잘 모른다. 다만 영주경찰서에서 트럭에 의해 실려온 보도연맹원들을 영주와 문경 사이 큰 개울옆 야산에서 총살한 것으로 알고 있다."
- 청주형무소나 대전형무소 등 재소자 처형건에 대해 당시 들은 얘기가 있다면?
"들은 바도 없고 잘 모른다."
2007-07-04 14:22 ⓒ 2007 OhmyNews
Thursday, July 31, 2008
산청 외공리 민간인학살 진실 파헤친다
진실화해위 “진실규명과 화해, 위령사업 토대 마련할 것”
구자환 기자kmindong@korea.com
사진더보기
2000년 1차 발굴한 외공리 피학살자 유해를 모은 봉분
ⓒ 민중의소리
한국전쟁 전후 민간인 집단 희생사건에 대한 실태를 파악하고 진상을 규명하기 위해 유골발굴을 진행하고 있는 진실ㆍ화해를 위한 과거사정리위원회(이하 진실화해위)가 2008년 유해 발굴지 계획을 확정해 발표했다.
유해발굴 계획이 확정된 곳은 △산청군 원리 및 외공리 △전남 순천시 매곡동 △충북 청원 분터골 및 지경골 △경북 경산코발트 광산 △전남 진도군 갈매기 섬이다.
진실화해위는 이들 유해 발굴지 중 경남 산청군 원리와 외공리 민간인학살사건에 대해 19일 먼저 발굴사업을 시작했다. 경남지역에서는 2000년 산청 외공리, 2004년 마산시 진전면 여양리에서 보도연맹관련 피해자들의 유해가 민간차원에서 발굴되기는 했지만, 국가 주도로 민간인 학살자들의 유해가 발굴되기는 이번이 처음이다.
산청군 외공리와 원리 민간인 학살에 대해서는 아직 정확하게 밝혀진 것은 없으나, 일단 국민보도연맹 피해자는 아니라는 견해가 지배적이다.
사진더보기
산청 외공리 학살 매장지를 둘러보고 있는 관계자들
ⓒ 민중의소리
원리 민간인 피해자 사건의 경우 1949년 7월18일 덕산초등학교에 주둔하고 있던 국군 3연대 37명이 빨치산 출몰과 관련한 작전을 수행하던 중 전원이 몰살당하는 사건이 벌어진 바 있다. 이를 계기로 1950년 2월경 3연대 소속 국군이 시천, 삼장일대 지역 주민을 공비색출 명분으로 집결시켜 적과 내통했다는 이유로 집단 학살한 사건이다.
유족들의 증언에 의하면 야간에 빨치산이 음식을 구하기 위해 마을로 내려오고, 낮에는 국군이 마을로 와서 음식을 주었다는 이유로 마을 주민들을 통비분자로 몰아 죽창과 칼로 처형했다고 한다.
이와 달리 외공리 매장지 쪽 사건은 1951년 2월과 3월 사이 장갑차를 앞세운 트럭 3대에 분승한 군인들이 민간인들을 11대의 버스에 태우고 와서, 산청군 시천면 외공리 소정골에서 총살을 한 후 5곳의 구덩이에 매장한 사건이다. 이런 탓에 외공리 피해자들의 경우는 유족이 나타나지 않고 있는 것이 특징이다.
이에 대해 서봉석 전 산청군 의원은 “2000년 민간단체에서 1차 발굴을 진행한 결과를 보면 유품 중에 나타난 경농 등의 글자가 새겨진 단추와 금니, 실탄을 발견했다”고 말하고 이를 토대로 보면 피해자들은 부유층이며, 1.4 후퇴 당시 이송된 수도권지역 출신 민간인일 가능성이 높다는 예측을 했다.
또 유골을 파악한 결과 어린이와 여성들이 포함되어 있는 것으로 보여 가족단위로 끌려와 학살된 것으로 보인다고 추측했다.
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유해발굴 개토제
ⓒ 민중의소리
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개토제에 참석한 유족들이 묵념을 올리고 있다
ⓒ 민중의소리
이에 앞서 산청군 시천면 덕산중고등학교에서 열린 개토제에는 유족 100여명과 김동춘 교수(진실화해를 위한 과거사정리위원회 상임위원)와 이종흡 경남대학교 박물관장, 외공리 대책위와 한국전쟁 전후 민간인학살 전국유족회, 이재근 산청군수, 김민환 군의회의장 등이 참석했다.
김동춘 상임위원은 인사말을 통해 “왜 누가 그 사람들을 집단 살해했을까. 무엇이 두려워서 은밀하게 이런 일을 저질렀을까. 왜 어린이와 부녀자까지 죽였어야 했을까 하는 그 진실을 파헤지기 위해 첫 삽을 뜬다”고 말하고 이를 통해 “유족들의 한을 풀고 진실규명과 위령 화해사업의 토대를 마련하고자 한다”고 유해발굴의 목적을 설명했다.
또 김종현 전국 유족회 상임대표는 추도사를 통해 “반세기가 더 지난 길고 긴 세월이었다”고 회고한 후 “이제야 겨우 발굴이 이루어지니 만시지탄을 느낀다”고 말문을 열었다.
그는 “민간인이 조류독감에 걸린 닭처럼 무참하게 도륙을 당할 지는 누가 상상이나 했겠나”고 묻고 “산자는 죽은 자의 모습만큼 처참하고 불안하게 살아왔다. 철저하게 진상을 규명해 유족들이 제사라도 지낼 수 있게 해 달라”고 소원했다.
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제를 올리고 있는 유족들
ⓒ 민중의소리
이번 유해발굴을 담당하고 있는 이상길 교수(경남대 사학과)는 억울한 희생이란 것을 잘 알고 있지만 이데올로기 문제를 떠나 유해를 발굴하고, 그 발굴과정을 통해 진실을 확보하고 피해자들의 영혼을 달랠 수 있도록 노력하겠다고 각오를 밝혔다.
그는 문화제 발굴기법을 사용해 2개월 정도의 발굴을 예정하고 있다며, 외공리부터 발굴조사에 들어 갈 것이라고 설명했다.
진실화해위는 이번 발굴을 통해 유골이나 유해를 통해서 피학살자들의 신원과 가해자, 피해자들 중 어린이와 여성들이 있는지 등 목격자들의 증언을 입증할 수 있는 결정적인 증거가 나오기를 기대하고 있다.
구자환 기자kmindong@korea.com
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2000년 1차 발굴한 외공리 피학살자 유해를 모은 봉분
ⓒ 민중의소리
한국전쟁 전후 민간인 집단 희생사건에 대한 실태를 파악하고 진상을 규명하기 위해 유골발굴을 진행하고 있는 진실ㆍ화해를 위한 과거사정리위원회(이하 진실화해위)가 2008년 유해 발굴지 계획을 확정해 발표했다.
유해발굴 계획이 확정된 곳은 △산청군 원리 및 외공리 △전남 순천시 매곡동 △충북 청원 분터골 및 지경골 △경북 경산코발트 광산 △전남 진도군 갈매기 섬이다.
진실화해위는 이들 유해 발굴지 중 경남 산청군 원리와 외공리 민간인학살사건에 대해 19일 먼저 발굴사업을 시작했다. 경남지역에서는 2000년 산청 외공리, 2004년 마산시 진전면 여양리에서 보도연맹관련 피해자들의 유해가 민간차원에서 발굴되기는 했지만, 국가 주도로 민간인 학살자들의 유해가 발굴되기는 이번이 처음이다.
산청군 외공리와 원리 민간인 학살에 대해서는 아직 정확하게 밝혀진 것은 없으나, 일단 국민보도연맹 피해자는 아니라는 견해가 지배적이다.
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산청 외공리 학살 매장지를 둘러보고 있는 관계자들
ⓒ 민중의소리
원리 민간인 피해자 사건의 경우 1949년 7월18일 덕산초등학교에 주둔하고 있던 국군 3연대 37명이 빨치산 출몰과 관련한 작전을 수행하던 중 전원이 몰살당하는 사건이 벌어진 바 있다. 이를 계기로 1950년 2월경 3연대 소속 국군이 시천, 삼장일대 지역 주민을 공비색출 명분으로 집결시켜 적과 내통했다는 이유로 집단 학살한 사건이다.
유족들의 증언에 의하면 야간에 빨치산이 음식을 구하기 위해 마을로 내려오고, 낮에는 국군이 마을로 와서 음식을 주었다는 이유로 마을 주민들을 통비분자로 몰아 죽창과 칼로 처형했다고 한다.
이와 달리 외공리 매장지 쪽 사건은 1951년 2월과 3월 사이 장갑차를 앞세운 트럭 3대에 분승한 군인들이 민간인들을 11대의 버스에 태우고 와서, 산청군 시천면 외공리 소정골에서 총살을 한 후 5곳의 구덩이에 매장한 사건이다. 이런 탓에 외공리 피해자들의 경우는 유족이 나타나지 않고 있는 것이 특징이다.
이에 대해 서봉석 전 산청군 의원은 “2000년 민간단체에서 1차 발굴을 진행한 결과를 보면 유품 중에 나타난 경농 등의 글자가 새겨진 단추와 금니, 실탄을 발견했다”고 말하고 이를 토대로 보면 피해자들은 부유층이며, 1.4 후퇴 당시 이송된 수도권지역 출신 민간인일 가능성이 높다는 예측을 했다.
또 유골을 파악한 결과 어린이와 여성들이 포함되어 있는 것으로 보여 가족단위로 끌려와 학살된 것으로 보인다고 추측했다.
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유해발굴 개토제
ⓒ 민중의소리
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개토제에 참석한 유족들이 묵념을 올리고 있다
ⓒ 민중의소리
이에 앞서 산청군 시천면 덕산중고등학교에서 열린 개토제에는 유족 100여명과 김동춘 교수(진실화해를 위한 과거사정리위원회 상임위원)와 이종흡 경남대학교 박물관장, 외공리 대책위와 한국전쟁 전후 민간인학살 전국유족회, 이재근 산청군수, 김민환 군의회의장 등이 참석했다.
김동춘 상임위원은 인사말을 통해 “왜 누가 그 사람들을 집단 살해했을까. 무엇이 두려워서 은밀하게 이런 일을 저질렀을까. 왜 어린이와 부녀자까지 죽였어야 했을까 하는 그 진실을 파헤지기 위해 첫 삽을 뜬다”고 말하고 이를 통해 “유족들의 한을 풀고 진실규명과 위령 화해사업의 토대를 마련하고자 한다”고 유해발굴의 목적을 설명했다.
또 김종현 전국 유족회 상임대표는 추도사를 통해 “반세기가 더 지난 길고 긴 세월이었다”고 회고한 후 “이제야 겨우 발굴이 이루어지니 만시지탄을 느낀다”고 말문을 열었다.
그는 “민간인이 조류독감에 걸린 닭처럼 무참하게 도륙을 당할 지는 누가 상상이나 했겠나”고 묻고 “산자는 죽은 자의 모습만큼 처참하고 불안하게 살아왔다. 철저하게 진상을 규명해 유족들이 제사라도 지낼 수 있게 해 달라”고 소원했다.
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제를 올리고 있는 유족들
ⓒ 민중의소리
이번 유해발굴을 담당하고 있는 이상길 교수(경남대 사학과)는 억울한 희생이란 것을 잘 알고 있지만 이데올로기 문제를 떠나 유해를 발굴하고, 그 발굴과정을 통해 진실을 확보하고 피해자들의 영혼을 달랠 수 있도록 노력하겠다고 각오를 밝혔다.
그는 문화제 발굴기법을 사용해 2개월 정도의 발굴을 예정하고 있다며, 외공리부터 발굴조사에 들어 갈 것이라고 설명했다.
진실화해위는 이번 발굴을 통해 유골이나 유해를 통해서 피학살자들의 신원과 가해자, 피해자들 중 어린이와 여성들이 있는지 등 목격자들의 증언을 입증할 수 있는 결정적인 증거가 나오기를 기대하고 있다.
Seagull Island, Jin-do - Unearthed Masscre / Bodo League
진도 '갈매기섬 비극'
60년 만에 규명되나
한국전쟁 당시 해남보도연맹원 300명 이상 학살
진실화해위, 9월 유해발굴 개시
입력시간 : 2008. 07.31. 00:00
진도 갈매기섬에서 집단 학살된 희생자 유골 중 지상에 노출된 일부를 수습해 관에 안치, 향후 합동 무덤 조성 등에 대비해 임시로 마련한 초분. 진도군 제공
진도군 의신면 수품항에서 쾌속선으로 30여 분 거리에 있는 무인도 '갈매기섬(갈명도)'. 크기가 각기 다른 3개의 섬이 잇닿아 있어 멀리서보면 마치 갈매기나 날개를 펴고 나는 것처럼 보인다고 해서 이같은 이름을 얻었다.
가끔 낚싯배만 찾을 뿐 한가롭던 갈매기섬이 민간인 집단 학살이라는 비극의 현장으로 전락한 것은 한국전쟁 발발 직후인 1950년 7월.
당시 이승만 정권의 지시를 받은 경찰이 해남 출신 보도연맹원들을 대거 연행, 구금해오다 북한군이 진격해오자 부산으로 퇴각하면서 길목에 있는 갈매기섬에서 집단 학살을 자행한 것이다.
당시 희생자 수에 대해서는 약간의 이견이 있지만 한국전쟁 전후 민간인 학살 진상규명과 명예회복을 위한 범국민위원회 해남군 유족회는 300명이 넘을 것으로 추정하고 있다. 희생자 대부분은 해남군 산이면을 중심으로 북평, 화산, 송지, 삼산면 등지에서 소집된 보도연맹원들로 알려졌다.
하지만 갈매기섬의 민간인 학살이 세상에 알려진 것은 사건 발생 한참 뒤의 일이었다. 경찰이 해남이 아닌 진도의 외딴 섬을 학살 장소로 택한 데다 이곳이 사람의 왕래가 없는 무인도였기 때문이다. 더욱이 서슬퍼런 군부독재 시절 공권력의 상징인 경찰에 의해 벌어진 학살사건을 파헤친다는 것도 쉽지 않은 일이었다.
이 때문에 유족들은 숨진 가족의 시신조차 찾지 못한 채 오랜 세월 가슴에 한을 품고 지내올 수밖에 없었다.
해남군 유족회 관계자는 "당시 경찰에 끌려간 채 소식이 끊긴 가족의 생사를 몰라 발을 동동 구르던 유족들은 2002년 갈매기섬에서 신원을 알 수 없
는 다량의 유골이 발견된 뒤 소문으로만 떠돌던 참상을 확인할 수 있었다"며 "그러나 경찰은 희생자 명단 등 관련 기록 열람을 거부하는 등 유족들의 진실규명 작업을 방해했다"고 말했다.
60년 가까운 세월이 흐르면서 역사의 뒤안길에 묻힐 뻔한 갈매기섬 사건의 진실이 햇빛을 보게 됐다.
진실ㆍ화해를 위한 과거사정리위원회(위원장 안병욱ㆍ이하 진실화해위원회)가 9월부터 진도 갈매기섬에 대한 유해발굴작업을 시작한다.
진실화해위원회는 발굴 작업을 통해 정확한 희생자 규모를 밝혀내는 한편 DNA검사로 신원 파악에도 나설 계획이다. 유해발굴단은 30일 진도 갈매기섬을 찾아 현지답사를 진행하는 등 발빠른 움직임을 보이고 있다. 진실화해위원회 관계자는 "유해 발굴작업은 갈매기섬 사건 진상규명을 위한 증거 수집 차원에서 이뤄진다"며 "현지에서 이미 상당수의 유골이 발견된만큼 많은 성과를 거둘 것으로 기대한다"고 밝혔다.
갈매기섬 진상규명 작업에 주력해온 향토사학자 박문규(74)씨는 "이번 유해 발굴을 통해 억울하게 희생된 희생자의 넋을 위로하고 유가족들의 아픔이 조금이나마 치유되길 바란다"며 "앞으로 희생자 신원 확인은 물론 집단학살의 전개과정, 갈매기섬까지의 이동경로, 학살일시 등 정확한 사건의 실체가 밝혀져야 한다"고 강조했다.
박성원 기자 swpark@jnilbo.com
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보도연맹사건 = 좌익 운동을 하다 전향한 사람들로 1949년 전국적으로 조직된 반공단체로 정식 명칭은 '국민보도연맹'이다.
강제적으로 가입이 이뤄졌으며 지역별 할당제가 있어 사상범이 아닌 경우에도 등록되는 경우가 많았다.
한국전쟁이 일어나자 정부와 경찰은 이들이 북한군과 내통할 우려가 있다는 이유로 해남을 비롯한 전국 각지에서 무차별적인 학살을 단행했다.
60년 만에 규명되나
한국전쟁 당시 해남보도연맹원 300명 이상 학살
진실화해위, 9월 유해발굴 개시
입력시간 : 2008. 07.31. 00:00
진도 갈매기섬에서 집단 학살된 희생자 유골 중 지상에 노출된 일부를 수습해 관에 안치, 향후 합동 무덤 조성 등에 대비해 임시로 마련한 초분. 진도군 제공
진도군 의신면 수품항에서 쾌속선으로 30여 분 거리에 있는 무인도 '갈매기섬(갈명도)'. 크기가 각기 다른 3개의 섬이 잇닿아 있어 멀리서보면 마치 갈매기나 날개를 펴고 나는 것처럼 보인다고 해서 이같은 이름을 얻었다.
가끔 낚싯배만 찾을 뿐 한가롭던 갈매기섬이 민간인 집단 학살이라는 비극의 현장으로 전락한 것은 한국전쟁 발발 직후인 1950년 7월.
당시 이승만 정권의 지시를 받은 경찰이 해남 출신 보도연맹원들을 대거 연행, 구금해오다 북한군이 진격해오자 부산으로 퇴각하면서 길목에 있는 갈매기섬에서 집단 학살을 자행한 것이다.
당시 희생자 수에 대해서는 약간의 이견이 있지만 한국전쟁 전후 민간인 학살 진상규명과 명예회복을 위한 범국민위원회 해남군 유족회는 300명이 넘을 것으로 추정하고 있다. 희생자 대부분은 해남군 산이면을 중심으로 북평, 화산, 송지, 삼산면 등지에서 소집된 보도연맹원들로 알려졌다.
하지만 갈매기섬의 민간인 학살이 세상에 알려진 것은 사건 발생 한참 뒤의 일이었다. 경찰이 해남이 아닌 진도의 외딴 섬을 학살 장소로 택한 데다 이곳이 사람의 왕래가 없는 무인도였기 때문이다. 더욱이 서슬퍼런 군부독재 시절 공권력의 상징인 경찰에 의해 벌어진 학살사건을 파헤친다는 것도 쉽지 않은 일이었다.
이 때문에 유족들은 숨진 가족의 시신조차 찾지 못한 채 오랜 세월 가슴에 한을 품고 지내올 수밖에 없었다.
해남군 유족회 관계자는 "당시 경찰에 끌려간 채 소식이 끊긴 가족의 생사를 몰라 발을 동동 구르던 유족들은 2002년 갈매기섬에서 신원을 알 수 없
는 다량의 유골이 발견된 뒤 소문으로만 떠돌던 참상을 확인할 수 있었다"며 "그러나 경찰은 희생자 명단 등 관련 기록 열람을 거부하는 등 유족들의 진실규명 작업을 방해했다"고 말했다.
60년 가까운 세월이 흐르면서 역사의 뒤안길에 묻힐 뻔한 갈매기섬 사건의 진실이 햇빛을 보게 됐다.
진실ㆍ화해를 위한 과거사정리위원회(위원장 안병욱ㆍ이하 진실화해위원회)가 9월부터 진도 갈매기섬에 대한 유해발굴작업을 시작한다.
진실화해위원회는 발굴 작업을 통해 정확한 희생자 규모를 밝혀내는 한편 DNA검사로 신원 파악에도 나설 계획이다. 유해발굴단은 30일 진도 갈매기섬을 찾아 현지답사를 진행하는 등 발빠른 움직임을 보이고 있다. 진실화해위원회 관계자는 "유해 발굴작업은 갈매기섬 사건 진상규명을 위한 증거 수집 차원에서 이뤄진다"며 "현지에서 이미 상당수의 유골이 발견된만큼 많은 성과를 거둘 것으로 기대한다"고 밝혔다.
갈매기섬 진상규명 작업에 주력해온 향토사학자 박문규(74)씨는 "이번 유해 발굴을 통해 억울하게 희생된 희생자의 넋을 위로하고 유가족들의 아픔이 조금이나마 치유되길 바란다"며 "앞으로 희생자 신원 확인은 물론 집단학살의 전개과정, 갈매기섬까지의 이동경로, 학살일시 등 정확한 사건의 실체가 밝혀져야 한다"고 강조했다.
박성원 기자 swpark@jnilbo.com
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
보도연맹사건 = 좌익 운동을 하다 전향한 사람들로 1949년 전국적으로 조직된 반공단체로 정식 명칭은 '국민보도연맹'이다.
강제적으로 가입이 이뤄졌으며 지역별 할당제가 있어 사상범이 아닌 경우에도 등록되는 경우가 많았다.
한국전쟁이 일어나자 정부와 경찰은 이들이 북한군과 내통할 우려가 있다는 이유로 해남을 비롯한 전국 각지에서 무차별적인 학살을 단행했다.
Buried truth of Korea killings exposed
Buried truth of Korea killings exposed
Korean War records show U.S. ambivalent during 'brutal chapter'
By Charles J. Hanley and Jae Soon Chang | Associated Press
11:05 PM CDT, July 6, 2008
DAEJEON, South Korea — Grave by mass grave, South Korea is unearthing the skeletons and buried truths of a cold-blooded slaughter from early in the Korean War.
With U.S. military officers sometimes present, and as North Korean invaders pushed down the peninsula in the summer of 1950, the southern army and police emptied South Korean prisons, lined up detainees and shot them in the head.
Some bodies were dumped into hastily dug trenches. Others were thrown into abandoned mines or the sea. Women and children were among those killed. Many victims never faced charges or trial.
The extermination campaign, carried out over mere weeks and largely hidden for a half-century, is "the most tragic and brutal chapter of the Korean War," said historian Kim Dong Choon, a member of a 2-year-old government commission investigating the mass executions.
The remains of hundreds have been uncovered, but researchers say those found are a tiny fraction of the deaths. An estimate of 100,000 such executions is "very conservative," said Kim. The true toll may be twice that or more, he said.
"Even now, I feel guilty that I pulled the trigger," said Lee Joon Young, 83, one of the executioners in a secluded valley near Daejeon in July 1950.
The retired prison guard said he knew that many of those shot and buried en masse were convicts or illiterate peasants wrongly ensnared in anti-communist roundups. They didn't deserve to die; they "knew nothing about communism," Lee said.
In addition, thousands of alleged collaborators with the communist occupation were slain by southern forces later in 1950, and North Korean troops conducted smaller-scale executions of rightists after their invasion on June 25, 1950.
Through the postwar decades of South Korea's dictatorships, fearful families kept silent about that blood-soaked summer. American military reports of the South Korean slaughter were stamped "secret." Communist accounts were dismissed as lies.
Mass graves uncovered
Only since the 1990s—and South Korea's democratization—has the truth begun to seep out.
In 2002, a typhoon led to the discovery of one mass grave. Another was found by a television news team that broke into a sealed mine. Further corroboration comes from a trickle of declassified U.S. military documents, including Army photographs of a mass killing outside Daejeon, about 90 miles south of Seoul.
Now the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has added government authority to the work of researchers, family members and journalists trying to peel away the cover-up.
The 17 investigators of the commission's subcommittee on "mass civilian sacrifice," led by Kim, have been dealing with petitions from more than 7,000 South Koreans, involving about 1,200 alleged incidents, including 215 cases in which the U.S. military is accused of the indiscriminate civilian killings in 1950-51, usually in air attacks.
The commission last year excavated sites at four of an estimated 150 mass graves across the country, recovering remains of more than 400 people. It has confirmed two large-scale executions—at a warehouse in the central county of Cheongwon and at Ulsan on the southeast coast.
In January, then-President Roh Moo Hyun, who helped establish the commission, formally apologized for the more than 870 deaths confirmed at Ulsan, calling them "illegal acts the then-state authority committed."
The commission, with no power to compel testimony or prosecute, faces daunting tasks both in verifying events and identifying victims, and in tracing a chain of responsibility. Under Roh's conservative successor, Lee Myung Bak, the commission may find less budgetary and political support.
The declassified U.S. military records and other documents show an ambivalent American attitude toward the killings—a hands-off position at times and disapproving statements at times.
In July 1950, truckloads of prisoners were brought in from the city's prison and elsewhere day after day as North Korean troops bore down on Daejeon.
Bound and shot
The U.S. photos, taken by an Army major and kept classified for a half-century, show the macabre sequence of events.
White-clad detainees with their hands bound were thrown down prone, jammed side by side, on the edge of a long trench. Members of the military and police then stepped up from behind and shot them in the head.
Trembling policemen—"they hadn't shot anyone before"—were sometimes off-target, leaving men wounded but alive, Lee said. He and others were ordered to finish off the wounded.
Evidence indicates from 3,000 to 7,000 were killed in Daejeon, Kim said.
CIA and U.S. military intelligence reports circulating at that time, and since declassified, told of the Daejeon killings. Lt. Col. Bob Edwards, U.S. Embassy military attache in South Korea, wrote in conveying the photos to Army intelligence in Washington that he believed nationwide "thousands of political prisoners were executed within [a] few weeks."
Kim said his projection of at least 100,000 dead is based on extrapolating from a survey by non-governmental organizations in one province, Busan's South Gyeongsang, which estimated 25,000 were killed. And initial evidence suggests most of the 300,000 on the South Korean government's lists of suspected leftists were killed, he said.
Commission investigators agree with Edwards' note to Washington in 1950, that "orders for execution undoubtedly came from the top," that is, then-President Syngman Rhee, who died in 1965.
However, a U.S. Army war crimes report attributed all summary executions in Daejeon to the "murderous barbarism" of North Koreans.
The life of the commission—with a staff of 240 and an annual budget of $19 million—is guaranteed by law until at least 2010, when it will issue a final, comprehensive report.
Korean War records show U.S. ambivalent during 'brutal chapter'
By Charles J. Hanley and Jae Soon Chang | Associated Press
11:05 PM CDT, July 6, 2008
DAEJEON, South Korea — Grave by mass grave, South Korea is unearthing the skeletons and buried truths of a cold-blooded slaughter from early in the Korean War.
With U.S. military officers sometimes present, and as North Korean invaders pushed down the peninsula in the summer of 1950, the southern army and police emptied South Korean prisons, lined up detainees and shot them in the head.
Some bodies were dumped into hastily dug trenches. Others were thrown into abandoned mines or the sea. Women and children were among those killed. Many victims never faced charges or trial.
The extermination campaign, carried out over mere weeks and largely hidden for a half-century, is "the most tragic and brutal chapter of the Korean War," said historian Kim Dong Choon, a member of a 2-year-old government commission investigating the mass executions.
The remains of hundreds have been uncovered, but researchers say those found are a tiny fraction of the deaths. An estimate of 100,000 such executions is "very conservative," said Kim. The true toll may be twice that or more, he said.
"Even now, I feel guilty that I pulled the trigger," said Lee Joon Young, 83, one of the executioners in a secluded valley near Daejeon in July 1950.
The retired prison guard said he knew that many of those shot and buried en masse were convicts or illiterate peasants wrongly ensnared in anti-communist roundups. They didn't deserve to die; they "knew nothing about communism," Lee said.
In addition, thousands of alleged collaborators with the communist occupation were slain by southern forces later in 1950, and North Korean troops conducted smaller-scale executions of rightists after their invasion on June 25, 1950.
Through the postwar decades of South Korea's dictatorships, fearful families kept silent about that blood-soaked summer. American military reports of the South Korean slaughter were stamped "secret." Communist accounts were dismissed as lies.
Mass graves uncovered
Only since the 1990s—and South Korea's democratization—has the truth begun to seep out.
In 2002, a typhoon led to the discovery of one mass grave. Another was found by a television news team that broke into a sealed mine. Further corroboration comes from a trickle of declassified U.S. military documents, including Army photographs of a mass killing outside Daejeon, about 90 miles south of Seoul.
Now the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has added government authority to the work of researchers, family members and journalists trying to peel away the cover-up.
The 17 investigators of the commission's subcommittee on "mass civilian sacrifice," led by Kim, have been dealing with petitions from more than 7,000 South Koreans, involving about 1,200 alleged incidents, including 215 cases in which the U.S. military is accused of the indiscriminate civilian killings in 1950-51, usually in air attacks.
The commission last year excavated sites at four of an estimated 150 mass graves across the country, recovering remains of more than 400 people. It has confirmed two large-scale executions—at a warehouse in the central county of Cheongwon and at Ulsan on the southeast coast.
In January, then-President Roh Moo Hyun, who helped establish the commission, formally apologized for the more than 870 deaths confirmed at Ulsan, calling them "illegal acts the then-state authority committed."
The commission, with no power to compel testimony or prosecute, faces daunting tasks both in verifying events and identifying victims, and in tracing a chain of responsibility. Under Roh's conservative successor, Lee Myung Bak, the commission may find less budgetary and political support.
The declassified U.S. military records and other documents show an ambivalent American attitude toward the killings—a hands-off position at times and disapproving statements at times.
In July 1950, truckloads of prisoners were brought in from the city's prison and elsewhere day after day as North Korean troops bore down on Daejeon.
Bound and shot
The U.S. photos, taken by an Army major and kept classified for a half-century, show the macabre sequence of events.
White-clad detainees with their hands bound were thrown down prone, jammed side by side, on the edge of a long trench. Members of the military and police then stepped up from behind and shot them in the head.
Trembling policemen—"they hadn't shot anyone before"—were sometimes off-target, leaving men wounded but alive, Lee said. He and others were ordered to finish off the wounded.
Evidence indicates from 3,000 to 7,000 were killed in Daejeon, Kim said.
CIA and U.S. military intelligence reports circulating at that time, and since declassified, told of the Daejeon killings. Lt. Col. Bob Edwards, U.S. Embassy military attache in South Korea, wrote in conveying the photos to Army intelligence in Washington that he believed nationwide "thousands of political prisoners were executed within [a] few weeks."
Kim said his projection of at least 100,000 dead is based on extrapolating from a survey by non-governmental organizations in one province, Busan's South Gyeongsang, which estimated 25,000 were killed. And initial evidence suggests most of the 300,000 on the South Korean government's lists of suspected leftists were killed, he said.
Commission investigators agree with Edwards' note to Washington in 1950, that "orders for execution undoubtedly came from the top," that is, then-President Syngman Rhee, who died in 1965.
However, a U.S. Army war crimes report attributed all summary executions in Daejeon to the "murderous barbarism" of North Koreans.
The life of the commission—with a staff of 240 and an annual budget of $19 million—is guaranteed by law until at least 2010, when it will issue a final, comprehensive report.
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
The South Korean Massacre at Taejon: New Evidence on US Responsibility and Coverup
The South Korean Massacre at Taejon: New Evidence on US Responsibility and Coverup
Bruce Cumings
In July 2008 the world media heralded the arrest of “the world’s most wanted war criminal,” Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. He had been in hiding for thirteen years, ever since he was charged with genocide by the United Nations war crimes tribunal in The Hague for his role in the massacre of some 8,000 Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica. These events were subsequently termed “Europe’s worst slaughter of civilians since World War II.” [1]
Radovan Karadzic in office and when captured
Fifty-eight years earlier, in another distant July, the North Korean People’s Army bore down upon the city of Taejon, south of Seoul. Police authorities removed political prisoners from local jails, men and boys along with some women, massacred them, threw them into open pits, and dumped the earth back on them. Somewhere between 4,000 and 7,000 died, and their stories remained buried for half a century. American officers stood idly by while this slaughter went on, photographing it for their records, but doing nothing to stop it. In September 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to keep these photos classified; they were not released until 1999, after a determined effort by a psychologist in New York, Do-Young Lee, whose father had been murdered by southern authorities in August 1950.
Charles Hanley and other colleagues at the Associated Press first broke the story of the Taejon massacre in the American press in 1999. After I was quoted in the media about it, I got a phone call from an American woman in Los Angeles whose father was one of the people slaughtered. In 1947 she was a Korean citizen living under the American Military Government, one of six children of a factory owner in a town near Taejon. He had prospered during the Japanese colonial period, and at liberation thought it desirable to share some of his wealth. He was arrested in the raucous summer of 1947 (when hundreds if not thousands of Koreans died at the hands of the Occupation’s National Police) for giving money to “communists” and was still rotting in prison in July 1950. This woman (a registered nurse) and her four sisters and one brother had never been able to tell anyone outside the family how their father died. For half a century they had agonized over the loss of the family patri! arch, but privately even unto themselves—no one ever talked about it. She was weeping over the phone for half an hour about her experience.
Charles Hanley has been following this story for nearly a decade by now, and the two articles herein reflect both a deepened understanding of these distant events, and a maddening paradox about the United States and its citizens: when they finally pay attention, Americans are entirely capable of calling their leaders to account for their actions. Most of the time, however, no one pays attention, and in the worst instance, when awful crimes occur for which the U.S. bears a deep responsibility, they are covered up and buried, and one wonders if anyone cares—even when the truth finally comes to light. Neither of Mr. Hanley’s articles was picked up or covered by our paper of record, the New York Times (even though the Times had run a short version of the original Associated Press story on this massacre). Yet the Los Angeles nurse’s father was thrown into prison under the U.S. Military Government (1945-48), as were perhaps the majority of the prisoners in Taejon; this is ! a direct link between the Americans who held ultimate authority in southern Korea, and the awful events of July 1950. Yet most Americans, including some journalists for the New York Times in my experience, are unaware that there even was an American occupation of Korea after World War II.
But is this not a terrible story? I still recall, during my research on the Korean War, coming across a contemporary article in the London Daily Worker by Alan Winnington claiming that 7,000 non-combatants had been slaughtered by southern authorities in Taejon. The American Embassy in London denounced his article as a fabrication. I also wanted to chalk it up to communist propaganda, but I had lived through the Vietnam War and had become deeply skeptical of my own government’s credibility; I made a silent bet with myself that Winnington was probably not the liar. Later on I discovered archival evidence that Winnington was much closer to the truth than were the American officials who instantly laid the murders at the door of the North Koreans, and indeed have always denied that any such massacres occurred at any point during the three-year war. The official military history of the war in this period, Roy Appleman’s 1961 book, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, blamed ! the Taejon massacre (and all other atrocities against civilians) on the North Koreans. Now that we have Hanley’s articles and other work based on declassified documentation, we know that Appleman, who had access to all internal documents, was not an honest historian but a participant in the cover-up.
It isn’t as if Americans at the time had illusions about their allies. The best candidate for South Korea’s leading war criminal—its Karadzic—is Kim Chong-wôn, otherwise known as “Tiger” Kim, and his career opens an individual window on the events upon which Mr. Hanley focuses. Kim epitomized the elite that the U.S. midwifed into power in South Korea, a man capable of anything, no doubt laughing to himself as Americans tried to corral his worst instincts. Charles Hanley links Kim to Lt. Col. Rollins S. Emmerich and the latter’s apparent willingness to allow Kim to slaughter thousands more prisoners held in Pusan jails, should the North Koreans threaten the city. In fact Emmerich and Kim go back much further than that.
Police Chief Chang Taek-sang with a man who may be Tiger Kim (left)
Kim Chong-wôn got the name “Tiger” for his service to the Japanese Army, and after 1945 he liked journalists to call him “the Tiger of Mt. Paekdu.” He volunteered for the Imperial Army in 1940 and rose to sergeant, “a rank which epitomized the brutality of the Japanese Army at its worst,” in the words of John Muccio, the U.S. Ambassador to Seoul in 1950; Kim served the Japanese in New Guinea and the Philippines. By 1946 he was in the Korean National Police, and for eight months in 1947 was the personal bodyguard of Chang T’aek-sang, head of the Seoul Metropolitan Police under the U.S. Occupation, and one of the most powerful men in Korea. Kim later entered the Army, where he rose quickly through the ranks in guerrilla suppression campaigns. Americans remembered him for his brutality in these campaigns (Muccio called it “ruthless and effective”), and for his refusal to take American orders. An American in 1948 termed him “a rather huge, brute of a man,” after! witnessing Kim and his men “mercilessly” beat captured rebels, including women and children, “with cot rounds, bamboo sticks, fists.” By August 1949 he was a regimental commander, and when the war began he was stationed along the 38th parallel.
Shortly thereafter an American advisor went “berserk with the idea of killing Kim,” according to Muccio. This officer was none other than Lt. Col. Emmerich, and he was not berserk: he said he would have to shoot Kim, “if no one else will get rid of him.” Kim was berserk: he had killed some of his own officers and men for alleged disobedience, avoided the front lines of fighting like the plague, and had beheaded fifty POWs and guerrillas (said to be just “one group” among others that had received this treatment). Soon Emmerich was transferred and Kim was temporarily relieved of his command under American pressure. When the Red Cross subsequently made representations about his murder of POWs, American officers said they “would not like to see it get in the hand of correspondents.” Kim’s furlough proved to be brief. President Syngman Rhee promoted him to Deputy Provost Marshal, and he soon commanded the martial law regime in Pusan, where as Hanley shows he again met up! with Emmerich, and distinguished himself in the squalid terror of the “conscription campaigns”, which consisted of “shanghai-ing the required number of young men off the streets.” He also prided himself on being a “one-man censor of the press,” which he indeed was in one instance where he personally administered a beating to two reporters for the Yônhap Sinmun. Although he was clearly, on this evidence, a war criminal, Tiger Kim was part of President Rhee’s bestiary of close and trusted confidants. Once South Korean forces entered Pyongyang in the fall of 1950, Rhee placed Kim in charge of the initial occupation, naming him Deputy Provost Marshall General for the northern capital. [2]
After the war another Korean officer in the Japanese military, Park Chung Hee, seized power and ruled until an October day in 1979 when his own intelligence chief, Kim Chae-gyu, murdered him over dinner. Kim was also a former Japanese officer. Indeed, both men had graduated in 1946 from the American military academy set up in the early years of the US occupation. A young protégé of Park’s, Chun Doo Hwan, mounted his own coup in May 1980 over the dead bodies of hundreds of Kwangju citizens. President Jimmy Carter, known for his human rights policies, supported Chun’s rise to power because he feared the North Koreans might take advantage of rebellions in the South. The Kwangju massacre was not a crime on the scale of Srebrenica: but Taejon was. And as always in our relations with Korea, it seems, Americans were just uninvolved bystanders, doing nothing—and therefore blameless, and therefore innocent. Someday the depth of American responsibility for the tr! agedies of postwar Korea will be fully known, but it is doubtful that Americans will be paying attention.
Bruce Cumings teaches in the History Department and the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago and is the author of the two volume work The Origins of the Korean War and North Korea: Another Country.
Bruce Cumings wrote this article for Japan Focus. Posted July 23, 2008.
See the accompanying series of stories by Associated Press writers Charles J. Hanley and Jae-Soon Chang. Summer of Terror: At least 100,000 said executed by Korean ally of US in 1950.
Notes
[1] “A Leader turned Ghost,” New York Times (July 22, 2008), p. A10. [Note that this AP report carried no byline.]
[2] Most of the information and quotations in the text are in Ambassador Muccio’s report, State Department 795.00 file, box 4267, “`Tiger’ Kim vs. the press,” May 12, 1951. On the beheading incident, see Record Group 338, entries for July 26 and Aug. 2, 1950. On Rhee and Tiger Kim, see the Matthew Ridgway Papers, box 20, draft of a message Muccio planned to present to Rhee, May 3, 1951, chiding Rhee for relying on Tiger Kim and his ilk for intelligence information, rather than the established agencies. On the occupation of Pyongyang see Truman Library, PSF, CIA file, box 248, daily summaries for Oct. 19, 25, 1950; ibid., NSC file, box 3, CIA report for Oct. 25, 1950; 795.00 file, box 4267, Muccio to State, May 12, 1951.
Japan Focus
미군정하 대한민국 대전에서의 대량학살:
이와 관련한 미국의 책임과 은폐시도에 관한 새로운 증거 자료
부르스 커밍스
2008년 7월 세계 언론은 역사상 가장 악명 높은 전범 중 한 명인 보스니아의 세르비아계 리더인 라도반 카라드지치의 체포 소식을 알렸다. 그는 헤이그의 국제연합 전범 재판소에서 스레브레니카에서 있었던 8천 여명의 무슬림계 남성과 소년들의 대량학살과 관련하여 그의 역할이 책임이 있다는 판결을 받은 이후부터 13년 간 은둔 생활을 하였다. 이 사건들은 2차 세계대전 이후 유럽에서 발생한 가장 참혹한 민간인에 대한 대량학살이라는 오명을 갖게 되었다.
58년 전 7월, 조선 인민 공화국 군대가 대한민국의 대전을 침략하였다. 경찰권력은 정치범들을 지역 감호소로부터 빼낸 다음, 구덩이 속에 그들을 집어 넣은 다음 매장하였다. 4천에서 7천여 명이 당시 사망하였고, 그들의 이야기는 그 후 반세기가 넘는 시간 동안 사람들의 기억 속에 묻혀 있었다. 당시 관련 미군들은 학살이 진행되는 동안 이를 방관하였고, 자신들의 내부기록을 위해 이를 사진으로 남겼으나 학살을 막기 위한 어떠한 조치도 취하지 않았다. 1950년 9월 한미연합사령관은 관련 사진들을 기밀로 유지하기로 결정하였고, 이 기록은 뉴욕에 거주하는 심리학자 이도영씨 (이도영씨의 아버지는 1950년 8월 대한민국 정부 기관들에 의해 살해되었다)의 결심과 노력이 열매를 맺은 직후인 1999년까지 공개되지 않았다.
AP 소속의 찰스 핸리와 그의 동료들은 1999년 미국 언론들에 반세기 전 대한민국 대전에서 발생한 집단 학살에 관한 이야기를 처음으로 공개하였다. 또한 사건과 관련하여 미디어에 본인이 소개된 후 필자는 미국 로스엔젤레스에서 거주하는 한 여인으로부터 그녀의 아버지 또한 당시 학살된 사람들 중 한 명이었다는 전화를 받았다. 1947년, 그녀는 미군정하에 살아가고 있는 대한민국의 시민이었고, 대전 근처의 한 마을에 위치한 공장의 소유주의 여섯 아이 중 하나였다. 그녀 아버지의 사업은 일제시대 동안 번창하였고, 해방이 되면서 그녀의 아버지는 가진 재산의 일부를 나누는 것이 합당하다고 생각하였다. 그는 소란스러웠던 1947년 (수 백 명에서 수 천명으로 추산되는 한국인들이 점령군 경찰력에 의해 사망할 당시) 여름 “공산주의자들”에게 자금을 제공한 혐의로 체포되었고, 1950년 7월까지 현지 구치소에 감금되어 있는 상황이었다. 간호사로 일하고 있는 이 여성과 그녀의 네 자매, 1명의 남자 형제는 그 동안 어떻게 그들의 아버지가 사망하였는지에 관련하여서는 가족 이외의 그 누구에게도 말할 기회를 갖지 못했고, 지난 반세기 동안 아버지의 죽음과 관련한 상실감에 고뇌하였다. 전화기에 대고 그녀는 30분여 분간 자신의 경험을 얘기하며 흐느꼈다.
찰스 핸리는 지금까지 거의 10여 년에 걸쳐 위에 소개된 사건을 추적하여 왔고, 그 중 두 개의 기사가 위에 언급된 사건과 관련한 심도 깊은 이해와 미국과 미국인들에 대한 역설적인 면을 잘 반영하고 있다. 이 사건들이 마침내 주목을 받게 되었을 때, 미국인들은 자신들의 지도자들에게 그들의 행동에 대한 책임을 물을 수 있게 되었다. 그러나 이 사건에 관심을 기울이는 사람은 대체로 거의 없었고, 최악의 경우에 어떤 이들은 미국이 깊이 책임을 져야 할 사건들이 이슈화되는 것을 은폐하려 하였고, 많은 이들은 심지어 진실이 결국 규명되었다 하더라고 누구 하나 관심이 있는 이들이 있을까를 궁금해 하는 상황에까지 이르렀다. 찰스 핸리의 위의 사건과 관련된 기사 중 그 어떤 것도 뉴욕타임즈에 의해 다뤄지지 못했다 (AP에 사건과 관련한 그의 짤막한 토막기사가 간략하게 소개되기는 하였다). 그러나 위에 소개된 미국 로스엔젤레스에 거주하고 있는 간호사의 아버지는 당시 대전에 있던 대다수의 정치범들의 경우와 마찬가지로 미군정 (1945~48)하에서 감금되었고, 이는 당시 남한에서 절대적 권력을 갖고 있었던 미군정과 1950년 7월에 발생한 끔찍한 사건을 잊는 직접적 연결고리이다. 그러나 필자의 경험으로 미루어 판단컨데, 뉴욕타임즈의 몇몇 기자들을 비롯한 대다수의 미국인들은 2차 세계대전 이후 미국이 한국을 점령한 사실이 있었던지 조차 인지하고 있지 못하다.
참으로 당혹스러운 이야기가 아닐 수 없다. 필자는 한국 전쟁에 관해 조사를 하던 중 당시 대전에서 7,000여 명의 비전투인(민간인)이 학살되었다고 주장하는 London Daily Worker지에 실린 앨랜 위닝턴의 기사를 본 기억이 있다. 런던 소재 미국 대사관은 그의 기사를 위조된 것이라 일축하였다. 필자 역시 이를 공산주의자들의 선전책동이라고 치부하고 싶었으나, 본인 또한 베트남 전쟁을 경험하며 이를 통해 필자의 정부 (미국 정부)의 신용도에 관해 심각하게 의구심을 갖게 되었던 터라 이 소식을 접하며 위닝턴이 거짓말을 하고 있지는 않을 것이다 라고 개인적으로 생각하게 되었다. 그 후 필자는 위닝턴이 단순이 사건을 북한의 책임으로 돌리고, 3년 동안의 전쟁 기간 중에 그러한 민간인에 대한 대량학살들이 자행되었다는 것을 언제나 부인하는 미국 공무원들보다 훨씬 진실에 가깝게 접근하여 있다는 관련 기록 자료를 발견하였다. 당시 전쟁 중 공식 군 기록을 인용하고 있는 로이 애플먼의 1961년 책 “South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu”에 의하면, 미군정은 대전에서의 대량학살을 비롯한 민간인에 대한 기타의 다른 대량 참살의 책임을 전적으로 북한에게 돌리고 있음을 알 수 있다. 그러나 우리는 핸리의 기사들과 그 밖의 보안이 해지된 기밀 서류 등을 근거로 하여 당시 내부 문서에 접근이 가능했었던 애플먼이 진실하지 못한 역사학자이자 사건의 은폐에 사실상 참여하였다는 것을 지금은 알 수 있다.
그러나 미국이 그 동맹국에 관해 환상을 갖고 있었던 것 같지는 않다. 구 유고슬라비아 학살의 전범 카라지치에 해당할 만한 남한의 대표적인 전범으로는 “타이거 킴” 이라고 알려진 김종원을 들 수 있다. 그의 화려한 경력은 핸리가 관심을 두고 있던 사건들에 관해 개별적인 관점을 제공한다. 김종원은 당시 남한에서의 미군정의 영향력을 확대시키기 위해 매개체로 사용한 엘리트 집단의 전형적 모습을 가지고 있었다. 찰스 핸리는 김종원을 론린스 에머리크 중령과 연관시키고 있는데, 이는 에머리크 중령이 북한이 부산을 위협한다면 김종원으로 하여금 부산 구치소에 감금되어 있는 수천 명의 수감수들을 추가로 학살하는 것을 의도적으로 간과하리라는 것이 분명하였기 때문이다. 사실, 에머리크 중령과 김종원의 관계는 이보다 훨씬 과거로 거슬러 간다.
김종원은 일본 군대에서의 그의 역할을 통해 “타이거”라는 별명을 갖고 있었는데, 일설에 의하면 1945년 이후 그는 기자들에게 자신을 “백두산의 타이거”라고 지칭해 주기를 요청하였다고 한다. 김은 1940년 일본제국군대에 자원하였고 존 무치오가 표현하기로 최고로기에 일본군의 잔인함을 가장 적절히 전형시킨 계급인 하사관까지 진급하였고, 1950년에는 서울 주둔 미국 대사를 역임하였으며, 뉴기니와 필리핀에서 일본군을 위하여 근무하였다. 1946년 무렵 그는 한국의 경찰이되었고, 그 후 8개월 간 1947년까지 미군정 하의 서울시경찰청장이었던 장개상의 개인 경호관이자, 당시 한국에서 가장 권력이 있는 이 가운데 한 명이 되었다. 그 후 군대에 입대한 김종원은 게릴라 소탕 작전 등에서 세운 공 등으로 빠르게 진급해 나갔다. 미국인들은 당시 김을 게릴라 소탕에서 그가 보여준 잔인한 면모와 (이를 존 무치오는 “무자비하나 효율적인”이라고 표현하였다) 미국측의 명령을 따르기를 거부했던 한국인 정도로 기억하였다. 1948년 한 미국인은 생포한 포로와 여자, 어린이들을 인정 사정없이 폭행하는 김과 그의 부하들을 본 후, 김종원을 “다소 비대하고 냉혹한 사람”이라고 묘사하였다. 1949년 무렵 김종원은 연대장이 되었고, 전쟁이 시작될 무렵에는 38선을 따라 주둔하였다.
그 직후, 존 무치오에 따르면, 한 미국인 자문가는 김종원을 암살할 계획에 몰두하였다고 하는데, 이 미국인이 에머리크 중령이고, 그는 다른 누군가가 김을 없애지 않는다면, 자신이 그를 쏴야 할 것이라고 말했다. 당시 김종원은 소위 불복종이라는 혐의를 씌워 자신의 사령관들과 부하를 처단하였고, 전투의 선봉에 서는 것을 기피하였으며, 50여 명에 달하는 전범과 게릴라를 처형하였다. (이와 관련해 어떤 자료는 앞의 수치는 비슷한 처벌을 받은 여러 개의 집단 중 한나의 경우일 뿐이라고 말하고 있다.) 그 후, 에머리크 중령은 다른 곳으로 전령을 받았고, 김은 미군정으로부터의 압력으로부터 임시적으로 자유로울 수 있었다. 적십자사가 전범들의 살해에 관한 김종원의 역할에 관해 언급하였을 때, 미군관계자들은 “그 자료가 기자들의 손에 들어가는 것을 보고 싶지 않다.”고 하였다.
김종원의 미군정의 압력으로부터 자유로울 수 있었던 기간은 짧았다. 당시 남한의 초대 대통령이었던 이승만은 김을 Deputy Provost Marshal로 승진시켰고, 김은 직후부터 부산에서 시행된 계엄령을 진두 지휘하였다. 부산에서 김은 에머리크와 다시금 조우하게 되었는데, 이 때 김종원은 거리에서 젊은이들을 속여 강제로 동원, 징집한 “징병운동” 비열한 공포를 조성하는 등의 활동으로 자신의 역할을 각인시키고 있었다. 김은 또한 당시 언론을 통제하는 유일한 사람이었는데, 일례로 그는 연합신문의 기자 두 명에 대한 폭력을 지휘한 혐의를 받은 사건이 있었다. 위와 같은 예에서 보여지듯이 분명히 전범이었음에도 불구하고, “타이거 킴”은 이승만 당시 대통령에게 가장 가깝고도 신임을 받는 이들 중 하나가 되었다. 1950년 가을, 남한 군이 평양에 진입하자, 이승만은 김에게 Deputy Provost Marshall General로 임명하여 초기 점령을 책임지게 하였다.
전후 일본군 내의 또 다른 한국인 장교였던 박정희는 정권을 잡고 자신의 최 측근인 정보부장이자 역시 일본군의 장교였던 김재규가 저녁식사 장소에서 그를 암살할 때인 1979년 10월까지 국가를 통치하였다. 사실, 김재규와 박정희는 모두 1946년 미군정 초기에 설립된 미국군사학교 (American Military Academy)에서 수학하였다. 박정희의 젊은 추종자였던 전두환은 1980년 광주에서 수백 명의 학살을 야기시키며 쿠테타를 일으켰다. 인권정책으로 유명한 당시 미국의 지미 카터 대통령은 전두환의 정권찬탈 계획을 지지하였는데, 이는 남한의 혼란한 정국을 탄 북한의 도발을 우려했기 때문이었다. 광주학살은 스레브레니카의 것과는 그 규모가 비교되지 못하지만, 대전학살의 경우는 스레브레니카 학살과 그 규모 면에서도 견줄 수 있을 만 하다. 그리고 한국과의 관계를 언급할 때는 항상 그래왔듯이, 이 때에도 미국은 당시의 상황에 직접적으로는 개입하지 않았던 방관자였다고, 그렇기 때문에 책임을 면할 수 있다고 주장한다. 언젠가는 전후 한국에서 발생하였던 참상들에 미국이 얼마나 책임이 있는지가 완전히 알려질 때가 있을 것이다, 그러나 이에 미국이 얼마나 관심을 가질 것인가는 의심이 많이 가는 대목이다.
부르스 커밍스는 시카고 대학의 역사학과와 국제관계위원회에서 가르치고 “한국전쟁의 기원 (The Origins of the Korean War)”과 “북한: 또 다른 국가 (North Korea: Another Country)”등 저서의 저자이다.
부르스 커밍스는 이 기사를 2008년 7월 23일자 Japan Focus를 위하여 작성하였다.
AP통신의 Charles J. Hanley와 장재순이 쓴 관련 기사인 “Summer of Terror: 적어도 100,000명 이상이 1950년 미국의 한국 동맹군에 의하여 처형되었다.”를 참조하십시오.
Bruce Cumings
In July 2008 the world media heralded the arrest of “the world’s most wanted war criminal,” Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. He had been in hiding for thirteen years, ever since he was charged with genocide by the United Nations war crimes tribunal in The Hague for his role in the massacre of some 8,000 Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica. These events were subsequently termed “Europe’s worst slaughter of civilians since World War II.” [1]
Radovan Karadzic in office and when captured
Fifty-eight years earlier, in another distant July, the North Korean People’s Army bore down upon the city of Taejon, south of Seoul. Police authorities removed political prisoners from local jails, men and boys along with some women, massacred them, threw them into open pits, and dumped the earth back on them. Somewhere between 4,000 and 7,000 died, and their stories remained buried for half a century. American officers stood idly by while this slaughter went on, photographing it for their records, but doing nothing to stop it. In September 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to keep these photos classified; they were not released until 1999, after a determined effort by a psychologist in New York, Do-Young Lee, whose father had been murdered by southern authorities in August 1950.
Charles Hanley and other colleagues at the Associated Press first broke the story of the Taejon massacre in the American press in 1999. After I was quoted in the media about it, I got a phone call from an American woman in Los Angeles whose father was one of the people slaughtered. In 1947 she was a Korean citizen living under the American Military Government, one of six children of a factory owner in a town near Taejon. He had prospered during the Japanese colonial period, and at liberation thought it desirable to share some of his wealth. He was arrested in the raucous summer of 1947 (when hundreds if not thousands of Koreans died at the hands of the Occupation’s National Police) for giving money to “communists” and was still rotting in prison in July 1950. This woman (a registered nurse) and her four sisters and one brother had never been able to tell anyone outside the family how their father died. For half a century they had agonized over the loss of the family patri! arch, but privately even unto themselves—no one ever talked about it. She was weeping over the phone for half an hour about her experience.
Charles Hanley has been following this story for nearly a decade by now, and the two articles herein reflect both a deepened understanding of these distant events, and a maddening paradox about the United States and its citizens: when they finally pay attention, Americans are entirely capable of calling their leaders to account for their actions. Most of the time, however, no one pays attention, and in the worst instance, when awful crimes occur for which the U.S. bears a deep responsibility, they are covered up and buried, and one wonders if anyone cares—even when the truth finally comes to light. Neither of Mr. Hanley’s articles was picked up or covered by our paper of record, the New York Times (even though the Times had run a short version of the original Associated Press story on this massacre). Yet the Los Angeles nurse’s father was thrown into prison under the U.S. Military Government (1945-48), as were perhaps the majority of the prisoners in Taejon; this is ! a direct link between the Americans who held ultimate authority in southern Korea, and the awful events of July 1950. Yet most Americans, including some journalists for the New York Times in my experience, are unaware that there even was an American occupation of Korea after World War II.
But is this not a terrible story? I still recall, during my research on the Korean War, coming across a contemporary article in the London Daily Worker by Alan Winnington claiming that 7,000 non-combatants had been slaughtered by southern authorities in Taejon. The American Embassy in London denounced his article as a fabrication. I also wanted to chalk it up to communist propaganda, but I had lived through the Vietnam War and had become deeply skeptical of my own government’s credibility; I made a silent bet with myself that Winnington was probably not the liar. Later on I discovered archival evidence that Winnington was much closer to the truth than were the American officials who instantly laid the murders at the door of the North Koreans, and indeed have always denied that any such massacres occurred at any point during the three-year war. The official military history of the war in this period, Roy Appleman’s 1961 book, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, blamed ! the Taejon massacre (and all other atrocities against civilians) on the North Koreans. Now that we have Hanley’s articles and other work based on declassified documentation, we know that Appleman, who had access to all internal documents, was not an honest historian but a participant in the cover-up.
It isn’t as if Americans at the time had illusions about their allies. The best candidate for South Korea’s leading war criminal—its Karadzic—is Kim Chong-wôn, otherwise known as “Tiger” Kim, and his career opens an individual window on the events upon which Mr. Hanley focuses. Kim epitomized the elite that the U.S. midwifed into power in South Korea, a man capable of anything, no doubt laughing to himself as Americans tried to corral his worst instincts. Charles Hanley links Kim to Lt. Col. Rollins S. Emmerich and the latter’s apparent willingness to allow Kim to slaughter thousands more prisoners held in Pusan jails, should the North Koreans threaten the city. In fact Emmerich and Kim go back much further than that.
Police Chief Chang Taek-sang with a man who may be Tiger Kim (left)
Kim Chong-wôn got the name “Tiger” for his service to the Japanese Army, and after 1945 he liked journalists to call him “the Tiger of Mt. Paekdu.” He volunteered for the Imperial Army in 1940 and rose to sergeant, “a rank which epitomized the brutality of the Japanese Army at its worst,” in the words of John Muccio, the U.S. Ambassador to Seoul in 1950; Kim served the Japanese in New Guinea and the Philippines. By 1946 he was in the Korean National Police, and for eight months in 1947 was the personal bodyguard of Chang T’aek-sang, head of the Seoul Metropolitan Police under the U.S. Occupation, and one of the most powerful men in Korea. Kim later entered the Army, where he rose quickly through the ranks in guerrilla suppression campaigns. Americans remembered him for his brutality in these campaigns (Muccio called it “ruthless and effective”), and for his refusal to take American orders. An American in 1948 termed him “a rather huge, brute of a man,” after! witnessing Kim and his men “mercilessly” beat captured rebels, including women and children, “with cot rounds, bamboo sticks, fists.” By August 1949 he was a regimental commander, and when the war began he was stationed along the 38th parallel.
Shortly thereafter an American advisor went “berserk with the idea of killing Kim,” according to Muccio. This officer was none other than Lt. Col. Emmerich, and he was not berserk: he said he would have to shoot Kim, “if no one else will get rid of him.” Kim was berserk: he had killed some of his own officers and men for alleged disobedience, avoided the front lines of fighting like the plague, and had beheaded fifty POWs and guerrillas (said to be just “one group” among others that had received this treatment). Soon Emmerich was transferred and Kim was temporarily relieved of his command under American pressure. When the Red Cross subsequently made representations about his murder of POWs, American officers said they “would not like to see it get in the hand of correspondents.” Kim’s furlough proved to be brief. President Syngman Rhee promoted him to Deputy Provost Marshal, and he soon commanded the martial law regime in Pusan, where as Hanley shows he again met up! with Emmerich, and distinguished himself in the squalid terror of the “conscription campaigns”, which consisted of “shanghai-ing the required number of young men off the streets.” He also prided himself on being a “one-man censor of the press,” which he indeed was in one instance where he personally administered a beating to two reporters for the Yônhap Sinmun. Although he was clearly, on this evidence, a war criminal, Tiger Kim was part of President Rhee’s bestiary of close and trusted confidants. Once South Korean forces entered Pyongyang in the fall of 1950, Rhee placed Kim in charge of the initial occupation, naming him Deputy Provost Marshall General for the northern capital. [2]
After the war another Korean officer in the Japanese military, Park Chung Hee, seized power and ruled until an October day in 1979 when his own intelligence chief, Kim Chae-gyu, murdered him over dinner. Kim was also a former Japanese officer. Indeed, both men had graduated in 1946 from the American military academy set up in the early years of the US occupation. A young protégé of Park’s, Chun Doo Hwan, mounted his own coup in May 1980 over the dead bodies of hundreds of Kwangju citizens. President Jimmy Carter, known for his human rights policies, supported Chun’s rise to power because he feared the North Koreans might take advantage of rebellions in the South. The Kwangju massacre was not a crime on the scale of Srebrenica: but Taejon was. And as always in our relations with Korea, it seems, Americans were just uninvolved bystanders, doing nothing—and therefore blameless, and therefore innocent. Someday the depth of American responsibility for the tr! agedies of postwar Korea will be fully known, but it is doubtful that Americans will be paying attention.
Bruce Cumings teaches in the History Department and the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago and is the author of the two volume work The Origins of the Korean War and North Korea: Another Country.
Bruce Cumings wrote this article for Japan Focus. Posted July 23, 2008.
See the accompanying series of stories by Associated Press writers Charles J. Hanley and Jae-Soon Chang. Summer of Terror: At least 100,000 said executed by Korean ally of US in 1950.
Notes
[1] “A Leader turned Ghost,” New York Times (July 22, 2008), p. A10. [Note that this AP report carried no byline.]
[2] Most of the information and quotations in the text are in Ambassador Muccio’s report, State Department 795.00 file, box 4267, “`Tiger’ Kim vs. the press,” May 12, 1951. On the beheading incident, see Record Group 338, entries for July 26 and Aug. 2, 1950. On Rhee and Tiger Kim, see the Matthew Ridgway Papers, box 20, draft of a message Muccio planned to present to Rhee, May 3, 1951, chiding Rhee for relying on Tiger Kim and his ilk for intelligence information, rather than the established agencies. On the occupation of Pyongyang see Truman Library, PSF, CIA file, box 248, daily summaries for Oct. 19, 25, 1950; ibid., NSC file, box 3, CIA report for Oct. 25, 1950; 795.00 file, box 4267, Muccio to State, May 12, 1951.
Japan Focus
미군정하 대한민국 대전에서의 대량학살:
이와 관련한 미국의 책임과 은폐시도에 관한 새로운 증거 자료
부르스 커밍스
2008년 7월 세계 언론은 역사상 가장 악명 높은 전범 중 한 명인 보스니아의 세르비아계 리더인 라도반 카라드지치의 체포 소식을 알렸다. 그는 헤이그의 국제연합 전범 재판소에서 스레브레니카에서 있었던 8천 여명의 무슬림계 남성과 소년들의 대량학살과 관련하여 그의 역할이 책임이 있다는 판결을 받은 이후부터 13년 간 은둔 생활을 하였다. 이 사건들은 2차 세계대전 이후 유럽에서 발생한 가장 참혹한 민간인에 대한 대량학살이라는 오명을 갖게 되었다.
58년 전 7월, 조선 인민 공화국 군대가 대한민국의 대전을 침략하였다. 경찰권력은 정치범들을 지역 감호소로부터 빼낸 다음, 구덩이 속에 그들을 집어 넣은 다음 매장하였다. 4천에서 7천여 명이 당시 사망하였고, 그들의 이야기는 그 후 반세기가 넘는 시간 동안 사람들의 기억 속에 묻혀 있었다. 당시 관련 미군들은 학살이 진행되는 동안 이를 방관하였고, 자신들의 내부기록을 위해 이를 사진으로 남겼으나 학살을 막기 위한 어떠한 조치도 취하지 않았다. 1950년 9월 한미연합사령관은 관련 사진들을 기밀로 유지하기로 결정하였고, 이 기록은 뉴욕에 거주하는 심리학자 이도영씨 (이도영씨의 아버지는 1950년 8월 대한민국 정부 기관들에 의해 살해되었다)의 결심과 노력이 열매를 맺은 직후인 1999년까지 공개되지 않았다.
AP 소속의 찰스 핸리와 그의 동료들은 1999년 미국 언론들에 반세기 전 대한민국 대전에서 발생한 집단 학살에 관한 이야기를 처음으로 공개하였다. 또한 사건과 관련하여 미디어에 본인이 소개된 후 필자는 미국 로스엔젤레스에서 거주하는 한 여인으로부터 그녀의 아버지 또한 당시 학살된 사람들 중 한 명이었다는 전화를 받았다. 1947년, 그녀는 미군정하에 살아가고 있는 대한민국의 시민이었고, 대전 근처의 한 마을에 위치한 공장의 소유주의 여섯 아이 중 하나였다. 그녀 아버지의 사업은 일제시대 동안 번창하였고, 해방이 되면서 그녀의 아버지는 가진 재산의 일부를 나누는 것이 합당하다고 생각하였다. 그는 소란스러웠던 1947년 (수 백 명에서 수 천명으로 추산되는 한국인들이 점령군 경찰력에 의해 사망할 당시) 여름 “공산주의자들”에게 자금을 제공한 혐의로 체포되었고, 1950년 7월까지 현지 구치소에 감금되어 있는 상황이었다. 간호사로 일하고 있는 이 여성과 그녀의 네 자매, 1명의 남자 형제는 그 동안 어떻게 그들의 아버지가 사망하였는지에 관련하여서는 가족 이외의 그 누구에게도 말할 기회를 갖지 못했고, 지난 반세기 동안 아버지의 죽음과 관련한 상실감에 고뇌하였다. 전화기에 대고 그녀는 30분여 분간 자신의 경험을 얘기하며 흐느꼈다.
찰스 핸리는 지금까지 거의 10여 년에 걸쳐 위에 소개된 사건을 추적하여 왔고, 그 중 두 개의 기사가 위에 언급된 사건과 관련한 심도 깊은 이해와 미국과 미국인들에 대한 역설적인 면을 잘 반영하고 있다. 이 사건들이 마침내 주목을 받게 되었을 때, 미국인들은 자신들의 지도자들에게 그들의 행동에 대한 책임을 물을 수 있게 되었다. 그러나 이 사건에 관심을 기울이는 사람은 대체로 거의 없었고, 최악의 경우에 어떤 이들은 미국이 깊이 책임을 져야 할 사건들이 이슈화되는 것을 은폐하려 하였고, 많은 이들은 심지어 진실이 결국 규명되었다 하더라고 누구 하나 관심이 있는 이들이 있을까를 궁금해 하는 상황에까지 이르렀다. 찰스 핸리의 위의 사건과 관련된 기사 중 그 어떤 것도 뉴욕타임즈에 의해 다뤄지지 못했다 (AP에 사건과 관련한 그의 짤막한 토막기사가 간략하게 소개되기는 하였다). 그러나 위에 소개된 미국 로스엔젤레스에 거주하고 있는 간호사의 아버지는 당시 대전에 있던 대다수의 정치범들의 경우와 마찬가지로 미군정 (1945~48)하에서 감금되었고, 이는 당시 남한에서 절대적 권력을 갖고 있었던 미군정과 1950년 7월에 발생한 끔찍한 사건을 잊는 직접적 연결고리이다. 그러나 필자의 경험으로 미루어 판단컨데, 뉴욕타임즈의 몇몇 기자들을 비롯한 대다수의 미국인들은 2차 세계대전 이후 미국이 한국을 점령한 사실이 있었던지 조차 인지하고 있지 못하다.
참으로 당혹스러운 이야기가 아닐 수 없다. 필자는 한국 전쟁에 관해 조사를 하던 중 당시 대전에서 7,000여 명의 비전투인(민간인)이 학살되었다고 주장하는 London Daily Worker지에 실린 앨랜 위닝턴의 기사를 본 기억이 있다. 런던 소재 미국 대사관은 그의 기사를 위조된 것이라 일축하였다. 필자 역시 이를 공산주의자들의 선전책동이라고 치부하고 싶었으나, 본인 또한 베트남 전쟁을 경험하며 이를 통해 필자의 정부 (미국 정부)의 신용도에 관해 심각하게 의구심을 갖게 되었던 터라 이 소식을 접하며 위닝턴이 거짓말을 하고 있지는 않을 것이다 라고 개인적으로 생각하게 되었다. 그 후 필자는 위닝턴이 단순이 사건을 북한의 책임으로 돌리고, 3년 동안의 전쟁 기간 중에 그러한 민간인에 대한 대량학살들이 자행되었다는 것을 언제나 부인하는 미국 공무원들보다 훨씬 진실에 가깝게 접근하여 있다는 관련 기록 자료를 발견하였다. 당시 전쟁 중 공식 군 기록을 인용하고 있는 로이 애플먼의 1961년 책 “South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu”에 의하면, 미군정은 대전에서의 대량학살을 비롯한 민간인에 대한 기타의 다른 대량 참살의 책임을 전적으로 북한에게 돌리고 있음을 알 수 있다. 그러나 우리는 핸리의 기사들과 그 밖의 보안이 해지된 기밀 서류 등을 근거로 하여 당시 내부 문서에 접근이 가능했었던 애플먼이 진실하지 못한 역사학자이자 사건의 은폐에 사실상 참여하였다는 것을 지금은 알 수 있다.
그러나 미국이 그 동맹국에 관해 환상을 갖고 있었던 것 같지는 않다. 구 유고슬라비아 학살의 전범 카라지치에 해당할 만한 남한의 대표적인 전범으로는 “타이거 킴” 이라고 알려진 김종원을 들 수 있다. 그의 화려한 경력은 핸리가 관심을 두고 있던 사건들에 관해 개별적인 관점을 제공한다. 김종원은 당시 남한에서의 미군정의 영향력을 확대시키기 위해 매개체로 사용한 엘리트 집단의 전형적 모습을 가지고 있었다. 찰스 핸리는 김종원을 론린스 에머리크 중령과 연관시키고 있는데, 이는 에머리크 중령이 북한이 부산을 위협한다면 김종원으로 하여금 부산 구치소에 감금되어 있는 수천 명의 수감수들을 추가로 학살하는 것을 의도적으로 간과하리라는 것이 분명하였기 때문이다. 사실, 에머리크 중령과 김종원의 관계는 이보다 훨씬 과거로 거슬러 간다.
김종원은 일본 군대에서의 그의 역할을 통해 “타이거”라는 별명을 갖고 있었는데, 일설에 의하면 1945년 이후 그는 기자들에게 자신을 “백두산의 타이거”라고 지칭해 주기를 요청하였다고 한다. 김은 1940년 일본제국군대에 자원하였고 존 무치오가 표현하기로 최고로기에 일본군의 잔인함을 가장 적절히 전형시킨 계급인 하사관까지 진급하였고, 1950년에는 서울 주둔 미국 대사를 역임하였으며, 뉴기니와 필리핀에서 일본군을 위하여 근무하였다. 1946년 무렵 그는 한국의 경찰이되었고, 그 후 8개월 간 1947년까지 미군정 하의 서울시경찰청장이었던 장개상의 개인 경호관이자, 당시 한국에서 가장 권력이 있는 이 가운데 한 명이 되었다. 그 후 군대에 입대한 김종원은 게릴라 소탕 작전 등에서 세운 공 등으로 빠르게 진급해 나갔다. 미국인들은 당시 김을 게릴라 소탕에서 그가 보여준 잔인한 면모와 (이를 존 무치오는 “무자비하나 효율적인”이라고 표현하였다) 미국측의 명령을 따르기를 거부했던 한국인 정도로 기억하였다. 1948년 한 미국인은 생포한 포로와 여자, 어린이들을 인정 사정없이 폭행하는 김과 그의 부하들을 본 후, 김종원을 “다소 비대하고 냉혹한 사람”이라고 묘사하였다. 1949년 무렵 김종원은 연대장이 되었고, 전쟁이 시작될 무렵에는 38선을 따라 주둔하였다.
그 직후, 존 무치오에 따르면, 한 미국인 자문가는 김종원을 암살할 계획에 몰두하였다고 하는데, 이 미국인이 에머리크 중령이고, 그는 다른 누군가가 김을 없애지 않는다면, 자신이 그를 쏴야 할 것이라고 말했다. 당시 김종원은 소위 불복종이라는 혐의를 씌워 자신의 사령관들과 부하를 처단하였고, 전투의 선봉에 서는 것을 기피하였으며, 50여 명에 달하는 전범과 게릴라를 처형하였다. (이와 관련해 어떤 자료는 앞의 수치는 비슷한 처벌을 받은 여러 개의 집단 중 한나의 경우일 뿐이라고 말하고 있다.) 그 후, 에머리크 중령은 다른 곳으로 전령을 받았고, 김은 미군정으로부터의 압력으로부터 임시적으로 자유로울 수 있었다. 적십자사가 전범들의 살해에 관한 김종원의 역할에 관해 언급하였을 때, 미군관계자들은 “그 자료가 기자들의 손에 들어가는 것을 보고 싶지 않다.”고 하였다.
김종원의 미군정의 압력으로부터 자유로울 수 있었던 기간은 짧았다. 당시 남한의 초대 대통령이었던 이승만은 김을 Deputy Provost Marshal로 승진시켰고, 김은 직후부터 부산에서 시행된 계엄령을 진두 지휘하였다. 부산에서 김은 에머리크와 다시금 조우하게 되었는데, 이 때 김종원은 거리에서 젊은이들을 속여 강제로 동원, 징집한 “징병운동” 비열한 공포를 조성하는 등의 활동으로 자신의 역할을 각인시키고 있었다. 김은 또한 당시 언론을 통제하는 유일한 사람이었는데, 일례로 그는 연합신문의 기자 두 명에 대한 폭력을 지휘한 혐의를 받은 사건이 있었다. 위와 같은 예에서 보여지듯이 분명히 전범이었음에도 불구하고, “타이거 킴”은 이승만 당시 대통령에게 가장 가깝고도 신임을 받는 이들 중 하나가 되었다. 1950년 가을, 남한 군이 평양에 진입하자, 이승만은 김에게 Deputy Provost Marshall General로 임명하여 초기 점령을 책임지게 하였다.
전후 일본군 내의 또 다른 한국인 장교였던 박정희는 정권을 잡고 자신의 최 측근인 정보부장이자 역시 일본군의 장교였던 김재규가 저녁식사 장소에서 그를 암살할 때인 1979년 10월까지 국가를 통치하였다. 사실, 김재규와 박정희는 모두 1946년 미군정 초기에 설립된 미국군사학교 (American Military Academy)에서 수학하였다. 박정희의 젊은 추종자였던 전두환은 1980년 광주에서 수백 명의 학살을 야기시키며 쿠테타를 일으켰다. 인권정책으로 유명한 당시 미국의 지미 카터 대통령은 전두환의 정권찬탈 계획을 지지하였는데, 이는 남한의 혼란한 정국을 탄 북한의 도발을 우려했기 때문이었다. 광주학살은 스레브레니카의 것과는 그 규모가 비교되지 못하지만, 대전학살의 경우는 스레브레니카 학살과 그 규모 면에서도 견줄 수 있을 만 하다. 그리고 한국과의 관계를 언급할 때는 항상 그래왔듯이, 이 때에도 미국은 당시의 상황에 직접적으로는 개입하지 않았던 방관자였다고, 그렇기 때문에 책임을 면할 수 있다고 주장한다. 언젠가는 전후 한국에서 발생하였던 참상들에 미국이 얼마나 책임이 있는지가 완전히 알려질 때가 있을 것이다, 그러나 이에 미국이 얼마나 관심을 가질 것인가는 의심이 많이 가는 대목이다.
부르스 커밍스는 시카고 대학의 역사학과와 국제관계위원회에서 가르치고 “한국전쟁의 기원 (The Origins of the Korean War)”과 “북한: 또 다른 국가 (North Korea: Another Country)”등 저서의 저자이다.
부르스 커밍스는 이 기사를 2008년 7월 23일자 Japan Focus를 위하여 작성하였다.
AP통신의 Charles J. Hanley와 장재순이 쓴 관련 기사인 “Summer of Terror: 적어도 100,000명 이상이 1950년 미국의 한국 동맹군에 의하여 처형되었다.”를 참조하십시오.
Ham, Seok Heon, the philosopher
이사람] 함석헌의 ‘무교회 정신’이 사라졌다
씨알사상 책 펴낸 조향균 계성종이박물관장
한승동 기자
» 작고 1년 전인 1988년 여름 한국퀘이커교 대표였던 함석헌(앞줄 왼쪽 두번째) 선생이 회원들과 함께 당시 서울 화곡동에 있는 조형균(앞줄 왼쪽 첫번째)씨네 자택을 방문했을 때 찍은 기념사진.
“도쿄 조직은 100개 넘어 한국과 대비”
사상적 후예 자처…역사 수필도 펴내
» 조형균(80·계성종이박물관장)
한국 최고의 종이 전문가이자 함석헌 사상 연구가로서 한-일관계를 비롯한 역사 바로잡기에 삶을 받쳐온 ‘평생 평신도’ 조형균(80·계성종이박물관장)씨가 두 권의 책을 함께 냈다. 하나는 1980년대부터 지금까지 신앙과 민족문제, 선학들에 대해 쓴 에세이들을 엮은 <씨알(아래알)의 오솔길-상>, 또 하나는 2차대전 뒤 역사를 반성적으로 돌아보며 패전국 독일과 일본, 그리고 한국인들의 자기점검에 대한 글들을 모아 묶은 <역사 신앙 고백>(그물코 출판사)이다.
조씨는 <씨알(아래알)의 소리> 회보 등에 쓴 글을 가려 모은 이 책을 “무어 특별히 내놓을 만한 글이 있어서가 아니라, 다만 생각의 오솔길에 주어진 작은 거둠들을 매개로 독자 제현과 진솔한 대화라도 나눴으면 하는 생각에서 내놓는다” 했다. 하지만 지난 5일 출판기념회에서 김경재 한신대 명예교수(삭개오 작은교회 담임목사)가 “이 책에 실린 글이 이제까지 나온 씨알(아래알)에 대한 글들 중에서도 가장 폭넓고 깊은 사유를 보여준다”고 평가한 것처럼 책의 무게는 결코 가볍지 않다. 특히 많은 글에서 변주되는 일제 식민지배에 대한 기억과 광복 뒤에도 그 치욕을 발전적으로 극복해내지 못한 우리 현실에 대한 통렬한 회오는 독도문제가 다시 불거진 지금 새삼 시시하는 바가 크다.
그와 함석헌 선생의 인연은 깊고도 각별하다. 그에게 민족의식을 가르쳤고 일제 때 두 번이나 옥고를 치른 부친 조세장 장로가 마지막 남긴 글이 ‘함석헌’ 이름 석자였다. “그 분(함석헌)이 1947년 3월24일 월남하셨는데 그해 마침 서울대 문리대 기독학생회의 전도강연회에서 밤 강사로 등장한 그 분과 청중의 한 사람으로 처음 만났지요. 그 후 그분이 쓰신 글이 실린 잡지나 단행본은 무조건 사서 읽었지요.” 그는 “그 분과 코드가 맞았고 장성하면서 지적 욕구도 그 분을 통해 채웠다”고 했다.
그는 자신이 고수해온 무교회정신의 대표적인 인물이 한국에선 함석헌이고 일본에선 우치무라 간조인데 그들 사후 한국과 일본이 걸어간 길은 너무나 대조적이라며 그것을 “함석헌의 비극”이라고 했다. “일본에선 우치무라의 정신을 이어받은 무교회 조직이 도쿄지역에만 100개가 넘고 오사카에서도 그의 정신이 50여군데나 가지치기를 하며 착실히 성장하고 있지만 한국에선 함석헌의 정신을 옳게 이해하지 못했다. 사회 참여 활동같은 빙산의 일각만 기억할 뿐 잠겨있는 거대한 부분엔 이르지 못했다. 우린 교회적 종교, 그 조직과 교권 등 외형은 그럴듯하게 성장했지만 기독교 생명은 쇠잔했다. 겨우 잡지 하나로 그 명맥을 이어왔는데, 거기에 글을 쓰면서 그 분과 대화 아닌 대화를 나눈 게 바로 이 책이다.”
<역사 신앙 고백>에는 “과거에 대해 눈을 감는 자는 결국 현재에도 눈먼 자가 되는 것”이라며 과거 잘못에 대한 숨김없는 고백과 그것을 토대로 한 진정한 용서와 화해를 촉구한 리하르트 폰 바이체커 독일 대통령의 국회연설문 ‘광야의 40년-1945년 5월8일과 그 후 40년’, 일본 무교회주의자 다카하시 사부로의 ‘전후 일본의 재건과 미주(迷走)’, 그리고 함석헌, 김재준, 한경직, 김경재, 박상증 등의 글도 함께 실었다.
한승동 선임기자 sdhan@hani.co.kr, 사진 조형균씨 제공
씨알사상 책 펴낸 조향균 계성종이박물관장
한승동 기자
» 작고 1년 전인 1988년 여름 한국퀘이커교 대표였던 함석헌(앞줄 왼쪽 두번째) 선생이 회원들과 함께 당시 서울 화곡동에 있는 조형균(앞줄 왼쪽 첫번째)씨네 자택을 방문했을 때 찍은 기념사진.
“도쿄 조직은 100개 넘어 한국과 대비”
사상적 후예 자처…역사 수필도 펴내
» 조형균(80·계성종이박물관장)
한국 최고의 종이 전문가이자 함석헌 사상 연구가로서 한-일관계를 비롯한 역사 바로잡기에 삶을 받쳐온 ‘평생 평신도’ 조형균(80·계성종이박물관장)씨가 두 권의 책을 함께 냈다. 하나는 1980년대부터 지금까지 신앙과 민족문제, 선학들에 대해 쓴 에세이들을 엮은 <씨알(아래알)의 오솔길-상>, 또 하나는 2차대전 뒤 역사를 반성적으로 돌아보며 패전국 독일과 일본, 그리고 한국인들의 자기점검에 대한 글들을 모아 묶은 <역사 신앙 고백>(그물코 출판사)이다.
조씨는 <씨알(아래알)의 소리> 회보 등에 쓴 글을 가려 모은 이 책을 “무어 특별히 내놓을 만한 글이 있어서가 아니라, 다만 생각의 오솔길에 주어진 작은 거둠들을 매개로 독자 제현과 진솔한 대화라도 나눴으면 하는 생각에서 내놓는다” 했다. 하지만 지난 5일 출판기념회에서 김경재 한신대 명예교수(삭개오 작은교회 담임목사)가 “이 책에 실린 글이 이제까지 나온 씨알(아래알)에 대한 글들 중에서도 가장 폭넓고 깊은 사유를 보여준다”고 평가한 것처럼 책의 무게는 결코 가볍지 않다. 특히 많은 글에서 변주되는 일제 식민지배에 대한 기억과 광복 뒤에도 그 치욕을 발전적으로 극복해내지 못한 우리 현실에 대한 통렬한 회오는 독도문제가 다시 불거진 지금 새삼 시시하는 바가 크다.
그와 함석헌 선생의 인연은 깊고도 각별하다. 그에게 민족의식을 가르쳤고 일제 때 두 번이나 옥고를 치른 부친 조세장 장로가 마지막 남긴 글이 ‘함석헌’ 이름 석자였다. “그 분(함석헌)이 1947년 3월24일 월남하셨는데 그해 마침 서울대 문리대 기독학생회의 전도강연회에서 밤 강사로 등장한 그 분과 청중의 한 사람으로 처음 만났지요. 그 후 그분이 쓰신 글이 실린 잡지나 단행본은 무조건 사서 읽었지요.” 그는 “그 분과 코드가 맞았고 장성하면서 지적 욕구도 그 분을 통해 채웠다”고 했다.
그는 자신이 고수해온 무교회정신의 대표적인 인물이 한국에선 함석헌이고 일본에선 우치무라 간조인데 그들 사후 한국과 일본이 걸어간 길은 너무나 대조적이라며 그것을 “함석헌의 비극”이라고 했다. “일본에선 우치무라의 정신을 이어받은 무교회 조직이 도쿄지역에만 100개가 넘고 오사카에서도 그의 정신이 50여군데나 가지치기를 하며 착실히 성장하고 있지만 한국에선 함석헌의 정신을 옳게 이해하지 못했다. 사회 참여 활동같은 빙산의 일각만 기억할 뿐 잠겨있는 거대한 부분엔 이르지 못했다. 우린 교회적 종교, 그 조직과 교권 등 외형은 그럴듯하게 성장했지만 기독교 생명은 쇠잔했다. 겨우 잡지 하나로 그 명맥을 이어왔는데, 거기에 글을 쓰면서 그 분과 대화 아닌 대화를 나눈 게 바로 이 책이다.”
<역사 신앙 고백>에는 “과거에 대해 눈을 감는 자는 결국 현재에도 눈먼 자가 되는 것”이라며 과거 잘못에 대한 숨김없는 고백과 그것을 토대로 한 진정한 용서와 화해를 촉구한 리하르트 폰 바이체커 독일 대통령의 국회연설문 ‘광야의 40년-1945년 5월8일과 그 후 40년’, 일본 무교회주의자 다카하시 사부로의 ‘전후 일본의 재건과 미주(迷走)’, 그리고 함석헌, 김재준, 한경직, 김경재, 박상증 등의 글도 함께 실었다.
한승동 선임기자 sdhan@hani.co.kr, 사진 조형균씨 제공
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Truth and Reconciliation
Truth and Reconciliation
By Kim Sung-soo
Korean history in the 20th century witnessed Japanese colonialism, the division of the country between North and South, civil war and military dictatorship.
Throughout this troubled century many civilians experienced oppression and human rights abuse but in many ways the families of these victims continued to suffer.
For example, before and during the 1950-53 Korean War, more than 200,000 innocent South Korean civilians were massacred by their own police, military, anti-communist groups and even U.S. soldiers.
Yet the bereaved families, guilty by association, continued to be victimized ― they were not allowed to get decent jobs or work in the public sector, police tailed them wherever they went and their children were bullied at school.
Most of the eyewitnesses and survivors are already dead. Although even these victims' families are now quite old, memories of these human rights abuses are still fresh.
During the periods of authoritarian rule (1948-60) and military dictatorship (1961-87), there were also frequent human rights abuses in the name of national security. Dissidents, demonstrators and sometimes even innocent people were dragged away by police and tortured or murdered.
Some people simply disappeared and those who survived were either enlisted into the army or were permanently disabled after undergoing unbearable torture. It was only after Korea became democratized that it began to address this past.
The past-dealing of the Gwangju Democratization Movement (Massacre) in 1980 may be the most well-known case among them.
In the early 2000s civil society groups began a nationwide campaign to establish a body to deal with these issues.
Working alongside these human rights activists and the bereaved families, liberal lawmakers proposed a bill to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (TRCK) to expose this hidden history of abuse of power from the time Korea was colonized by the Japanese up to the military dictatorship of the late 1980s.
After considerable debate the bill became law in May 2005 and the TRCK was launched on December 1, 2005. The TRCK is run by 15 commissioners who are appointed by the President, the National Assembly and the Supreme Court.
It is an independent governmental body, and the scope of its investigations covers the following five areas: the anti-Japanese movement during the colonial period and the history of the Korean diasporas; the massacre of civilians after 1945; human rights abuses by the state; incidents of dubious conviction and suspicious death; reinvestigation of the above categories and other incidents as determined by the Commission.
Since the government has never dealt with these kind of issues before, the TRCK has been charged with addressing some of the most sensitive and painful events in 20th century Korean history.
The TRCK's truth-finding activities are not only to settle the grievances of the individual victims, they also function as preventive measures against a recurrence of the same sort of incidents in the future.
Its goal is to prevent a distorted history leading to a distorted present and future. Korea is only country in Asia that reveals its shameful past to the public. However painful it may be, knowing the truth can help us build a better society in the future.
Human history is like a root of a tree. We cannot expect a tree to flourish if we cut its roots. Equally, we cannot dream of building a bright future while we ignore our history.
Kim Sung-soo, who has a PhD. in historical studies, works as head of the International Cooperation Team of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (www.jinsil.go.kr/english). He was the author of ``Biography of a Korean Quaker, Ham Sok-Hon." He can be reached at wadans@empal.com.
By Kim Sung-soo
Korean history in the 20th century witnessed Japanese colonialism, the division of the country between North and South, civil war and military dictatorship.
Throughout this troubled century many civilians experienced oppression and human rights abuse but in many ways the families of these victims continued to suffer.
For example, before and during the 1950-53 Korean War, more than 200,000 innocent South Korean civilians were massacred by their own police, military, anti-communist groups and even U.S. soldiers.
Yet the bereaved families, guilty by association, continued to be victimized ― they were not allowed to get decent jobs or work in the public sector, police tailed them wherever they went and their children were bullied at school.
Most of the eyewitnesses and survivors are already dead. Although even these victims' families are now quite old, memories of these human rights abuses are still fresh.
During the periods of authoritarian rule (1948-60) and military dictatorship (1961-87), there were also frequent human rights abuses in the name of national security. Dissidents, demonstrators and sometimes even innocent people were dragged away by police and tortured or murdered.
Some people simply disappeared and those who survived were either enlisted into the army or were permanently disabled after undergoing unbearable torture. It was only after Korea became democratized that it began to address this past.
The past-dealing of the Gwangju Democratization Movement (Massacre) in 1980 may be the most well-known case among them.
In the early 2000s civil society groups began a nationwide campaign to establish a body to deal with these issues.
Working alongside these human rights activists and the bereaved families, liberal lawmakers proposed a bill to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (TRCK) to expose this hidden history of abuse of power from the time Korea was colonized by the Japanese up to the military dictatorship of the late 1980s.
After considerable debate the bill became law in May 2005 and the TRCK was launched on December 1, 2005. The TRCK is run by 15 commissioners who are appointed by the President, the National Assembly and the Supreme Court.
It is an independent governmental body, and the scope of its investigations covers the following five areas: the anti-Japanese movement during the colonial period and the history of the Korean diasporas; the massacre of civilians after 1945; human rights abuses by the state; incidents of dubious conviction and suspicious death; reinvestigation of the above categories and other incidents as determined by the Commission.
Since the government has never dealt with these kind of issues before, the TRCK has been charged with addressing some of the most sensitive and painful events in 20th century Korean history.
The TRCK's truth-finding activities are not only to settle the grievances of the individual victims, they also function as preventive measures against a recurrence of the same sort of incidents in the future.
Its goal is to prevent a distorted history leading to a distorted present and future. Korea is only country in Asia that reveals its shameful past to the public. However painful it may be, knowing the truth can help us build a better society in the future.
Human history is like a root of a tree. We cannot expect a tree to flourish if we cut its roots. Equally, we cannot dream of building a bright future while we ignore our history.
Kim Sung-soo, who has a PhD. in historical studies, works as head of the International Cooperation Team of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (www.jinsil.go.kr/english). He was the author of ``Biography of a Korean Quaker, Ham Sok-Hon." He can be reached at wadans@empal.com.
Thursday, March 27, 2008
New Light Textbook
이병도, 이영훈, 그리고 뉴라이트
뉴라이트 교과서를 탄생시킨 역사적 맥락
김성수 (wadans) 기자
▲ 뉴라이트 계열 지식인들이 출간한 '대안교과서 한국 근ㆍ현대사'.
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 대안교과서
일본제국주의의 한국강점은 서구의 제3세계 강점과는 극명한 차이가 있다. 유럽의 아프리카 정복이 힘과 문화의 강자와 약자간의 일방적 케이오 게임이었다면, 일본의 한국강점은 다르다.
한일관계는 오히려 전통적으로는 한국이 큰형으로서 일본을 문화적으로 '개화'시켜주었던 관계였다.
포함외교(gunboat diplomacy) 영향으로 서구문명의 주도권이 일본으로 넘어가는 근세의 과정에서 한국은 일본의 식민지로 전락했을 뿐이다. 마치 마당쇠에게 오히려 사지를 결박당한 주인 신세처럼. 이 말은 일본이 한국을 식민화시키는 일이 유럽이 아프리카를 식민화시키는 일보다 훨씬 더 어려웠다는 말이다.
문화의 힘이 없는 무력으로만의 정복은 결코 오래가지 못할 뿐 아니라 실패할 가능성이 높다는 것은 역사가 증명해 준다.
그러니 일본의 한국 강점은 일본 측에서도 골칫덩어리였다. 무력 외엔 한국을 정신문화적으로 굴복시킬 수 없었던 일본은, 그래서 제갈공명이 맹획을 7번 사로잡아 7번을 놓아주니 그 때서야 복종했다는 교훈의 실천이 무엇보다도 절실했을 것이다.
정신적인 굴복을 받아내지 않고 무력만으로 한 민족이 다른 민족을 계속 억압하고 그 강요된 체제를 유지하기가 거의 불가능하기 때문이다. 반면에 인간이란 신비한 존재는, 김구 앞에 섰던 윤봉길이나 이봉창처럼, 왜장의 열손가락을 잡고 남강에 투신했던 논개처럼, 거대한 정신을 대하거나 사랑하는 사람을 위해선, 자신의 몸과 마음을 그저 초개(草芥)와 같이 버린다.
'조선정신 죽이기' 앞장선 조선사편수회
그래서 일제는 일왕칙령으로 거액의 자금과 고급인력을 대대적으로 동원, 한국민족의 정신과 문화를 말살하고, 조선인에게 복종을 강조하는 일본 혼을 심어주는 프로젝트에 착수한다. 즉 황국신민 만들기인 정신개조 작업이다. 이러한 일제의 야심에 걸맞게, 조선사편수회가 만들어지는데, 그 구성원 대부분은 동양최고의 대학이라던 도쿄제국대학 출신이었다.
조선총독부는 조선사편수회를 위해 당시 일본학계의 최고두뇌들을 총동원한다. 이것은 식민지 조선을 철저히 굴복시키기 위한, 요즈음 말 많은 대운하 프로젝트보다, 더 거대하고 막강한, 일제강점기 최대국가사업이었다.
그래서 일본의 조선사료 강탈기간 중이던 1916년 1월, 중추원 산하 조선반도사편찬위원회를 발족한다. 이 위원회는 조선인에 대한 왜곡된 역사교육을 통해 일본민족의 '우수함'을 고취하는 한편 조선인의 열등성·타율성·정체성·사대주의성 등을 강조하면서 동시에 조선전통 민족정신이나 역사의식은 배제하였다. 그러다 학문적으로 더욱 권위 있는 기구로 만들기 위하여, 1925년 6월 일왕칙령에 의해 조선사편수회로 명칭을 바꾸고 독립된 관청으로 격상하면서 조직을 확대, 개편하였다.
그 후 총 35권, 전체 2만 4천 쪽에 이르는 방대한 분량의 <조선사>를 제작하는 데 일본정부의 막대한 자금과 최고 두뇌의 역사학자가 퍼부은 시간은 무려 16년이었다. 그 결과 1932년 일제는 마침 <조선사>를 마친다. 제작비용으로 100만 엔이라는 거액을 들여 편찬한 <조선사>는 이렇게 일왕명령으로 만들어지고 조선총독부에 의해 직접관리, 운용됐던 당시 일제의 "조선정신 죽이기"를 시도한 최대국가사업이었다.
일본은 현명하게도 조선인을 무력으로 굴종시키기보다는 정신적으로 복종시키는 것이 훨씬 더 중요하다는 것을 철저히 깨닫고 있었던 것이다. 일본은 식민지 조선의 지배를 정당화하기 위한 논리의 일환으로 이렇게 한국사를 대폭 축소하고, 한민족의 역사는 일본과 중국 사이에서 항상 지배를 받는 피지배의 연속이라 주장했다. 뿐만 아니라 조선역사를 당쟁으로 얼룩진 부패한 역사로 규정지으며 일본식민지가 될 수밖에 없다는 '역사적 필연성'을 내세운다.
역사학계를 좌우한 '친일식민사관'의 뿌리
▲ '식민사관' 역사학자 이병도
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 자료사진 이병도
이 당시 일제하 국가기관의 설치, 조직 및 직무범위 등을 정한 제도인 관제(官制)를 보면 일제가 얼마나 한국사 왜곡 편찬에 심혈을 기울였는지 알 수 있다. 조선사편수회 고문에 이완용, 권중현을 앉히고 박영효·이윤용을 비롯해 일본인 거물들과 어용학자들을 위촉하였다. 위원회 회장은 조선총독부 총독과 맞먹는 막강한 권력자인 정무총감이 맡아 권력을 휘두를 수 있는 일본인들을 참여시켰다. 고문·위원·간사와 편찬사무를 담당하는 수사관 3명, 수사관보 4명, 서기 2명을 두었다.
이때 수사관 3명중엔 후일 국립서울대학교 교수를 하며 일본식민사관을 계승한 역할을 톡톡히 했던 이병도(1896~1989)가 포함되어있다. 훗날 함석헌이 '재야사학자'로 감옥 문을 드나들며 생활고에 허덕이며 갖은 탄압과 핍박을 받는 동안, 이병도는 심지어 1960년 허정(1896~1988) 과도정부 하에서도, 문교장관 등을 지냈다. 박정희 정권 하에서는 5·16민족상, 대통령 표창까지 받는 등 국사학계에 미친 그의 '공로'가 대외에 알려졌다. 이래서 함석헌이 한국역사를 "중추·등뼈가 부러진 역사"라고 하지 않았을까!
그뿐이 아니다. 1960년대 이병도는 학술원회장을 비롯하여 각종 대학의 명예교수를 독차지했다. 한국사 발전에 기여한 '빛나는 공로'로 그는 충무무공훈장·서울시문화상·문화훈장대한민국장·학술원상·국민훈장무궁화장·인촌문화상 등등을 싹쓸이하는 화려한 경력을 자랑하는 학계의 대부로 자리를 굳혔다. 그런 이유로 이병도에 대한 비판의 소리는 숨도 쉴 수 없었고, 제대로 고개를 들 수도 없었다.
아니 고개를 들 수 없는 정도가 아니라 오히려 이병도의 정신적 제자라고 할 수 있고 뉴라이트교과서의 집필자 이영훈 서울대 교수는 일제의 조선강점이 조선을 근대화시켜 주었기에, 일제의 조선지배는 오히려 축복이라는 논리를 펴고 있는 현실이다.
이런 논리를 가진 사람을 국민들이 내는 소중한 세금으로 꼬박꼬박 월급과 연구비를 챙겨준다. 이것이 바로오늘 한국이 직면해 있는 현주소다. 얼마나 우리들의 대한민국이 좋은 나라인가! 이런 적반하장의 소리를 하고도 당당히 한국 최고의 지성이 모였다는 국립대학의 교수를 하며 넉넉한 월급, 연구비를 받고, 가장 많이 팔린다는 수구재벌 일간지에 칼럼을 쓰고 있으니 말이다.
정리되지 않은 과거역사는 이렇게 반드시 오늘 현실에 독이 되어서 돌아온다. 그래서 과거사 정리가 필요 없는 일이 아니라 역사적인 존재인 인간에게 너무도 중요한 것이다. 역사를 경멸하는 민족은 반드시 그 역사로부터 경멸을 받는다. 잘못된 과거를 가지고 잘된 미래를 꿈꿀 수는 없다. 인간은 싫으나 좋으나, 긍부정에 무관하게, 어쩔 수 없이 역사적인 존재다.
콩 심은 곳엔 반드시 콩이 난다. 이병도를 심은 곳에는 이영훈이 나오고, 박정희가 5·16을 심은 곳에는 곧 전두환의 5·17이 나온다. 이것이 역사의 필연이다.
▲ 고려대 총학생회 산하 일제청산위원회는 2005년 3월 대학본관앞에서 기자회견을 열어 이병도를 비롯한 친일인사 명단 10명을 1차로 발표했다.
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 권우성
역사의 도덕성 무시한 '뉴라이트 교과서'와 함석헌
인간사의 도덕성을 철저히 무시한 뉴라이트교과서 집필자들의 위험한 궤변은 600만의 유대인학살을 정당화한 히틀러의 선전상 괴벨스나 할 수 있는 말이다.
가난한 이웃집 아빠를 내가 때려죽인 뒤 돈을 많이 벌어다주면, 그 살인, 강탈행위가 정당화되고 '축복'이 되는가? 일제식민지정권, 박정희·전두환 정권을, "우리를 근대화시켜주고 잘 살게 해주었기 때문에 불가피했을 뿐 아니라 오히려 축복이었다"고 정당화하는 것은, 곧 인간생명과 존엄성을 벌레같이 짓밟으며 히틀러·스탈린이 거둔 소위 경제적 성공을 정당화하고 축복이었다고 하는 것과 전혀 다를 바가 없다.
일제가 조선사편수회 프로젝트를 통해서, 일방적으로 조선정신을 말살시키는 상황에서, 식민지 지식인 함석헌은 무력감 속에서, "나는 누구이고 조선인은 누구인가?"라는 처절한 자아발견의 고민을 할 수밖에 없었다. 조선민족 정체성의 위기, 자아상실의 위기가 도래한 것이다.
자아를 잃어버린다는 것은 곧 정체성, 정신의 파괴이고, 한 개인과 민족의 총체적 몰락이다. 아무리 용맹한 장수도 실성한 상태에선 전쟁터에서 제대로 싸울 수 없고 오합지졸이 될 수밖에 없다.
"불의와 편법이 강물처럼" 융성했고, 국가폭력이 난무했던 20세기 한국역사는 한국인들을 허무주의나 기회주의로 젖어들게 한 면이 강하다. 한평생 옳은 일을 추구한 의인의 끝은 결국 자기희생과, 풍비박산이라는 냉소주의적 풍토를 초래한 경우가 대부분이라 해도 과언이 아니다. 반면 합천 '일해공원'이나 '박정희기념관' 소동에서 볼 수 있는 것처럼, 수단방법을 가리지 않고 사람의 생명을 지렁이처럼 밟아버리는 독재자들을 여전히 수용하고 향수에 그리워하는, 병에 걸린 닭 같은 감상주의가 이 땅을 지금도 휩쓸고 있다.
기본적 도덕성마저 상실한 탈세한 억만장자가 선거에 압승하는 철저한 처세술과 도덕의 공동화가 오늘 한국인의 성공신화와 바람직한 가치관으로 받아들여지고 있다. 이른바 '엘리트'들의 상당수는 일신과 가정의 행복을 위한 가치를 사회정의나 진리추구를 위한 가치보다 더 '숭고하다'고 여기며, 철저하고 이기적인 기회주의자로 자리 잡았다. 저지른 범죄에 대한 수치심이나 죄책감을 잃은 지 오래고 오히려 당당하고 뻔뻔하다.
▲ 함석헌 선생.
ⓒ 김성수 함석헌
그래서 함석헌은 고민했을 것이다. "군사력, 무력, 돈이 없는 개인이나 민족은 과연 열등한 존재일까?"
그리고 그는 깨달았을 것이다. 사명감·문화·역사의식 없이는 한 민족의 자의식·정체성이 붕괴될 수밖에 없다는 것을. 그래서 그는 역사의 도덕성을 강조한다. "우주보다 귀한 한 인간의 생명"을 도구화하고 마음대로 빼앗은 것은 어떠한 명분으로도 정당화 될 수 없고, 정당화되어서도 안 된다.
인간사회의 근본을 이루는 것은 하나도 도덕성, 둘도 도덕성, 셋도 도덕성이기 때문이다.
그러나 이러한 도덕성의 가치를 경멸하고 이른바 실용성의 가치만 내세울 때 제2·제3의 뉴라이트교과서는 언제고 다시 우리 앞에 등장할 것이다.
덧붙이는 글 | 김성수 기자는 <함석헌 평전> 저자입니다.
2008.03.26 15:12 ⓒ 2008 OhmyNews
뉴라이트 교과서를 탄생시킨 역사적 맥락
김성수 (wadans) 기자
▲ 뉴라이트 계열 지식인들이 출간한 '대안교과서 한국 근ㆍ현대사'.
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 대안교과서
일본제국주의의 한국강점은 서구의 제3세계 강점과는 극명한 차이가 있다. 유럽의 아프리카 정복이 힘과 문화의 강자와 약자간의 일방적 케이오 게임이었다면, 일본의 한국강점은 다르다.
한일관계는 오히려 전통적으로는 한국이 큰형으로서 일본을 문화적으로 '개화'시켜주었던 관계였다.
포함외교(gunboat diplomacy) 영향으로 서구문명의 주도권이 일본으로 넘어가는 근세의 과정에서 한국은 일본의 식민지로 전락했을 뿐이다. 마치 마당쇠에게 오히려 사지를 결박당한 주인 신세처럼. 이 말은 일본이 한국을 식민화시키는 일이 유럽이 아프리카를 식민화시키는 일보다 훨씬 더 어려웠다는 말이다.
문화의 힘이 없는 무력으로만의 정복은 결코 오래가지 못할 뿐 아니라 실패할 가능성이 높다는 것은 역사가 증명해 준다.
그러니 일본의 한국 강점은 일본 측에서도 골칫덩어리였다. 무력 외엔 한국을 정신문화적으로 굴복시킬 수 없었던 일본은, 그래서 제갈공명이 맹획을 7번 사로잡아 7번을 놓아주니 그 때서야 복종했다는 교훈의 실천이 무엇보다도 절실했을 것이다.
정신적인 굴복을 받아내지 않고 무력만으로 한 민족이 다른 민족을 계속 억압하고 그 강요된 체제를 유지하기가 거의 불가능하기 때문이다. 반면에 인간이란 신비한 존재는, 김구 앞에 섰던 윤봉길이나 이봉창처럼, 왜장의 열손가락을 잡고 남강에 투신했던 논개처럼, 거대한 정신을 대하거나 사랑하는 사람을 위해선, 자신의 몸과 마음을 그저 초개(草芥)와 같이 버린다.
'조선정신 죽이기' 앞장선 조선사편수회
그래서 일제는 일왕칙령으로 거액의 자금과 고급인력을 대대적으로 동원, 한국민족의 정신과 문화를 말살하고, 조선인에게 복종을 강조하는 일본 혼을 심어주는 프로젝트에 착수한다. 즉 황국신민 만들기인 정신개조 작업이다. 이러한 일제의 야심에 걸맞게, 조선사편수회가 만들어지는데, 그 구성원 대부분은 동양최고의 대학이라던 도쿄제국대학 출신이었다.
조선총독부는 조선사편수회를 위해 당시 일본학계의 최고두뇌들을 총동원한다. 이것은 식민지 조선을 철저히 굴복시키기 위한, 요즈음 말 많은 대운하 프로젝트보다, 더 거대하고 막강한, 일제강점기 최대국가사업이었다.
그래서 일본의 조선사료 강탈기간 중이던 1916년 1월, 중추원 산하 조선반도사편찬위원회를 발족한다. 이 위원회는 조선인에 대한 왜곡된 역사교육을 통해 일본민족의 '우수함'을 고취하는 한편 조선인의 열등성·타율성·정체성·사대주의성 등을 강조하면서 동시에 조선전통 민족정신이나 역사의식은 배제하였다. 그러다 학문적으로 더욱 권위 있는 기구로 만들기 위하여, 1925년 6월 일왕칙령에 의해 조선사편수회로 명칭을 바꾸고 독립된 관청으로 격상하면서 조직을 확대, 개편하였다.
그 후 총 35권, 전체 2만 4천 쪽에 이르는 방대한 분량의 <조선사>를 제작하는 데 일본정부의 막대한 자금과 최고 두뇌의 역사학자가 퍼부은 시간은 무려 16년이었다. 그 결과 1932년 일제는 마침 <조선사>를 마친다. 제작비용으로 100만 엔이라는 거액을 들여 편찬한 <조선사>는 이렇게 일왕명령으로 만들어지고 조선총독부에 의해 직접관리, 운용됐던 당시 일제의 "조선정신 죽이기"를 시도한 최대국가사업이었다.
일본은 현명하게도 조선인을 무력으로 굴종시키기보다는 정신적으로 복종시키는 것이 훨씬 더 중요하다는 것을 철저히 깨닫고 있었던 것이다. 일본은 식민지 조선의 지배를 정당화하기 위한 논리의 일환으로 이렇게 한국사를 대폭 축소하고, 한민족의 역사는 일본과 중국 사이에서 항상 지배를 받는 피지배의 연속이라 주장했다. 뿐만 아니라 조선역사를 당쟁으로 얼룩진 부패한 역사로 규정지으며 일본식민지가 될 수밖에 없다는 '역사적 필연성'을 내세운다.
역사학계를 좌우한 '친일식민사관'의 뿌리
▲ '식민사관' 역사학자 이병도
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 자료사진 이병도
이 당시 일제하 국가기관의 설치, 조직 및 직무범위 등을 정한 제도인 관제(官制)를 보면 일제가 얼마나 한국사 왜곡 편찬에 심혈을 기울였는지 알 수 있다. 조선사편수회 고문에 이완용, 권중현을 앉히고 박영효·이윤용을 비롯해 일본인 거물들과 어용학자들을 위촉하였다. 위원회 회장은 조선총독부 총독과 맞먹는 막강한 권력자인 정무총감이 맡아 권력을 휘두를 수 있는 일본인들을 참여시켰다. 고문·위원·간사와 편찬사무를 담당하는 수사관 3명, 수사관보 4명, 서기 2명을 두었다.
이때 수사관 3명중엔 후일 국립서울대학교 교수를 하며 일본식민사관을 계승한 역할을 톡톡히 했던 이병도(1896~1989)가 포함되어있다. 훗날 함석헌이 '재야사학자'로 감옥 문을 드나들며 생활고에 허덕이며 갖은 탄압과 핍박을 받는 동안, 이병도는 심지어 1960년 허정(1896~1988) 과도정부 하에서도, 문교장관 등을 지냈다. 박정희 정권 하에서는 5·16민족상, 대통령 표창까지 받는 등 국사학계에 미친 그의 '공로'가 대외에 알려졌다. 이래서 함석헌이 한국역사를 "중추·등뼈가 부러진 역사"라고 하지 않았을까!
그뿐이 아니다. 1960년대 이병도는 학술원회장을 비롯하여 각종 대학의 명예교수를 독차지했다. 한국사 발전에 기여한 '빛나는 공로'로 그는 충무무공훈장·서울시문화상·문화훈장대한민국장·학술원상·국민훈장무궁화장·인촌문화상 등등을 싹쓸이하는 화려한 경력을 자랑하는 학계의 대부로 자리를 굳혔다. 그런 이유로 이병도에 대한 비판의 소리는 숨도 쉴 수 없었고, 제대로 고개를 들 수도 없었다.
아니 고개를 들 수 없는 정도가 아니라 오히려 이병도의 정신적 제자라고 할 수 있고 뉴라이트교과서의 집필자 이영훈 서울대 교수는 일제의 조선강점이 조선을 근대화시켜 주었기에, 일제의 조선지배는 오히려 축복이라는 논리를 펴고 있는 현실이다.
이런 논리를 가진 사람을 국민들이 내는 소중한 세금으로 꼬박꼬박 월급과 연구비를 챙겨준다. 이것이 바로오늘 한국이 직면해 있는 현주소다. 얼마나 우리들의 대한민국이 좋은 나라인가! 이런 적반하장의 소리를 하고도 당당히 한국 최고의 지성이 모였다는 국립대학의 교수를 하며 넉넉한 월급, 연구비를 받고, 가장 많이 팔린다는 수구재벌 일간지에 칼럼을 쓰고 있으니 말이다.
정리되지 않은 과거역사는 이렇게 반드시 오늘 현실에 독이 되어서 돌아온다. 그래서 과거사 정리가 필요 없는 일이 아니라 역사적인 존재인 인간에게 너무도 중요한 것이다. 역사를 경멸하는 민족은 반드시 그 역사로부터 경멸을 받는다. 잘못된 과거를 가지고 잘된 미래를 꿈꿀 수는 없다. 인간은 싫으나 좋으나, 긍부정에 무관하게, 어쩔 수 없이 역사적인 존재다.
콩 심은 곳엔 반드시 콩이 난다. 이병도를 심은 곳에는 이영훈이 나오고, 박정희가 5·16을 심은 곳에는 곧 전두환의 5·17이 나온다. 이것이 역사의 필연이다.
▲ 고려대 총학생회 산하 일제청산위원회는 2005년 3월 대학본관앞에서 기자회견을 열어 이병도를 비롯한 친일인사 명단 10명을 1차로 발표했다.
ⓒ 오마이뉴스 권우성
역사의 도덕성 무시한 '뉴라이트 교과서'와 함석헌
인간사의 도덕성을 철저히 무시한 뉴라이트교과서 집필자들의 위험한 궤변은 600만의 유대인학살을 정당화한 히틀러의 선전상 괴벨스나 할 수 있는 말이다.
가난한 이웃집 아빠를 내가 때려죽인 뒤 돈을 많이 벌어다주면, 그 살인, 강탈행위가 정당화되고 '축복'이 되는가? 일제식민지정권, 박정희·전두환 정권을, "우리를 근대화시켜주고 잘 살게 해주었기 때문에 불가피했을 뿐 아니라 오히려 축복이었다"고 정당화하는 것은, 곧 인간생명과 존엄성을 벌레같이 짓밟으며 히틀러·스탈린이 거둔 소위 경제적 성공을 정당화하고 축복이었다고 하는 것과 전혀 다를 바가 없다.
일제가 조선사편수회 프로젝트를 통해서, 일방적으로 조선정신을 말살시키는 상황에서, 식민지 지식인 함석헌은 무력감 속에서, "나는 누구이고 조선인은 누구인가?"라는 처절한 자아발견의 고민을 할 수밖에 없었다. 조선민족 정체성의 위기, 자아상실의 위기가 도래한 것이다.
자아를 잃어버린다는 것은 곧 정체성, 정신의 파괴이고, 한 개인과 민족의 총체적 몰락이다. 아무리 용맹한 장수도 실성한 상태에선 전쟁터에서 제대로 싸울 수 없고 오합지졸이 될 수밖에 없다.
"불의와 편법이 강물처럼" 융성했고, 국가폭력이 난무했던 20세기 한국역사는 한국인들을 허무주의나 기회주의로 젖어들게 한 면이 강하다. 한평생 옳은 일을 추구한 의인의 끝은 결국 자기희생과, 풍비박산이라는 냉소주의적 풍토를 초래한 경우가 대부분이라 해도 과언이 아니다. 반면 합천 '일해공원'이나 '박정희기념관' 소동에서 볼 수 있는 것처럼, 수단방법을 가리지 않고 사람의 생명을 지렁이처럼 밟아버리는 독재자들을 여전히 수용하고 향수에 그리워하는, 병에 걸린 닭 같은 감상주의가 이 땅을 지금도 휩쓸고 있다.
기본적 도덕성마저 상실한 탈세한 억만장자가 선거에 압승하는 철저한 처세술과 도덕의 공동화가 오늘 한국인의 성공신화와 바람직한 가치관으로 받아들여지고 있다. 이른바 '엘리트'들의 상당수는 일신과 가정의 행복을 위한 가치를 사회정의나 진리추구를 위한 가치보다 더 '숭고하다'고 여기며, 철저하고 이기적인 기회주의자로 자리 잡았다. 저지른 범죄에 대한 수치심이나 죄책감을 잃은 지 오래고 오히려 당당하고 뻔뻔하다.
▲ 함석헌 선생.
ⓒ 김성수 함석헌
그래서 함석헌은 고민했을 것이다. "군사력, 무력, 돈이 없는 개인이나 민족은 과연 열등한 존재일까?"
그리고 그는 깨달았을 것이다. 사명감·문화·역사의식 없이는 한 민족의 자의식·정체성이 붕괴될 수밖에 없다는 것을. 그래서 그는 역사의 도덕성을 강조한다. "우주보다 귀한 한 인간의 생명"을 도구화하고 마음대로 빼앗은 것은 어떠한 명분으로도 정당화 될 수 없고, 정당화되어서도 안 된다.
인간사회의 근본을 이루는 것은 하나도 도덕성, 둘도 도덕성, 셋도 도덕성이기 때문이다.
그러나 이러한 도덕성의 가치를 경멸하고 이른바 실용성의 가치만 내세울 때 제2·제3의 뉴라이트교과서는 언제고 다시 우리 앞에 등장할 것이다.
덧붙이는 글 | 김성수 기자는 <함석헌 평전> 저자입니다.
2008.03.26 15:12 ⓒ 2008 OhmyNews
Thursday, February 28, 2008
During the Night
Listen to this. It's written by one of my students.
During the Night
The clock indicates midnight
I left my bed at last
I turn on the light
And break the peace to find you, the lastest.
Then I light my cigarette
Smoke fills in my heart
and it makes everything unclear, like fog, like a dream.
I'm opening my eyes, but I can't wake up
from the nightmare.
I just breathe in the reality
and breathe it out immeditely.
When the sun makes shadows again
eventually, I go back to my bed
only to cover myself.
- John.
During the Night
The clock indicates midnight
I left my bed at last
I turn on the light
And break the peace to find you, the lastest.
Then I light my cigarette
Smoke fills in my heart
and it makes everything unclear, like fog, like a dream.
I'm opening my eyes, but I can't wake up
from the nightmare.
I just breathe in the reality
and breathe it out immeditely.
When the sun makes shadows again
eventually, I go back to my bed
only to cover myself.
- John.
Friday, February 22, 2008
Dearest Daniel,
Dearest Daniel,
Thanks for your message that I only check this morning at my blog “alexandrakim.blogspot.com.”
Sure, let’s set up a time to meet up! (since you like mountain hiking, we should do that sometime! ^^)
Regarding talks on your future, I am not so sure how much I can help, but if there’s anything I can help you out with, I would feel more than glad to do so.
I also checked out your blog. It was absolutely fabulous! No wonder why you have such a good family! There were sweat and time you and your wife have spent into. I could definitely see from your blog.
Anyways, I am very grateful that you always show up at the class first, put all of our classmates together, and most of all, be a great role-model for all of us.
Many thanks,
Thanks for your message that I only check this morning at my blog “alexandrakim.blogspot.com.”
Sure, let’s set up a time to meet up! (since you like mountain hiking, we should do that sometime! ^^)
Regarding talks on your future, I am not so sure how much I can help, but if there’s anything I can help you out with, I would feel more than glad to do so.
I also checked out your blog. It was absolutely fabulous! No wonder why you have such a good family! There were sweat and time you and your wife have spent into. I could definitely see from your blog.
Anyways, I am very grateful that you always show up at the class first, put all of our classmates together, and most of all, be a great role-model for all of us.
Many thanks,
Friday, December 14, 2007
Happy Holiday!
Happy Holiday Season, Everyone!
How's everything with you and your beloveds around you?
Some of you, I still maintain to contact with, some I may have not. My apologies to those you haven't heard from me for a while.
Weather in Seoul has become chill over last few weeks, but not enough considering the average tempt. of the season.
Saturday, December 01, 2007
La Vie en Rose
Mon DieuMon Dieu
Edith Piaf
Paroles: Michel Vaucaire
Musique: Charles Dumont (1960)
Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu!
Laissez-le-moi
Encore un peu
Mon amoureux!
Un jour, deux jours, huit jours...
Laissez-le-moi
Encore un peu
A moi...
Le temps de s`adorer
De se le dire
Le temps de se fabriquer
Des souvenirs.
Mon Dieu! Oh oui... mon Dieu!
Laissez-le-moi
Remplir un peu
Ma vie...
Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu!
Laissez-le-moi
Encore un peu
Mon amoureux
Six mois, trois mois, deux mois...
Laissez-le-moi
Pour seulement
Un mois...
Le temps de commencer
Ou de finir
Le temps d`illuminer
Ou de souffrir
Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu!
Même si j`ai tort
Laissez-le-moi
Un peu...
Même si j`ai tort
Laissez-le-moi
Encore... Mon Dieu
Edith Piaf
Paroles: Michel Vaucaire
Musique: Charles Dumont (1960)
Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu!
Laissez-le-moi
Encore un peu
Mon amoureux!
Un jour, deux jours, huit jours...
Laissez-le-moi
Encore un peu
A moi...
Le temps de s`adorer
De se le dire
Le temps de se fabriquer
Des souvenirs.
Mon Dieu! Oh oui... mon Dieu!
Laissez-le-moi
Remplir un peu
Ma vie...
Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu!
Laissez-le-moi
Encore un peu
Mon amoureux
Six mois, trois mois, deux mois...
Laissez-le-moi
Pour seulement
Un mois...
Le temps de commencer
Ou de finir
Le temps d`illuminer
Ou de souffrir
Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu!
Même si j`ai tort
Laissez-le-moi
Un peu...
Même si j`ai tort
Laissez-le-moi
Encore... Mon Dieu
Monday, November 19, 2007
Thanksgiving Message.
When we count our many blessings;
It isn't hard to see that life's most valued treasures are the treasures that are free.
For it isn't what we own or buy that signifies our wealth.
It's the special gifts that have no price: our family, friends and health.
I'd like to take this opportunity to tell you just how much your friendship and love means to me.
Many of us have lost dear friends and loved ones this past year and our country as a whole has suffered great losses also.
In times like this, it gives us a chance to stop and reflect and think about what is really important to us in this life;
Just how precious and fragile it is, and to not waste what time we are given with the special people in our lives.
For myself, it is the gift of family and friends that are the riches in my life.
Those precious times that we hold dear to our heart and memories and special moments that can never be replaced, neither by time nor all the wealth in the world.
Whether you have planned a grand feast surrounded by friends and family, an intimate candlelight dinner for two, or a simple frozen dinner or takeout, it is not really the edible food, but rather who we share them with that counts most of all, and to me, this is the true value and meaning of Thanksgiving.
I will be thinking of each and every one of you during this season of Thanksgiving, and even though we may be seperated by miles, you will be close to me in my heart.
I give thanks for you all, friends and close loved ones.
You have touched my life in many ways and I am a very wealthy individual for this.
For those that have passed on to be with the Lord, I know there will be a special place for you in the hearts and minds of many of us as we observe Thanksgiving this year.
Please remember those who can't be with their loved ones.
God Bless You all,
Alexa
It isn't hard to see that life's most valued treasures are the treasures that are free.
For it isn't what we own or buy that signifies our wealth.
It's the special gifts that have no price: our family, friends and health.
I'd like to take this opportunity to tell you just how much your friendship and love means to me.
Many of us have lost dear friends and loved ones this past year and our country as a whole has suffered great losses also.
In times like this, it gives us a chance to stop and reflect and think about what is really important to us in this life;
Just how precious and fragile it is, and to not waste what time we are given with the special people in our lives.
For myself, it is the gift of family and friends that are the riches in my life.
Those precious times that we hold dear to our heart and memories and special moments that can never be replaced, neither by time nor all the wealth in the world.
Whether you have planned a grand feast surrounded by friends and family, an intimate candlelight dinner for two, or a simple frozen dinner or takeout, it is not really the edible food, but rather who we share them with that counts most of all, and to me, this is the true value and meaning of Thanksgiving.
I will be thinking of each and every one of you during this season of Thanksgiving, and even though we may be seperated by miles, you will be close to me in my heart.
I give thanks for you all, friends and close loved ones.
You have touched my life in many ways and I am a very wealthy individual for this.
For those that have passed on to be with the Lord, I know there will be a special place for you in the hearts and minds of many of us as we observe Thanksgiving this year.
Please remember those who can't be with their loved ones.
God Bless You all,
Alexa
Friday, November 09, 2007
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